South Africa: Justice Sector and the Rule of Law by unknown
South Africa
Justice Sector and the Rule of Law
A review by AfriMAP  
and  
Open Society Foundation for South Africa
OPEN SOCIETY FOUNDATION
Copyright © 2005 by the Open Society Foundation for South Africa. All rights reserved.
No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form, or by 
any means, without the prior permission of the publisher.
Published by:
Open Society Foundation for South Africa
ISBN: 1-920051-22-8
For more information, contact:
AfriMAP
Open Society Foundation
5th Floor, Cambridge House
100 Cambridge Grove
London, W6 OLE, United Kingdom
www.afrimap.org 
Open Society Foundation for South Africa
Colinton House, The Oval
1 Oakdale Road
Newlands, 7700, South Africa
www.osf.org.za
Design by: Jeanne Criscola/Criscola Design, New York
Layout and printing by: Compress, South Africa 
Cover image: Headband, 20th century Ndebele; South Africa Glass beads, ﬁber 20 1/4 x 2 1/2 in.
Collection of the Orlando Museum of Art, gift of Norma Canelas and William D. Roth
Contents
List of case studies v





1 Legal and institutional framework 3
A.  International law, the Constitution and national legislation 3
B.  Structure of the court system 15
C.  Reform of the legal sector 22
2 Government respect for the rule of law 25
A. The legislative process  25
B.  Executive compliance with the law 27
C.  Investigation of executive action: commissions of enquiry 32
D.  Pardons and amnesties 35
3 Management of the justice system  39
A.  Planning and ﬁnancial management  39
B.  Court administration 46
C.  Availability of legislation and jurisprudence 50
D.  Access to information about the courts 52
4 Independence and accountability of judges and lawyers 55
A. Judges and magistrates 55
B. Lawyers  66
5 Criminal justice 70
A. Protection from crime  70
B. Policing 73
C. Fair trial 85
D. Appropriate remedies and sentencing  92
E. Prisons  97
F.  Non-state action against crime  104
6 Access to justice 108
A. Knowledge of rights 108
B. Physical access 109
C.  Financial access 110
D.  Right to appear/jurisdictional restrictions  117
E.  Delays in court proceedings 118
F.  ‘Traditional’ justice systems  118
G.  Respect for court orders 122
H.   Ofﬁcial mechanisms to assert rights outside the court system 123
I.  Non-state mechanisms and alternative dispute resolution 131
7 Development assistance 132
 Annexes
Annex A: Human rights treaties  134
Annex B: Notable laws affecting the justice system 139
Annex C: Court structure 141
Annex D: Sources on management of the justice sector 146
Annex E: Policing in South Africa 148
S O U T H  A F R I C A :  J U S T I C E  S E C T O R  A N D  T H E  R U L E  O F  L AW     v
List of case studies
Successful institutional reform—sexual offences courts 23
Government’s failure to comply with the Grootboom judgment 31 
The Schabir Shaik and Jacob Zuma prosecutions 34
Media access to court hearings 53
Transformation of the judiciary in South Africa 62
The effect of the introduction of minimum sentencing on prison overcrowding 96
People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD) 106
Access to justice for immigration detainees 115
v i     S O U T H A F R I C A : J U S T I C E S E C T O R A N D T H E R U L E O F L A W
List of acronyms
AfriMAP Africa Governance Monitoring and Advocacy Project
ACDP African Christian Democratic Party
ANC African National Congress
APRM African Peer Review Mechanism
AWB  Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging
AU African Union
AZAPO Azanian People’s Organisation
CALS Centre for Applied Legal Studies
CSSDCA Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Co-operation in Africa
CPF Community Police Forum 
CSPRI Civil Society Prison Reform Initiative
CV Curriculum Vitae
DA Democratic Alliance
DoJCD Department of Justice and Constitutional Development
ENE Estimates of National Expenditure 
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
FXI Freedom of Expression Institute of South Africa 
HURISA  Human Rights Institute of South Africa
ICD Independent Complaints Directorate
ICESR International Covenant on Economic and Social Rights
IDASA Institute for Democracy in South Africa 
IFP Inkatha Freedom Party 
IPV Independent Prison Visitor 
JSC Judicial Services Commission
LLB Bachelor of Law degree
LSSA Law Society of South Africa 
MEC Member of the Executive Council (provincial executive)
MTEF Medium-Term Expenditure Framework 
MTSF Medium-Term Strategic Framework 
NDPP National Director of Public Prosecutions 
S O U T H  A F R I C A :  J U S T I C E  S E C T O R  A N D  T H E  R U L E  O F  L AW     v i i
NEC National Executive Council (of the ANC)
NEPAD New Partnership for Africa’s Development
NGO Non-governmental Organisation 
NICRO National Institute for Crime Prevention and the Reintegration of Offenders
NNP New National Party
NPA National Prosecuting Authority 
OAU Organisation of African Unity
OHCHR Ofﬁce of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights
OSF-SA Open Society Foundation for South Africa
PAGAD People Against Gangsterism and Drugs  
PAIA Promotion of Access to Information Act
PAJA Promotion of Administrative Justice Act
PEACA Peninsula Anti-Crime Agency
PLT Practical Legal Training course
Poslec Seta  Police, Private Security, Legal, Correctional Services and Justice Sector Education 
and Training Authority
SABC South African Broadcasting Corporation 
SAHA South African History Archive 
SAHRC South African Human Rights Commission 
SANDF South African National Defence Force
SANGOCO South African Non-Governmental Organisation Coalition 
SARS South African Revenue Service
SAPS South African Police Service
SCOPA Standing Committee on Public Accounts 
SIU Special Investigating Units  
TAC Treatment Action Campaign
TRC Truth and Reconciliation Commission
UN United Nations
USA United States of America
WLC Women’s Legal Centre 
v i i i   S O U T H A F R I C A : J U S T I C E S E C T O R A N D T H E R U L E  O F L A W
Acknowledgements
The preparation and ﬁnalisation of this report would not have been possible without the valuable 
contributions of a number of individuals and research organisations.
Key amongst these contributors is Anthea van der Burg (OSF-SA), who played many roles 
from researcher to editor to manager. Without her pivotal role, this report may yet be a work in 
progress.
Karla Saller undertook the task of legal editor and not only did a superb job, she enjoyed 
herself too.
Sean Tait and Louise Ehlers, senior members of staff at OSF-SA, contributed excellent 
research on the Criminal Justice System in South Africa.
A panel of researchers, comprised of the Human Rights Institute for South Africa 
(HURISA), the Institute for Security Studies, and Chaskalson and De Jong Associates, prepared 
sections of the report.
Bronwen Manby, executive director of AfriMAP, edited drafts of the report and made valu-
able contributions. 
Smita Choraria, programme assistant to AfriMAP, provided painstaking work in checking 
footnotes and summarising chapter contents, as well as contributing supplementary research 
and leading the report design.
Zohra Dawood, executive director of OSF-SA, provided intellectual guidance and valuable 
advice throughout the process.
Sincere appreciation is extended to all involved. 
S O U T H  A F R I C A :  J U S T I C E  S E C T O R  A N D  T H E  R U L E  O F  L AW     i x
Preface
The Africa Governance Monitoring and Advocacy Project (AfriMAP) of the Open Society 
Foundation was established in 2004 to monitor observance of standards relating to human 
rights, the rule of law and accountable government, by both African states and their development 
partners. 
African states have undertaken increasing commitments to good governance since the 
African Union replaced the Organisation of African Unity in 2002. Among these commit-
ments are the provisions of the Constitutive Act of the African Union, in which member states 
agree to promote human rights, democratic principles and institutions, popular participa-
tion and good governance. Other newly adopted documents include the New Partnership for 
Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), as well as 
the Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption. AfriMAP’s research is intended to 
facilitate and promote respect for these commitments by highlighting key issues, and providing 
a platform for national civil society organisations to engage in their own monitoring efforts. 
AfriMAP’s methodology is based on standardised reporting frameworks that link respect 
for good governance and human rights, to development that beneﬁts poor people. Through a 
process of expert consultation, AfriMAP has developed reporting frameworks in three thematic 
areas: the justice sector and the rule of law; political participation; and the delivery of public ser-
vices. The questionnaires that result, among them the questionnaire on the justice sector and the 
rule of law that guided this report, are available at the AfriMAP website: www.afrimap.org. 
The reports are elaborated by experts from the countries concerned, in close collaboration 
with the Open Society Institute’s network of foundations in Africa and AfriMAP’s own staff. 
Drafts of this report were reviewed by a range of experts, with their comments and criticisms 
reﬂected in the ﬁnal content.  The aim is that the reports should form a resource both for activists 
in the country concerned, and for others working across Africa, to improve respect for human 
rights and democratic values.
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Foreword
This report, South Africa: Justice Sector and the Rule of Law, comes at an important time for South 
Africa and the African continent. It is one of a set of reports initiated by AfriMAP that intend to 
go beyond describing the institutional arrangements in a constitutional democracy and reﬂect on 
the health and quality of democracy and governance in South Africa. In particular, these reports 
will measure South Africa’s compliance with the commitments undertaken since 2000 by the 
African Union and NEPAD’s African Peer Review Mechanism.
This report on the justice sector arises from a comprehensive questionnaire that beneﬁted 
from wide consultation and input, from within Africa and beyond.  Such continent-wide studies, 
as undertaken by AfriMAP, require much reﬂection on the state of the justice sector, commit-
ment and application of the rule of law, and on the main challenges and opportunities facing 
governments, civil society and regional and continental bodies in creating better outcomes for 
our societies.
Reﬂecting on the detailed information contained in the report, a number of key challenges 
have been identiﬁed. These include, amongst others:
• Weaknesses in domestication of international human rights treatises, as well as 
inconsistency in monitoring and reporting against those that have been ratiﬁed;
• The ongoing need for transformation of the judiciary, while respecting the 
independence of the courts from the executive;
• The need to reﬂect on the strengths and weaknesses of the major reforms undertaken 
in relation to the South African justice system since 1994, and to ensure that the new 
initiatives work as they were intended;
• The need for the executive to take steps to ensure that court judgments may challenge 
government policy, and also where they indicate a simple lack of administrative 
capacity to respect the law;
• The need to build and strengthen the civilian oversight of police;
• The need to promote an integrated approach to sentencing and improve the 
conditions of detention; and
• The need to ensure wider access to justice.
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Responding to the above would inform the ongoing business of the OSF-SA. It is hoped that 
the utility of the report lies in the richness of information it contains for use by practitioners and 
policymakers. Crucially too, the report should enrich discourse on the profound beneﬁts of com-
mitting to the principles eloquently set out in the NEPAD document.
In the words of the Solemn Declaration at the Conference on Security, Stability, Development 
and Co-operation in Africa (CSSDCA), ‘Democracy, good governance, respect for human and 
people’s rights and the rule of law are prerequisites for the security, stability and development of 
the continent.’
The conditions to meet the values set out in the CSSDCA exist in South Africa, on the part 
of both government and civil society. The ongoing transition in the country requires vigilance to 
address set-backs and challenges in order to guarantee and sustain a robust democracy.
Zohra Dawood
Executive director, OSF-South Africa
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Executive summary
South Africa’s legal and institutional landscape has changed remarkably since the end of apart-
heid in 1994. The 1996 Constitution contains a comprehensive Bill of Rights that includes socio-
economic as well as civil, political and cultural rights. Since 1994, South Africa has become party 
to most key international human rights instruments, and there has been substantial legal and 
institutional reform. However, despite the leaps and bounds made, a more systematic process is 
needed to domesticate the content of the international human rights treaties that South Africa 
has become party to, as the record to date is mixed, with partial domestication of international 
law only in speciﬁc cases. The Constitutional Court has heard over 50 cases challenging the con-
stitutionality of legislation (particularly pre-1994) and has played an important role in developing 
the law, including interpretation of economic and social rights provisions. 
Generally, since the new regime was established in 1994, the executive has not been viewed 
as frustrating the affairs of the judiciary or interfering in prosecutions, with the possible excep-
tion of the investigation and prosecution on corruption charges of the special adviser to Deputy 
President Jacob Zuma, and subsequently Zuma himself. Overall, there is a healthy tradition of 
judicial review of executive actions, though there have been some cases of government failure to 
comply with subsequent rulings. 
The Department of Justice and Constitutional Development (DoJCD) is the national gov-
ernment department responsible for the administration of justice, and since 1994, has been 
subject to substantial reorganisation. Budget and resource allocation to the DoJCD takes place 
at a national level, and the department regularly faces under-funding, leading to pressure on 
resources. Despite improvements in the department’s ﬁnancial management in recent years, 
ﬁscal accountability issues remain. Nonetheless, the courts are in a reasonable state of repair 
(though less so in rural areas), staff are generally punctually remunerated, and legislation and 
jurisprudence are publicly available. 
The separation of powers between the judiciary and executive is ﬁrmly enshrined in the 
1996 Constitution and also well recognised in South African case law. Since 1994, the appoint-
ment process for judges and magistrates has been substantially revised, greatly increasing insti-
tutional protection for the independence of the judiciary. Constitutional provisions also require 
progress in achieving racial and gender transformation. Although a large number of black judges 
have been appointed since 1994, white judges are still in the majority, in part a reﬂection of 
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the limited number of suitable black candidates for appointment. To date, there have been no 
accounts of direct interference in the independence of the judiciary from the executive, although 
controversy over afﬁrmative action has led some to voice concerns that a rapidly accelerated 
process of transformation could lead to a decline in the quality and independence of judges. 
South Africa continues to face an extremely high violent-crime rate, and issues relating to 
policing and prisons remain in need of attention, despite the substantial progress made since 
1994. 
Prior to 1994, the South African Police Service (SAPS) was in effect an enforcer of the 
apartheid state, and since then reform has been far-reaching. Rigorous training of ofﬁcers has 
been introduced, accountability mechanisms set up (both civilian oversight secretariats and the 
Independent Complaints Directorate), and a ‘prevention of torture’ policy instated. However, 
public lack of faith in SAPS persists, due in part to limited access to policing in traditionally black 
areas, as well as continuing allegations of abuse, corruption and poor service delivery. 
Prison overcrowding has become an increasing cause for concern, reﬂecting an extremely 
high incarceration rate. Although this cannot be attributed to any one factor, it has led to debate 
on the effects of minimum sentencing as introduced under the 1997 Criminal Law Amendment 
Act, and exploration of alternative sentencing options. Widespread delays in bringing cases to 
court are also contributing to prison overcrowding. 
The right to a fair public hearing of any dispute is constitutionally enshrined, and also 
outlined in several international and regional treaties to which South Africa is party. However, 
despite efforts to introduce small claims procedures, an active set of organisations involved in 
public-interest litigation and the expanding mandate of the Legal Aid Board to include civil cases, 
the ﬁnancial cost of legal proceedings remains a signiﬁcant barrier to realising equal access to 
justice. In particular, the cost of legal professional services remains unaffordable to the average 
South African, contributing to the continuing popularity of traditional courts as a practical forum 
for dispute resolution, especially in rural areas. 
A number of independent oversight institutions were established by Chapter 9 of the 1996 
Constitution, most notably the South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC). Although 
these institutions do provide alternative avenues of recourse for individuals, their effectiveness 
has been criticised, with issues such as overlapping mandates and a lack of adequate parliamen-
tary support being raised.
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1
Legal and institutional framework
South Africa’s legal and institutional landscape has changed remarkably since the end of apart-
heid in 1994. The 1996 Constitution contains a comprehensive Bill of Rights that includes socio-
economic as well as civil, political and cultural rights. Since 1994, South Africa has become party 
to most key international human rights instruments, and there has been substantial legal and 
institutional reform. However, despite the leaps and bounds made, a more systematic process is 
needed to domesticate the content of the international human rights treaties that South Africa 
has become party to, as the record to date is mixed, with partial domestication of international 
law only in speciﬁc cases. The Constitutional Court has heard over 50 cases challenging the con-
stitutionality of legislation (particularly pre-1994) and has played an important role in developing 
speciﬁc areas of law, including interpretation of economic and social rights provisions.
A. International law, the Constitution and national legislation
Since the end of white minority rule in 1994, South Africa has transformed its legal and consti-
tutional rights framework, becoming party to the majority of international and African human 
rights treaties and adopting a Constitution that includes a wide-ranging Bill of Rights. In addi-
tion, there has been widespread reform of national legislation.
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International law
Although South Africa has become party to most of the important international human 
rights instruments,1 some key human rights treaties have not been signed and/or ratiﬁed.  In 
common with other countries that receive many migrant workers, South Africa has not signed 
the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and 
Members of Their Families. Nor has it signed either the Optional Protocol to the Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, which allows individuals 
to lodge complaints with the UN committee monitoring respect for the convention, or the 
Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture, which seeks to establish a system of regular 
visits undertaken by independent international and national bodies in order to prevent torture 
and ill-treatment.2 Three important treaties have been signed but not ratiﬁed, including the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (signed on 3 October 1994); the 
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, on the involvement of children 
in armed conﬂict (signed on 8 February 2002); and the Convention on the Political Rights of 
Women (signed on 29 January 1993).  All human rights treaties ratiﬁed since 1994 have been 
accepted without reservation.3 
South Africa’s failure to ratify the International Covenant on Economic and Social Rights in 
particular is perplexing, given that South Africa’s Constitution in fact contains a more detailed set 
of commitments. However, it may be that the government sees practical difﬁculties in comply-
ing with both sets of obligations—constitutional and international law—simultaneously, given 
differing interpretations of state responsibilities in this area. 
The negotiation and signing of all international agreements is an executive function. 
However, in terms of the Constitution, an international agreement will generally only bind 
1 See Annex A: List of human rights treaties supplied by the ofﬁce of the chief state law adviser (international law), Department 
of Foreign Affairs; supplemented by electronic and telephonic communication on 15 March 2005. In particular, South Africa is a 
party to ﬁve of the seven most important treaties in the international human rights system: the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (signed on 3 October 1994, ratiﬁed on 10 December 1998); the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (signed on 29 January 1993, ratiﬁed on 10 December 1998); the Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (signed on 29 December 1993, ratiﬁed on 15 December 1995); 
the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (signed on 3 October 1994, ratiﬁed on 10 
December 1998); and Convention on the Rights of the Child (signed on 29 January 1993, ratiﬁed on 16 June 1995). The two to 
which South Africa is not a party are the Migrant Workers Convention and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights. South Africa is also a party to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (signed on 9 July 1996, ratiﬁed 
on 9 July 1996); its protocols on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (signed on 9 June 1999, 
ratiﬁed on 3 July 2002); on the Rights of Women in Africa (signed on 16 March 2004, ratiﬁed on 17 December 2004); and to the 
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (signed on 10 October 1997, ratiﬁed on 7 January 2000).  
2 South Africa has also not signed the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples’ Convention or the Convention on the Non-Applicability of 
Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity.
3 It is possible for a declaration clarifying a country’s position to accompany the ratiﬁcation of or accession to a treaty. South Africa 
has done this in at least three cases, namely the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination 
(signed on 3 October 1994, ratiﬁed on 10 December 1998); the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (signed on 
3 October 1994, ratiﬁed on 10 December 1998); and the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (signed on 29 January 1993, ratiﬁed on 10 December 1998). Mostly, South Africa has pointed to the 
fact that the Constitution imposes more stringent requirements than the treaty in question. 
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the republic in its interaction with other states after it has been approved by both houses of 
Parliament. Once Parliament has approved the treaty, the executive may then ratify a signed 
treaty or accede to it.  An international agreement only becomes binding within the republic 
once it is enacted into national law, unless it is ‘self-executing’, in which case it becomes law upon 
being approved by both houses of Parliament.4 International law generally acts as an interpreta-
tive tool for national law.5
There has been no systematic process of domesticating international human rights treaties 
once they are ratiﬁed or acceded to. Nonetheless, partial domestication of international law has 
taken place in speciﬁc instances: for example the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Racial Discrimination has been enacted into national law through the Promotion of Equality 
and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act,6 and the Convention on the International Criminal 
Court has been enacted into national law through the Implementation of the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court Act.7 In addition, since 2004 the Department of Justice and 
Constitutional Development (DoJCD) has begun taking steps to develop legislation that domes-
ticates all human rights obligations under international treaties, where compatible with the 
Constitution.8  Equally, there is no systematic mechanism to ensure that laws which conﬂict with 
treaty obligations are identiﬁed, removed or amended. However, the South African Law Reform 
Commission has recently conducted an audit of the constitutionality of the laws in force.9
Since South Africa’s constitutional democracy was introduced in 1994, only one case has 
been lodged against South Africa with an international human rights body. The Centre for 
Human Rights at the University of Pretoria has lodged a communication before the African 
4 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (Act 108 of 1996), Section 231: 
International agreements
(1) The negotiating and signing of all international agreements is the responsibility of the national executive.
(2)  An international agreement binds the republic only after it has been approved by resolution in both the National Assembly 
and the National Council of Provinces, unless it is an agreement referred to in Subsection (3).
(3) An international agreement of a technical, administrative or executive nature, or an agreement which does not require either 
ratiﬁcation or accession, entered into by the national executive, binds the republic without approval by the National Assembly 
and the National Council of Provinces, but must be tabled in the assembly and the council within a reasonable time.
(4) Any international agreement becomes law in the republic when it is enacted into law by national legislation; but a self-execut-
ing provision of an agreement that has been approved by Parliament is law in the republic, unless it is inconsistent with the 
Constitution or an act of Parliament.
(5) The republic is bound by international agreements, which were binding on the republic when this Constitution took effect.
Available at http://www.info.gov.za/documents/constitution/index.htm.
5 Ibid., Section 39(1)(b) requires a court to consider international law when it interprets the Bill of Rights. Section 233 requires 
a court to prefer a reasonable interpretation of legislation that is consistent with international law, over an interpretation that is 
not.
6 The Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act, 2000 (Act 4 of 2000), in the Government Gazette Vol. 
416, No. 20876, 9 February 2000.
7 Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Act, in the Government Gazette, 2002 (Act 27 of 2002), 
Vol. 445, No. 23642, 18 July 2002.
8 Interview with John Makubela, Director of International Affairs, DoJCD, Pretoria, 15 December 2004.
9 See further below, p.9 Legislation.
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Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the treaty body under the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights, invoking freedom of religion and conscience as guaranteed in 
Article 8 of the African Charter. The case concerns the use of marijuana for religious purposes 
among Rastafarian people, which remains illegal in South Africa.10 The government has lodged 
a response and is awaiting the commission hearing to present its case.11 
The government is failing to submit timely reports under its reporting obligations under 
international human rights treaties. For example, after submitting its initial report in 1998 to 
the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, South Africa has failed to submit two 
subsequent periodic reports according to schedule.  The government has submitted its initial 
reports on its adherence to the following conventions:  UN Convention on the Rights of the 
Child (4 December 1997); International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (2 December 2004); and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (5 February 1998).12 At the time of writing, South Africa was yet 
to submit its initial and periodic reports to treaty bodies of the Convention against Torture and 
other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights.  It would appear that the lack of a dedicated unit to compile these 
documents is a contributing factor in the late submission of reports. At present, the International 
Affairs Directorate within the DoJCD is responsible for compiling these reports. Its inability to 
complete the work on time suggests that further capacity needs to be built in this directorate, or 
indeed, that a separate, dedicated directorate needs to be created.
The Constitution
During the apartheid era, South Africa followed a doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. Since 
Parliament was the supreme law-giver, courts could not test the content of legislation but only 
that it was passed in accordance with the correct procedure and that the executive complied 
with its provisions. Since 1994, South Africa has a system of constitutional democracy based on 
a supreme Constitution, which includes a comprehensive Bill of Rights.13 The courts are now 
obliged to test laws against the requirements of the Constitution and ‘must declare that any law 
or conduct that is inconsistent with the Constitution is invalid to the extent of its inconsistency 
…’.14
The Constitution was developed through a consultative process led by a Constitutional 
Assembly. The Constitutional Assembly consisted of members of the National Assembly and 
10 The Constitutional Court upheld the criminalisation of marijuana use, in all circumstances, in Prince v The Cape Law Society and 
Others 2002 (2) SA 794 (CC), 2002 (3) BCLR 231 (CC).
11 Interview with John Makubela, Director of International Affairs, DoJCD, Pretoria, 15 December 2004;  Gareth Anver Prince v South 
Africa, 255/2002, lodged at the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, on 12 August 2002.
12 Further information on reporting status can be viewed at the Ofﬁce of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(OHCHR) website, available at  http://www.unhchr.ch/TBS/doc.nsf/NewhvVAllSPRByCountry?OpenView.
13 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (Act 108 of 1993), Chapter 2.
14Ibid., Section 172(1).
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the Senate, who were elected in the ﬁrst non-racial elections in 1994. It was governed by basic 
principles adopted in the 1993 Interim Constitution, and it was agreed between the parties to 
the negotiations leading up to South Africa’s ﬁrst democratic elections.15 The Constitutional 
Assembly undertook public consultation through hearings and consultative meetings with dif-
ferent sectors.16 Submissions were received from a variety of groups, including the legal frater-
nity, women, local communities, traditional structures, business sectors, labour, the land sector, 
media, arts and culture, youth and disabled and children’s rights groups.17 The assembly also 
received 1 990 334 submissions from members of the public.18 Several books have been written 
on the process, including an analysis of the argument for the inclusion or exclusion of different 
social and economic rights.19
The Constitutional Assembly initially adopted a constitutional text on 8 May 1996 and 
referred it to the Constitutional Court for certiﬁcation in terms of the provisions of the Interim 
Constitution.20 During proceedings before the Constitutional Court, political parties, interest 
groups and private persons were permitted to submit representations. The Constitutional Court 
refused to ratify several sections in what became known as the ‘ﬁrst certiﬁcation judgment’.21 
The Constitutional Assembly then passed an amended text on 11 October 1996, which was then 
certiﬁed by the Constitutional Court on 4 December 1996 in what is known as the ‘second cer-
tiﬁcation judgment’.22 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, came into force 
on 4 February 1997.
The Constitution contains an extensive Bill of Rights in Chapter 2, including civil, political, 
cultural and socio-economic rights.23 In addition to the vertical application of the rights against 
state organs, Section 8(2) provides that a right contained in the Bill of Rights may also apply hori-
zontally between natural or juristic persons ‘if, and to the extent that it is applicable, taking into 
15 The Interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1993 (Act 200 of 1993), available at http://www.polity.org.za/html/
govdocs/legislation/1993/constit0.html?rebookmark=1.
16 The address by the chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly, Mr. C Ramaphosa, during Parliamentary Brieﬁng Week, 14 
February 1996, available at http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/1996/f26constass.htm. 
17 The address by President Nelson Mandela to the Constitutional Assembly on the occasion of the adoption of the New 
Constitution, Cape Town, 8 May 1996, available at http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/1996/960513_Ox764.htm. 
18 Constitutional Assembly: Views expressed by Past. Willie Viljoen of AGS, 29 April 1996, available at  http://www.info.gov.
za/speeches/1996/960430_Ox513.htm.
19 Hassen Ebrahim, The Soul of a Nation: Constitution-making in South Africa, Oxford University Press, Cape Town, 1998; TRH 
Davenport, The Birth of a New South Africa, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1998;   Siri Gloppen, South Africa: The Battle over 
the Constitution, UNESCO, Brookﬁeld, 1997; Paul Bell (ed), The Making of the Constitution: The Story of South Africa’s Constitutional 
Assembly, May 1994 to December 1996, Churchill Murray Publications for the Constitutional Assembly, Claremont, 1997;  Per 
Strand, Decisions on Democracy: the Politics of Constitution-making in South Africa, Uppsala University, Uppsala, 2000.
20 The Interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1993 (Act 200 of 1993).
21In re Certiﬁcation of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC), (on certiﬁcation of the interim 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1993, (Act 200 of 1993)).
22Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly; In re Certiﬁcation of the Amended Text of the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa, 1996, 1997 (2) SA 97 (CC).
23 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (Act 108 of 1996), Chapter 2.
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account the nature of the right and the nature of any duty imposed by that right’. Rights in the 
Bill of Rights are subject to a limitation clause in Section 36, which requires that any limitation 
of a right must be ‘reasonable and justiﬁable in an open and democratic society based on human 
dignity, equality and freedom…’.24 Section 7(2) of the Constitution requires that the state ‘must 
respect, protect, promote and fulﬁl the rights in the Bill of Rights’, thereby imposing a positive 
duty on the state to realise these rights.
The Constitution also contains provisions on courts and the administration of justice in 
Chapter 8. The chapter includes provisions vesting judicial authority in the courts;25 provisions 
outlining the judicial system and the different types of courts;26 provisions on court procedures;27 
provisions on the appointment, terms of ofﬁce, remuneration and removal of judicial ofﬁcers;28 
provisions on the Judicial Service Commission;29 and provisions on the prosecuting authority.30 
There are also speciﬁc provisions in the Bill of Rights that apply to the courts and the justice 
sector. In particular, the articles on access to courts;31 the rights of arrested, detained and accused 
persons;32 enforcement of rights;33 and the interpretation of the Bill of Rights,34 contain provisions 
aimed directly at courts and the justice sector broadly. 
In Chapter 9, the Constitution establishes a range of independent and impartial state 
institutions which aim to ‘strengthen constitutional democracy’.35 Of these institutions, the 
South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC),36 the Commission for the Promotion and 
Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities37 and the Commission 
for Gender Equality38 are speciﬁcally tasked with the protection and promotion of human rights, 
and with particular monitoring and reporting functions relating to human rights.
The South African Constitution has been hailed as the most progressive in the world, an 
accolade based on its extensive social and economic rights provisions. The Constitution protects 
the following social and economic rights:
24 Ibid., Section 36(1).
25 Ibid., Section 165(1).
26 Ibid., Section 166.
27 Ibid., Section 171.
28 Ibid., Sections 174 to 177.
29 Ibid., Section 178.
30 Ibid., Section 179.
31 Ibid., Section 34.
32 Ibid., Section 35.
33 Ibid., Section 38.
34 Ibid., Section 39.
35 Ibid., Section 181.
36 Ibid., Section 184.
37 Ibid., Section 185.
38 Ibid., Section 187.
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• Environmental rights;39
• Property rights;40
• The right to access adequate housing;41
• The right to access healthcare, food, water and social security;42
• An extensive children’s rights provision that includes the right to basic nutrition, 
shelter, basic healthcare services and social services;43 and
• The right to basic and further education.44
In many cases, constitutional protection extends to providing access to social and economic 
rights only: the duty imposed on the state is to take reasonable steps, within available resources, 
to achieve their progressive realisation. Other rights are not subject to this qualiﬁcation, includ-
ing the right to education and children’s rights provisions.45 The Constitutional Court considered 
the inclusion of socio-economic rights in its ﬁrst certiﬁcation judgment and conﬁrmed their 
inclusion in the Bill of Rights. 
Legislation
Many of the most egregious laws violating international human rights norms were repealed by 
the former government of South Africa during the transition to democracy between 1990 and 
1994, or by the 1993 Interim Constitution that came into effect when the new government took 
ofﬁce in 1994. Nevertheless, there remain laws in force that are not in compliance with South 
Africa’s international obligations or the Constitutional Bill of Rights. At the transition, all laws 
remained in force subject to action by the legislature, which can repeal or amend any law, or a 
declaration of constitutional invalidity by the Constitutional Court.46
39 Ibid., Section 24. 
40 Ibid., Section 25.
41 Ibid., Section 26.
42 Ibid., Section 27.
43 Ibid., Section 28.
44 Ibid., Section 29.
45 See Danie Brand, ‘Introduction to socio-economic rights in the South African Constitution’, in Danie Brand and Christof Heyns 
(eds), Socio-economic Rights in South Africa, Pretoria University Law Press, 2005.
46 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (Act 108 of 1996), Item 2 of Schedule 6 (Transitional arrangements), 
provides for the continuity of laws during the transition to the new Constitution. Item 2 reads:
2 Continuation of existing law
(1) All law that was in force when the new Constitution took effect, continues in force, subject to –
 (a) any amendment or repeal; and
 (b) consistency with the new Constitution.
(2) Old order legislation that continues in force in terms of sub-item (1) –
 (a) does not have a wider application, territorially or otherwise, than it had before the previous Constitution took effect,  
  unless subsequently amended to have a wider application; and
 (b) continues to be administered by the authorities that administered it when the new Constitution took effect, subject  
  to the new Constitution.
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Parliament has been effective in passing legislation required by the Constitution, and 
thereby creating a legislative framework in which the courts, the National Prosecuting Authority 
(NPA), the independent institutions established under Chapter 9 of the Constitution and other 
constitutionally mandated bodies can function.47
In addition, the South African Law Reform Commission completed in July 2004 an audit 
into post-1909 legislation that is still in force. This audit examined only primary legislation 
and is the ﬁrst step in a project aimed at examining the constitutional compliance of existing 
legislation, customary law and common law.48 An effort has been made to address shortcom-
ings in a thematic manner. Repeal and replacement of the Interpretation Act49 of 1957 and 
the Black Administration Act50 of 1927 have been recognised as priorities by the Law Reform 
Commission.51 In July 2005, a bill to repeal the Black Administration Act was introduced to 
Parliament: since not all of the provisions of the act can be repealed without replacement, the 
bill envisages the repeal of some of the provisions immediately, and others when new laws 
provide substitute mechanisms to manage the matters that the act has governed up to now. The 
Recognition of Customary Marriages Act52 has been in effect since November 2000, and the 
Law Reform Commission is developing legislation to recognise Islamic marriages.53 Challenges 
to laws on the basis of the Constitution have also led to particular provisions of legislation being 
overturned (see ‘Constitutional challenges to the law’, p.12). 
However, to date, there has been no systematic repeal of colonial or apartheid laws that 
conﬂict with the Constitution, and the Law Reform Commission has drafted papers mostly as a 
result of lobbying efforts by civil society.
At a departmental level, the review conducted by the National Department of Provincial 
and Local Government of legislation affecting local government, is probably the most extensive 
statute law-revision exercise carried out to date. This project, which was completed in April 2002, 
reviewed over 1 000 legislative instruments and over 8 000 provisions for redundancy against 
the new framework legislation on local government.54 A similar review was conducted of the 
Gauteng statute book in 2003, this time for redundancy against new national legislation, includ-
ing the Constitution.55
47 See Annex B for some of the key pieces of legislation giving effect to the provisions of the Constitution.
48 Interview with Hendrick Potgieter, Researcher for Project 25, South African Law Reform Commission, Pretoria, 17 January 
2005.
49 The Interpretation Act, 1957 (Act 33 of 1957).
50 The Black Administration Act, 1927 (Act 38 of 1927). 
51 The South African Law Reform Commission, Annual Report 2002/03, p.25.
52 The Recognition of Customary Marriages Act, 1998 (Act 120 of 1998), No. R. 1101, in the Government Gazette No. 21700, 1 
November 2000. 
53 The South African Law Reform Commission, Project 59: Islamic Marriages and Related Matters.
54 Ashira Consulting (Pty) Ltd and the Centre for Applied Legal Studies, ‘Review of Legislation Affecting Local Government’, April 
2002.
55 Ashira Consulting (Pty) Ltd and Centre for Applied Legal Studies, ‘Gauteng Statute Law Revision Project: Final Narrative Report’, 
June 2003.
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The most comprehensive, cross-department, statute law-revision exercise was an audit of 
the entire national, provincial and local government statute book to assess the extent of compli-
ance with the constitutional right to just administrative action. This 2004 study, commissioned 
by the German Agency for Technical Co-operation, concluded that 97 per cent of the provisions 
dealing with administrative action on the statute book were ‘supplementable’, in the sense that 
the provisions of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (PAJA) could be used 
to bring them into line with the Constitution. Two per cent of the provisions were found to be 
compliant with PAJA, and less than one per cent non-compliant and unfair.56
Despite these various law-reform efforts, there remain signiﬁcant areas of the statute book 
that still bear the marks of South Africa’s apartheid past. The Freedom of Expression Institute 
of South Africa (FXI) has registered its concern over several pieces of legislation impacting on 
freedom of expression. In several reports it has submitted that the Regulation of Gatherings 
Act,57 which was passed in 1993 and came into force in 1996, allows local government agen-
cies to prohibit demonstrations and assemblies.58 The FXI has also raised concerns that the 
Criminal Procedure Act59 permits the subpoena of journalists compelling them to testify and/or 
to reveal their sources. In 2003, it published an opinion on the constitutionality of several acts, 
all of which were passed during the political upheaval of the 1980s or earlier, which it argues 
impermissibly impact on freedom of expression.60 Included in this list were the Defence Act, the 
Internal Security Act, the Intimidation Act, the National Key Points Act, the National Supplies 
Procurement Act and the Protection of Information Act.61 
The Internal Security Act62 was repealed by the Protection of Constitutional Democracy 
Against Terrorist Activities Act,63 which came into operation on 20 May 2005. The Protection of 
Constitutional Democracy Against Terrorist and Related Activities Act was passed after heated 
debate in Parliament and much opposition from organisations representing civil society. The act 
is not as intrusive as similar legislation which has been passed in many other countries, includ-
ing the United States, Great Britain, Canada and Australia. It does not permit the detention 
56 See Jonathan Klaaren, ‘An audit of administrative action and the South African statute book: Research methods and conceptual 
issues’, South African Journal of Public Law, Vol. 19, 2004, pp.532-542.
57 The Regulation of Gatherings Act, 1993 (Act 205 of 1993).
58 The FXI Anti-Censorship Programme, Third progress report to the Open Society Foundation for South Africa, March 2004, FXI 
Annual Report 2003/04, Annual Report 2002/03, available at www.fxi.org.za.
59 The Criminal Procedure Act, 1977 (Act 51 of 1977), Section 205.
60 The FXI Anti-Censorship Programme, Opinion on Legislation Affecting Freedom of Expression in South Africa, January 2003.
61 The Defence Act, 1957 (Act 44 of 1957); the Internal Security Act, 1982 (Act 74 of 1982); the Intimidation Act, 1982 (Act 72 of 
1982); the National Key Points Act, 1980 (Act 102 of 1980); the National Supplies Procurement Act, 1970 (Act 89 of 1970); and 
the Protection of Information Act, 1982 (Act 84 of 1982). One of the most notorious pieces of South African legislation, used 
extensively by the apartheid government to suppress political activity and protest, the Public Safety Act and regulations issued 
in terms of it, was repealed with effect from October 1995.  The Public Safety Act, 1953 (Act 3 of 1953), repealed by the State of 
Emergency Act, 1995 (Act 86 of 1995). No. 1546, 6 October 1995.
62 The Internal Security Act, 1982 (Act 74 of 1982).
63 The Protection of Constitutional Democracy Against Terrorist Activities Act, 2004 (Act 33 of 2004), in the Government Gazette, 
Vol. 476, No. 27266, 11 February 2005.
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without trial of suspects or the proscription of organisations. However, the deﬁnition of ‘terror-
ist activity’ is very broad and vague. It overlaps with a wide range of common law and statutory 
offences, including common assault, public violence, intimidation, sedition and treason. The 
broadness and vagueness of the deﬁnition makes uncertain the kinds of activity that now fall 
under the rubric of ‘terrorist activity’. Uncertainty of the reach of the legislation arguably makes 
it vulnerable to challenge, on the basis that it fails to comply with the principle of legality. 
It is likely that there are still several apartheid-era statutes, and many more individual pro-
visions on the South African statute book, that are not only contrary to the Bill of Rights and 
international human rights norms, but also offensive to the majority of South Africans. For 
this reason, the Law Reform Commission’s recently announced project on cleansing the statute 
book of all provisions that are considered to be unconstitutional, redundant or obsolete, is to be 
welcomed. For this initiative to succeed, however, it needs to be combined with a comprehensive 
system to assess the impact of regulations adopted by the executive, in accordance with the laws 
passed by Parliament.  
Constitutional challenges to the law
Only superior courts (high courts and above—see below for description of court structures) have 
constitutional jurisdiction. Where a constitutional point is raised in a lower court, proceedings 
are suspended and the question referred to a high court. A high court has the power to declare 
legislation unconstitutional, but an order of this kind must be conﬁrmed by the Constitutional 
Court before it has any effect.64 Section 172(1)(b) of the Constitution provides that all courts with 
jurisdiction have wide remedial powers when deciding a constitutional matter, namely the power 
to ‘make any order that is just and equitable’.
Section 39(1)(b) of the Constitution provides that, when interpreting the Bill of Rights, 
‘a court, tribunal or forum … must consider international law’. A review of the Constitutional 
Court’s decisions from 1995 to the end of 2004 reveals that this provision has not resulted in 
international law being considered as much as might have been expected, with international law 
being considered in detail in only 14 per cent of cases.65 Nevertheless, the same study praised the 
Constitutional Court for its openness to international law, which, in comparison with Australia, 
appears far-sighted and generous.
Reference is often made to rulings in other jurisdictions (Section 39(1) of the Constitution 
also allows a court to consider foreign law when interpreting the Bill of Rights), although more 
attention is paid to the easily accessible judgments of developed countries, as opposed to devel-
oping or African countries.  Comparative law has remained of persuasive value only and the 
focus in South Africa’s constitutional jurisprudence has been on the text of the South African 
Constitution.
The Constitutional Court has heard over 50 cases challenging the constitutionality of 
64 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (Act 108 of 1996), Sections 167(5) and 172(2). 
65 Devika Hovell & George Williams, ‘A tale of two systems: The use of international law in constitutional interpretation in 
Australia and South Africa’, University of Melbourne Law Review, 2005.
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speciﬁc provisions in legislation. The majority of these cases have challenged pre-1994 legisla-
tion. In roughly half of the cases, the court has ruled against the legislation. 
Two areas of law in particular have experienced signiﬁcant development through the 
Constitutional Court, namely the customary law of succession and the law relating to marriage. 
In the Bhe66 case, in which the South Africa Human Rights Commission intervened as amicus 
curiae, the Constitutional Court declared that Section 23 of the Black Administration Act67 and 
Section 1(4)(b) of the Intestate Succession Act68 were unconstitutional and invalid. It also declared 
that the rule of male primogeniture, as it applies in African customary law to the inheritance of 
property, is inconsistent in terms of the Constitution and invalid to the extent that it excludes 
or hinders women and extra-marital children from inheriting property. The estate of a black 
deceased person now devolves as does that of a white person. 
The Constitutional Court has contributed to bringing existing legislation in line with the 
Constitution, by recognising same-sex life partnerships as equivalent to marriage for certain 
purposes,69 by reading provisions into the Children’s Status Act,70 the Child Care Act,71 the Aliens 
Control Act,72 and the Judges’ Remuneration and Conditions of Employment Act,73 among 
others. The Supreme Court of Appeal has developed the common law in a similar manner.74
The court has also heard a number of cases challenging the validity of actions or decisions 
of different governmental authorities, including local government and provincial government, 
as well as the national executive. In the Pharmaceuticals case,75 the Constitutional Court stated 
clearly that the courts’ judicial review of the exercise of public power by the executive and other 
administrative bodies is a constitutional matter, and as such will always be subject to the jurisdic-
tion of the Constitutional Court.
The role of the Constitutional Court in the interpretation of the economic and social rights 
provisions of the Bill of Rights has been particularly important, given the groundbreaking nature 
of the protection to economic and social rights in South Africa’s Constitution, with two notable 
cases being the 2001 Grootboom case and the 2002 Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) case. 
66 Bhe and Others v Magistrate, Kayelitsha and Others; Shibi v Sithole and Others; South African Human Rights Commission and 
Another v President of the Republic of South Africa and Another 2005 (1) BCLR 1 (CC).
67 The Black Administration Act, 1927 (Act 38 of 1927).
68 The Intestate Succession Act, 1987 (Act 81 of 1987).
69 For example in J and Another v Director General, Department of Home Affairs, and Others 2003 (5) SA 621 (CC); Satchwell v 
President of the Republic of South Africa and Another 2003 (4) SA 266 (CC); Du Toit and Another v Minister of Welfare and Population 
Development and Others 2003 (2) SA 198 (CC); and National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Home Affairs and 
Others 2000 (2) SA 1 (CC).
70 The Children’s Status Act, 1987 (Act 82 of 1987).
71 The Child Care Act, 1983 (Act 74 of 1983).
72 The Aliens Control Act, 1991 (Act 96 of 1991).
73 The Judges’ Remuneration and Conditions of Employment Act, 2001 (Act  47 of 2001).
74 Du Plessis v Road Accident Fund, 2004 (1) SA 359 (SCA). 
75 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA and Another: In re Ex Parte President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 
2000 (2) SA 674 (CC).
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In the case of Grootboom,76 the Constitutional Court was asked to consider the demands of 
a community for which the state had made inadequate housing provision in an emergency situ-
ation. The court found that the state’s failure to provide relief in emergency situations, where it 
was in its power to do so, was in contravention of the right to access to adequate housing, con-
tained in Section 26(1) of the Constitution. The court made it clear that government could not 
avoid its responsibilities towards the most vulnerable segment of the population, and must take 
effective steps towards the progressive realisation of socio-economic rights. This did not mean 
that socio-economic rights had to be immediately and fully realised, but it did require active 
engagement on behalf of government.
In the case of the Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (TAC),77 the Constitutional 
Court held that government was under an obligation to embark on reasonable legislative and 
other measures in the furtherance of socio-economic rights. The court declared that the govern-
ment was not fulﬁlling its responsibilities and ordered it to do so, requiring the department to 
provide a comprehensive programme to prevent mother-to-child transmission of HIV. The court 
issued a detailed order, saying that unless equally effective measures became available and were 
incorporated into the government’s policy, the government was obliged to:
(a) Remove the restrictions that prevent Nevirapine [an anti-retroviral drug] from being 
made available for the purpose of reducing the risk of mother-to-child transmission of 
HIV, at public hospitals and clinics that are not research and training sites. 
(b) Permit and facilitate the use of Nevirapine for the purpose of reducing the risk of 
mother-to-child transmission of HIV and to make it available for this purpose at 
hospitals and clinics, when in the judgment of the attending medical practitioner 
acting in consultation with the medical superintendent of the facility concerned, this 
is medically indicated, which shall if necessary include that the mother concerned has 
been appropriately tested and counselled. 
(c) Make provision if necessary for counsellors, based at public hospitals and clinics other 
than the research and training sites, to be trained (in) the counselling necessary for 
the use of Nevirapine to reduce the risk of mother-to-child transmission of HIV. 
(d) Take reasonable measures to extend the testing and counselling facilities at hospitals 
and clinics throughout the public health sector, to facilitate and expedite the use of 
Nevirapine for the purpose of reducing the risk of mother-to-child transmission of 
HIV.
The TAC (and other public interest organisations) have on numerous occasions complained that 
government continues to comply only reluctantly and partially with this order, and have also 
76 Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC). Also, see case-study on 
Grootboom, p.31.
77 Minister of Health and Others v Treatment Action Campaign and Others (No 2) 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC).
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highlighted the difﬁculties faced in obtaining information regarding the implementation.78
There are different views on the courts’ approach to litigation-enforcing rights and its record 
in the last ten years. The government argues that the court judgments have largely reﬂected a 
progressive interpretation of the Constitution and social rights.79 There is academic argument, 
however, that the record(s) of the Constitutional Court on socio-economic rights demonstrates 
a reluctance to interfere with state decisions made in the context of scarce resources. Dennis 
Davis, a judge in the Cape High Court, argues in particular that the court has refused to follow 
the ‘minimum core content’ approach favoured by the relevant United Nations bodies; and (has) 
shown an unwillingness to grant structural interdicts.80 Others have been disappointed at the 
Constitutional Court’s weak interpretation of the children’s rights provisions of the Constitution.81 
On the other hand, it has also been argued that the Constitutional Court has legitimately been 
wary of the ‘minimum core content’ approach to economic and social rights, and has instead 
focused on ‘seeking to protect the interests of vulnerable sectors of society, while also leaving the 
primary responsibility for co-ordinating socio-economic programmes in the hands of the state’.82 
It would be fair to conclude that the courts have been open to rights litigation generally, although 
cautious in addressing social and economic rights. 
B. Structure of the court system
South Africa’s court system has been substantially revised since 1994, but is still in the process 
of transformation and there remain aspects of the old system still to be reorganised. Section 166 
of the Constitution sets out the court structure in the republic,83 and sections 167 to 170 establish 
and provide for these courts. A table of relevant laws applying to each court, supplied by the 
78 Mail & Guardian, 16 March 2004; TAC Newsletter, 3 December 2004; Joint statement COSATU/TAC, 23 February 2005; AIDS 
Budget Unit Annual Report 2002, 2003 & 2004, IDASA; ‘TAC, Health Department Lock Horns’, The Star, 3 November 2004.
79 Policy Co-ordination and Advisery Services—The Presidency, Towards a Ten Year Review—Synthesis report on the Implementation 
of Government Programmes (Discussion document), October 2003, pp. 45-46.
80 Dennis Davis, ‘Socio-economic rights in South Africa: the record of the Constitutional Court after 10 years’, ESR Review, Vol. 
5, No. 5, Dec 2005.
81 Paula Proudlock, Children’s Socio-Economic Rights: Do they have a right to special protection? Available at http://communitylaw-
centre.org.za/ser/esr2002/2002sept_special.php.
82 Murray Wesson, ‘Grootboom and beyond: Reassessing the socio-economic jurisprudence of the South African Constitutional 
Court’, South African Journal on Human Rights, Vol. 20, No. 2, 2004, p.285. See also, Marius Pieterse, ‘Coming to terms with 
judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights’, South African Journal on Human Rights, Vol. 20, No. 3, 2004.
83Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (Act 108 of 1996), Section 166:
Judicial system
The courts are –
(a) The Constitutional Court;
(b) The Supreme Court of Appeal;
(c)  The high courts, including any high court of appeal that may be established by an act of Parliament to hear appeals from 
high courts;
(d) The magistrates’ courts; and
(e)  Any other court established or recognised in terms of an act of Parliament, including any court of a status similar to either 
the high courts or the magistrates’ courts.
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DoJCD, is attached as Annex C.84  
In terms of Item 16(6)(a) of Schedule Six of the Constitution, ‘all courts, their structure, 
composition, functioning and jurisdiction, and all relevant legislation, must be rationalised 
with a view to establishing a judicial system suited to the requirements of the Constitution’. The 
Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development must, after consultation with the Judicial 
Services Commission (JSC), manage this process, which is ongoing.
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
Apex court for constitutional issues located in Johannesburg
SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL
Apex court for non-constitutional issues located in Bloemfontein
HIGH COURTS
10 provincial divisions and 3 local divisions
REGIONAL MAGISTRATES’  COURTS
DISTRICT MAGISTRATES’  COURTS
Current court structure
(excluding special courts established by legislation)85
The Constitutional Court, created as a new institution in 1994, is situated in Johannesburg 
and is the highest court in all constitutional matters. It deals solely with constitutional matters, 
including whether the conduct of the president, the executive and the acts of Parliament are con-
sistent with the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. Its decisions are binding on all persons and 
84 See Annex C: Court structure, also available at http://www.doj.gov.za/2004dojsite/ab_dojcd/2001_courtstructures.htm.
85 Much of the information contained in the text below is derived from the Government of South Africa website, www.gov.za, with 
particular information on the courts and the justice sector generally to be found at http://www.info.gov.za/aboutgovt/justice/
courts.htm and http://www.info.gov.za/aboutgovt/justice/admin.htm respectively.
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organs of state,86 as well as on all other courts. It is headed by the chief justice of South Africa 
and further comprises a deputy chief justice and nine other judges.87 
While the Constitutional Court is generally speaking an appeal court, Section 167 of the 
Constitution provides that the Rules of the Constitutional Court may provide for direct access 
to the court where this is in the interests of justice, as well as for direct appeal from any other 
court to the Constitutional Court, thereby allowing a litigant to ‘leapfrog’ over the ordinary appeal 
process.88 In both instances, a litigant must show why the court should grant direct access in 
the interests of justice, and the court has held in numerous cases that this will not easily be 
granted.89 In practice, however, the direct access provisions have been strictly interpreted, and the 
Constitutional Court receives on average only 50 cases a year, of which it decides roughly half. 
The Supreme Court of Appeal, situated in Bloemfontein, is the highest court in respect of 
all other matters, and was the highest court for all matters before 1994 (when it was known as 
the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court). It is composed of the president, deputy president 
and a number of judges to be determined by national legislation. This legislation has not yet 
been passed, and the Supreme Court Act of 195990 remains the only legislation regulating the 
Supreme Court of Appeal and the high court divisions. Currently, there are 15 permanent and six 
acting judges of appeal on the bench. The quorum of the Supreme Court of Appeal is usually ﬁve 
judges. The court has jurisdiction to hear and determine an appeal against any decision of a high 
court division. Decisions of the Supreme Court of Appeal are binding on all courts of a lower 
order. The relationship between the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal has 
not been entirely problem-free, and remains a matter of debate.91
In 2001, the Interim Rationalisation of Jurisdiction of High Courts Act92 partially ratio-
nalised the jurisdictions of the high court divisions inherited from the previous government. 
Although it repeals the First Schedule to the Supreme Court Act, which established the high 
court divisions in accordance with the previous geographical set-up of provinces and so-called 
self-governing territories, it also provides that ‘the seats and the areas of jurisdiction of the high 
courts referred to in the said First Schedule shall … remain as they were immediately before the 
86 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (Act 108 of 1996), Section 165(5).
87 Ibid., Section 167 (1).
88 See also the Constitutional Court Complementary Act, 1995 (Act 13 of 1995), Section 16; and Rule 18 of the Rules of the 
Constitutional Court, 2003, No. R. 1675, in the Government Gazette No. 25726, 31 October 2003. 
89 For example, see S v Pennington and Another 1997 (4) SA 1076 (CC); Bruce and Another v Fleecytex v Johannesburg CC and Others 
1998 (2) SA 1143 (CC); MEC for Development Planning and Local Government, Gauteng v DP and Others 1998 (4) SA 1157 (CC); 
Moseneke and Others v The Master and Another 2001 (2) SA 18 (CC); and National Education Health and Allied Workers Union v 
University of Cape Town and Others 2003 (3) SA 1 (CC).
90 The Supreme Court Act, 1959 (Act 59 of 1959).
91 See for example, the programme for a 2004 Department of Justice Colloquium, available at http://www.doj.gov.za/2004dojsite/
cfw/colloquium/framework.htm.
92 Interim Rationalisation of Jurisdiction of High Courts Act, 2001 (Act 41 of 2001), in the Government Gazette Vol. 438, No. 22893, 
5 December 2001.
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commencement of this act’.93 Consequently, there are ten provincial divisions (although they 
do not follow the current division of the republic into nine provinces) and three local divisions. 
Each provincial division, with the exception of the Venda Supreme Court, is headed by a judge 
president who also bears responsibility for a local division within its geographical jurisdiction. 
Decisions of the high courts are binding on magistrates’ courts within the respective areas 
of jurisdiction of the divisions.  A decision by a high court is subject to appeal, usually to the 
Supreme Court of Appeal. 
Current location of high court divisions
Name of court Location
Ciskei Bisho
Orange Free State Bloemfontein
Cape of Good Hope Cape Town
Durban and Coast local division Durban
Eastern Cape Grahamstown








One noticeable feature of the South African court system since 1994, has been a rapid increase 
in the number of specialist courts.  In addition to the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court of 
Appeal and  the provincial and local divisions of the high court, there now exist at superior court 
93 Ibid., Section 4(2).
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level the following courts: the labour court and the labour appeal court,94 the land claims court,95 
the electoral court,96 the competition appeal court,97 special (consumer) courts,98 and the income 
tax courts.99 Of these, only the special (consumer) courts and the income tax courts existed before 
1994.  Other specialist courts, such as dedicated sexual offences courts and maintenance courts, 
as well as equality courts established under the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair 
Discrimination Act 2000, have been created by giving ordinary courts specialist functions. 
These specialist courts have been created with the aim of improving the delivery of justice in 
relation to the matters over which they have jurisdiction, especially in the context of a judiciary that 
in 1994 was almost wholly white and male and entirely appointed by the previous government. 
These new courts have played an important role in ensuring that policies designed to reverse the 
effect of apartheid laws would not be struck down by apartheid-era judges. The land claims court, 
for example, was established in 1996 to adjudicate matters arising from the government’s land-
reform programme, a highly controversial area given South Africa’s history of land expropriation. 
Nevertheless, the record of the land claims court tends to suggest that appointing judges with 
human-rights credentials to specialist courts is a necessary but not sufﬁcient condition for pro-
gressive legal transformation, and that a change in professional legal culture is also required.  In 
one well-known case, the land claims court turned down the claim of an indigenous community 
to its ancestral land, only for this decision to be overturned by the non-specialist Supreme Court 
of Appeal.100 In another case, it appeared to reverse an earlier precedent that had protected female 
farm workers as tenants in their own right.101 
94 Established under the Labour Relations Act, 1995 (Act 66 of 1995) and with exclusive jurisdiction to hear disputes under the 
act. Judges are either of the high court or lawyers of ten years standing and with special expertise in labour law.  Appeals from the 
labour court are made to the labour appeal court, and from there to the Supreme Court of Appeal.  
95 The land claims court was established in 1996. It is a specialist court which hears disputes arising from the  Restitution of Land 
Rights Act, 1994 (Act 22 of 1994); the Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act, 1996 (Act 3 of 1996); and the Extension of Security 
of Tenure Act, 1997 (62 of 1997). Appeals lie to the Supreme Court of Appeal and, in appropriate cases, to the Constitutional 
Court. Aspects of the court’s jurisdiction and proceedings are peculiar to the functions it performs, for example, it may conduct 
any part of its proceedings on an informal or inquisitorial basis and it may convene hearings in any part of the country to make 
it more accessible. 
96 An electoral court is provided for by Section 18 of the Electoral Commission Act 51 of 1996, and consists of three judges and 
two other persons appointed by the president, with the responsibility to adjudicate electoral disputes and hear appeals from 
decisions of the Electoral Commission. 
97 Established by Section 36 of the Competition Act 89 of 1998.
98 Established by Section 13 of the Consumer Affairs (Unfair Business Practices) Act 71 of 1988, these courts operate on an ad 
hoc basis.
99 Special income tax courts are set up under the Income Tax Act of 1962, within divisions of the high court, and consist of a judge 
of the high court, assisted by an accountant of not less than ten years’ standing and a representative of the business community. 
This court deals with high-value disputes between a taxpayer and the South African Revenue Service. Appeals are made directly 
to the Supreme Court of Appeal.
100 Richtersveld Community v Alexkor Ltd 2001 (3) SA 1293 (LCC), and Richtersveld Community v Alexkor Ltd 2003 (6) SA 104 (SCA). 
See also, Theunis Roux, ‘Pro-poor court, anti-poor outcomes: Explaining the performance of the South African Land Claims 
Court’, South African Journal on Human Rights, Vol.20, No.4, 2004.
101 Die Landbou Navorsingsraaad v Klaasen, LCC Case 83R/01 (unreported, 29 October 2001).
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The Superior Courts Bill, introduced to Parliament in 2003 and still being debated, intends 
to complete the process of rationalisation for the superior courts (that is, the high courts and 
above), repealing the Supreme Court Act of 1959 and consolidating the laws relating to the 
Constitutional Court, Supreme Court of Appeal and high courts into a single act of Parliament.102 
The bill also provides for the restructuring of the existing high courts into a single High Court 
of South Africa, comprising one division in each province, with the exception of Gauteng, 
where there will be two divisions. It will also abolish the labour court and labour appeal court, 
giving jurisdiction in labour matters to the high court and instead establishing a panel of spe-
cially selected judges within the high court, who may hear labour matters.  A bill to amend the 
Constitution accordingly has also been introduced.103 
The lower courts comprise regional and district magistrates’ courts. Magisterial districts 
have been grouped into 13 clusters, each headed by a chief magistrate, or in a few cases, by a 
senior magistrate. Regional courts deal solely with serious criminal matters, such as murder, 
rape or armed robbery. District courts deal with a variety of matters, but the bulk of the work is 
made up of civil or criminal matters. The district courts may not sentence an individual to more 
than three years’ imprisonment, and civil matters may not be heard where the quantum of the 
dispute exceeds R100 000. All lower cases in both district and regional courts may be subject to 
review or appeal by the high court.
Courts structures are not equitably distributed and effective throughout the country. In par-
ticular, specialist courts tend to be based in urban centres. In 1999, the then Minister of Justice 
and Constitutional Development, Dr Penuell Maduna, acknowledged several problems with 
regards to the efﬁciency of the courts in a presentation before Parliament. In this presentation, 
the minister discussed problems in terms of quality of court accommodation in townships and 
rural areas. He also outlined problems in acquiring the required personnel and magistrates in 
these areas.104
In an attempt to address these issues, the DoJCD has publicly sought to strengthen and 
standardise court services delivery, which includes building new courts, upgrading existing 
court facilities, training court personnel and investigating the need for new court facilities.105 
The department also runs an Additional and Saturday Court Project,106 aimed at reaching areas 
where insufﬁcient court resources exist. In 2003, 72 courts participated in this project, ﬁnalising 
23 836 cases.107 
102 The Superior Courts Bill, (B52-2003).
103 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Amendment Bill, (B 60-2003).
104 The DoJCD, Matters arising from the Statement by the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development on the Efﬁciency 
of the Courts, 9 September 1999, available at http://www.doj.gov.za/2004dojsite/reports/1999reports/courtefﬁciency/1999_
courtsefﬁciency.htm#4.
105 The DoJCD, Annual Report 2003/04,  pp.28-32.
106 Parliamentary question to Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development, additional courts, 2003, available at  http://
www.doj.gov.za/2004dojsite/parliament_qa/2003/pqas/qa_hr_18.htm.
107 The DoJCD, Annual Report 2003/04,  pp.29-30.
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Prominent among the new court structures are the equality courts, established by the 
Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act (No. 4 of 2000), with the 
aim of providing remedies to victims of discrimination by both public and private institutions; 
in the context of South Africa, especially of racial discrimination. Equality courts are specialised 
chambers within the existing system of high courts (automatically designated so by the act) and 
magistrates’ courts (staff must have training before they can receive that status)—though in prac-
tice most cases will be brought before magistrates’ courts. The act provides for procedural and 
evidentiary rules that aim to maximise access to justice, and for a number of different remedies 
that aim to improve and educate offenders, rather than merely punish them. The ﬁrst courts 
began operating in June 2003. By June 2005, more than 200 equality courts had been desig-
nated and more than 800 magistrates trained on the implementation of the act.
As with the other specialist courts that must be incorporated and accommodated within the 
existing court infrastructure, the equality courts are likely to be constrained by a lack of human 
resources: trained personnel are scarce and already overworked. It is early to evaluate the opera-
tion of the equality courts, but the record so far is somewhat mixed in terms of the ability of 
potential complainants to access the system. Although the experience of the land claims court 
indicates that a change in legal culture may be necessary for these new institutions to be effective, 
the equality courts are potentially powerful tools for an effort to end discrimination. Several of 
the early cases have received high-proﬁle media attention, placing pressure on those accused of 
discrimination to reach a settlement.108
In May 2004, President Mbeki used his ‘State of the Nation’ address to Parliament to iden-
tify as a priority the establishment of at least two ‘community courts’ in each province, based on a 
pilot project established at Hatﬁeld, in Tshwane.109 Community courts are district courts that deal 
with the same cases as normal district magistrates’ courts (that is, less serious crimes); the dif-
ference lies in the way the courts are intended to be integrated with other services. In particular, 
community courts are to handle offences relating to drug and alcohol abuse; offences relating to 
municipal by-laws; and petty offences like theft. Offenders will be dealt with immediately and the 
idea is that sentences other than imprisonment or ﬁnes should, where possible, be considered 
and imposed.  In addition, court services are supposed to be integrated into an array of social 
support and control mechanisms created by community members. By the end of 2004, such 
community courts were in the process of being established at twelve locations.110
The Open Society Foundation for South Africa (OSF-SA) has funded the evaluation of 
108 Information from Philippa Lane, ‘South Africa’s Equality Courts: An early assessment’, Race and Citizenship in Transition 
Series, Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, 2005. See also, Speech by Minister for Justice and Constitutional 
Development, Ms BS Mabandla, 21 June 2005, available at http://www.doj.gov.za/2004dojsite/m_speeches/sp2005/2005_06_
21_eqcourts.html. 
109 Thabo Mbeki, ‘State of the Nation’ Address, 2004, available at http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/2004/04052111151001.htm. 
110 The Open Society Foundation for South Africa, Evaluation of the Western Cape Community Courts, Cape Town, July 2005, p.9; 
Institute of Criminology, Social Justice Resource Project Position Paper: Specialist Courts & Community Courts, University of Cape Town, 
Cape Town, May 1997; deputy Minister for Justice and Constitutional Development, address at the ofﬁcial launch of the Western Cape 
Community Courts, 7 December 2004, available at http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/2004/04121010151002.htm. 
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community courts and will be looking more speciﬁcally at the recent implementation of special-
ist courts. The intention in setting up the specialist courts appears to have been to ensure that 
justice is made more accessible and that cases are heard by adjudicators with relevant expertise. 
However, there are questions as to whether these specialist courts do in fact ensure that justice is 
more accessible and, more importantly, whether this method of justice is cost effective or simply 
diverts expenditure, leaving the regular court system under-funded.
In addition to the court structures described above, traditional or chiefs’ courts exist in most 
of the former ‘homeland’ areas that were designated for black Africans under the apartheid 
system.111
C.  Reform of the legal sector
Although there have been wide-ranging and important reforms of the laws governing the courts 
since 1994, there has been no systematic review of all laws governing the courts. Reform has 
taken place on a piecemeal basis. The reform process has been driven by the South African Law 
Reform Commission, judgments of the courts, constitutional obligations and the judiciary itself 
in some instances. Important reforms include the rationalisation of the different apartheid divi-
sions into a single judicial system, rationalising different legal aid systems, recognising attorneys 
from different apartheid divisions and providing for judges’ and magistrates’ remuneration and 
greater independence.
Law reform is the responsibility of the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development. 
The South African Law Reform Commission is an advisery body established to renew and 
improve the law of South Africa.112 While anyone may submit proposals for law reform to the Law 
Reform Commission, the Law Reform Commission also identiﬁes reform matters to investigate. 
A preliminary enquiry is instituted to justify taking up the matter. The Law Reform Commission 
then produces and disseminates an ‘Issue Paper’ outlining the existing legal position, any prob-
lems that must be addressed, an international comparative study and suggested options for 
reform. The Issue Paper is the basis for public consultation with the aim of establishing the most 
suitable solution. A ‘Discussion Paper’ contains the preliminary results of research, including 
public comment and a proposed solution usually in the form of draft legislation. This paper is 
also subject to public comment before a full report on the investigation, ﬁnal recommendations 
and draft legislation is submitted to the minister.113
Post-1994 reform of criminal and civil procedure has been more systematic. The Law Reform 
Commission has several projects reviewing these areas, including Project 73: Simpliﬁcation of 
Criminal Procedure; Project 25: Statute Law; Project 82: Sentencing; and Project 90: Customary 
Law. While investigations are ongoing, legislation has already been passed addressing bail 
111 See further below, Section 6.F, on ‘Traditional’ Justice Systems,  p.118.
112 The South African Law Act, 1973 (Act 19 of 1973). The members of the Law Reform Commission are appointed by the president; 
the commission was substantially reconstituted following 1994, to better reﬂect South Africa’s racial and religious diversity.
113 The South African Law Reform Commission, Thirtieth Annual Report 2002/03, Pretoria, March 2003,  pp.8-9.
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matters, appeal matters and regulating plea bargains.114
The reform of the legal sector has been slow. The department has justiﬁed the delays by 
pointing out that it attempts to achieve consensus amongst key role-players, which has resulted 
in these delays.115 Legislation regulating the legal practice has also been prolonged since 2001. 
The legislation has been prolonged because of strong differences within the legal profession116 
on a range of matters, including the recognition of paralegal practice and the powers of speciﬁc 
regulatory bodies. 
Case study:  Successful institutional reform—sexual offences 
courts
The sexual offences courts are lauded by the DoJCD as an example of successful institutional 
reform. These courts, which are ordinary establishments but with special facilities and offering 
support for vulnerable witnesses, were ﬁrst piloted in 1993, as a response to civil society calls 
for a criminal justice system that was more sensitive to victims of sexual violence during trials.
The ﬁrst sexual offences court in Wynberg, near Cape Town was created in 1993, as the con-
ceptual model. It provides suitable facilities including separate consultation rooms, waiting 
rooms, toilet facilities and camera facilities. The court model requires collaboration between 
different role-players who all contribute to effective service provision: social workers, district 
surgeons, members of the child-protection unit, professionals and NGOs that provide support 
services. The effectiveness of the court also requires training of relevant personnel. 
Throughout the years, the sexual offences courts have, however, been criticised for a range of 
weaknesses. Initial concerns about the slow roll-out process became more detailed concerns 
about implementation in speciﬁc courts. A 2001 assessment of the sexual offences courts 
in Wynberg and Cape Town found the courts to have inadequate human, ﬁnancial and other 
resources, and inadequate physical facilities. Support services provided by NGOs were found 
to be wanting, while cross-sectoral training and intersectoral co-ordination were identiﬁed as 
areas that required improvement. A later review argues that the sexual offences courts con-
tinue to depend primarily on donor funding.
Despite these criticisms, there is wide consensus that these courts have a higher conviction 
rate than normal courts—up to 63 per cent. By 2004 a Sexual Offences Court Strategy and 
Blueprint was approved by the DoJCD. A National Project Oversight Committee had been 
established to co-ordinate role-players at a senior departmental level. Fifty-three permanent 
114 See also Annex B: List of notable laws affecting the justice system.
115 The DoJCD, Annual 2003/04, p.5.
116 Parliamentary question to Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development: Legal Profession, 2003, available at http://www.
doj.gov.za/2004dojsite/parliament_qa/2003/pqas/qa_lp_53.htm.
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courts and 19 additional courts have since been established. Personnel have been contracted 
to function as intermediaries, court-preparation ofﬁcials and victim assistants. Work has also 
been done to co-ordinate training, including the development of guidelines for prosecutors in 
sexual offences courts and the development of an intersectoral Child Law Manual.
Ongoing improvements have made the sexual offences courts a primary example of insti-
tutional reform in the justice sector. Combined with improvements in the caseﬂow and 
information-management systems of the department, the courts have been able to ‘respond to 
the needs of women and children’.
S O U R C E S :
Mastoera Sadan, Lulama Dikweni, Shaamela Cassiem, Pilot Assessment: The Sexual Offences Courts in Wynberg and 
Cape Town, and related services, IDASA, 2001;
Penny Parenzee, Investigating the Implications of Ten Years of Democracy for Women: The Role of the Department of 
Justice and Constitutional Development, IDASA, 2004; and
The DoJCD, Annual Report 2003/04.
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2 
Government respect  
for the rule of law
Generally, since the new regime was established in 1994, the executive has not been viewed as 
frustrating the affairs of the judiciary or interfering in prosecutions, with the possible excep-
tion of the controversy surrounding the investigation and prosecution on corruption charges of 
the special adviser to former Deputy President Jacob Zuma, and subsequently Zuma himself. 
Overall, there is a healthy tradition of judicial review of executive action, though there have been 
some cases of government failure to comply with subsequent rulings. 
A. The legislative process 
In general, the South African government upholds international, constitutional and legal stan-
dards when generating laws. 
However, one instance in which legislation was passed that was widely regarded as serving 
the ruling party’s interests, was the introduction in early 2002 of a law to allow Members of 
Parliament from one party to ‘cross the ﬂoor’ and join another party.  The New National Party 
(NNP) sought to leave an alliance it had entered into with the opposition Democratic Alliance 
(DA), and instead enter into an alliance with the ruling party, the African National Congress 
(ANC). But under existing legislation and constitutional provisions, members of the NNP would 
lose their elected seats when they left the DA, under whose name they had been elected.  In June 
2002, Parliament passed four pieces of legislation that would change the Constitution to allow 
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ﬂoor-crossing at national, provincial and local level.117 
There was strong resistance to the ﬂoor-crossing legislation, as opposition parties stated 
that it was passed out of political expediency for the ANC.118 The Constitutional Court, however, 
decided in favour of the government on most points, in a case brought to challenge the laws, and 
stated that the motives of the parties supporting the legislation were not relevant to the question 
of whether the acts were constitutional.119 But it declared the Loss or Retention of Membership 
of National and Provincial Legislatures Act120 unconstitutional, because it had not followed 
the correct procedure through Parliament. The procedure that was followed was allowed only 
for a ‘reasonable period’, after the Constitution came into effect in 1996. Three years into 
Parliament’s second term, and six years after the Constitution came into effect, was too long to 
be a ‘reasonable period’. Parliament then passed the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 
Amendment Act 2 at the beginning of 2003. The Amendment Act had a very similar content to 
the Membership Act, and this time the proper procedure was followed. 
Concerns have been raised about the apparent lack of consultation with stakeholders in the 
passing of regulations (which are the rules for detailed implementation of an act, and in terms 
of Section 239 of the Constitution are regarded as ‘national legislation’). Regulations have been 
subject to judicial review of administrative action under the common-law system, and the prevail-
ing opinion is that they remain so under the recently passed Promotion of Administrative Justice 
Act (PAJA).121 This means that their adoption must be procedurally fair. The most recent case has 
seen pharmaceutical groups challenge the legality of regulations122 to the Medicines and Related 
Substances Act,123 among other things, on the basis that their formulation and adoption was 
procedurally unfair. The Supreme Court of Appeal has ruled in favour of the applicants, agreeing 
that the regulations extend beyond the ambit of the original legislation, and that the consultation 
process was ﬂawed.124 The case has been appealed to the Constitutional Court.
117 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Amendment Act, 2002 (Act 18 of 2002) in the Government Gazette Vol. 444, 
No. 23542, 20 June 2002; Local Government: Municipal Structures Amendment Act, 2002 (Act 20 of 2002) in the Government 
Gazette Vol. 444, No. 23543, 20 June 2002; the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Second Amendment Act, 2002 (Act 
21 of 2002) in the Government Gazette Vol. 444, No. 23544, 20 June 2002; and Loss or Retention of Membership of National and 
Provincial Legislatures Act, 2002 (Act 22 of 2002).
118 Donwald Pressly, ‘Floor-crossing: Bad news for opposition’, Mail & Guardian, 21 September 2004.
119 United Democratic Movement v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others (No. 2) (ACDP and Others intervening; 
Institute for Democracy in South Africa and Another as amicus curiae) 2003 (1) SA 495 (CC).
120 The Loss or Retention of Membership of National and Provincial Legislatures Act, 2002, (Act 22 of 2002).
121 The Promotion of Administrative Justice Act, 2000 (Act 3 of 2000) in the Government Gazette Vol. 416, No. 20853, 3 February 
2000.
122 Regulations relating to a transparent pricing system for medicines and scheduled substances, made in terms of Section 22G 
of the Act and promulgated on 30 April 2004.
123 The Medicines and Related Substances Act, 1965 (Act 101 of 1965).
124 Pharmaceutical Society of South Africa and Others: New Clicks (Pty) Limited v Minister of Health and Another: Tshabala-Msimang 
NO and Another, 542/04, 543/04 SCA.
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B.  Executive compliance with the law
The government has not always been successful in complying with the requirements of its own 
new laws. A particularly concerning instance is the only very gradual implementation of the 
Promotion of Access to Information Act (PAIA), which was passed in 2000 and came into force 
in 2001. PAIA is a groundbreaking piece of legislation that requires government organs to make 
information available regarding their operations. The act envisages a central role for the South 
African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC), including the drafting of a guide on how to use 
the act,125 and to receive reports from other public bodies concerning statistics of requests made 
and to provide guidelines for such reporting.126 The SAHRC is also required to include in its 
annual report to Parliament a section on the implementation of the act.127 The guide was eventu-
ally published and launched on 1 March 2005, and distribution of the guide was taking place in 
phases at the time of writing.128 Furthermore, despite the fact that Section 32 of the act came into 
effect in March 2001, there was still widespread non-compliance with reporting requirements 
in 2003, which was the ﬁrst year that the SAHRC actively sought compliance with the act’s 
requirements.129 The South African History Archive (SAHA), a non-governmental organisation, 
has published an assessment of the compliance of public bodies with the reporting requirement 
contained in Section 32 of PAIA, and concludes that a large number of public bodies have not 
submitted reports as required and that there are considerable problems with the reports that 
were submitted.130 The SAHA points out that the country’s three most populous provinces, 
the Eastern Cape, Gauteng and KwaZulu-Natal did not report to the SAHRC, and all but three 
municipalities failed to submit reports.131
The Department of Home Affairs has also been criticised for its administration of the 
Refugees Act.132   Reports by organisations working on refugee and asylum-seeker issues show 
that the department has failed to process applications for asylum under the refugee status-
determination process, within the requisite 180 days.133 The result has been a backlog of applica-
125 The Promotion of Access to Information Act, 2000 (Act 2 of 2000), Sections 10 & 83, in the Government Gazette Vol. 416, No. 
20853, 3 February 2000.
126 Ibid., Section 32.
127 Ibid., section 83, read with Section 185(5) of the Constitution.
128 Information obtained via telephone from SAHRC, 20 March 2005. 
129 The SAHRC Annual Report 2002/3.
130 Rolf Sorenson,  Statistics with respect to the Promotion of Access to Information Act (PAIA): Report to National Assembly by 
Human Rights Commission pursuant to section 84(b) of PAIA, South African History Archive, 2003, available at http://www.wits.
ac.za/saha/publications/FOIP_2_1_Sorensen.pdf.
131 Ibid. p. 3.
132 The Refugees Act, 1998 (Act 130 of 1998), in the Government Gazette Vol. 402, No. 19544, 2 December 1998.
133 Lee Anne de la Hunt, Tracking Progress: Initial Experiences with the Refugees Act 130 of 1998, researched for the National 
Consortium for Refugee Affairs, Johannesburg, September 2002, pp. 36–37; Human Rights Committee of South Africa, ‘Access 
to Justice—Focus on Refugees and Asylum Seekers’, Quarterly Review, Braamfontein, March 2001, pp. 1-5; the Community Agency 
for Social Enquiry, National Refugee Baseline Survey, researched for United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the 
Japan International Co-operation Agency,  Johannesburg, November 2003, pp. 93-96.
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tions, which have an adverse effect on an asylum seeker’s ability to exercise his or her rights as 
protected under the Constitution, particularly accessing social services and ﬁnding employment 
legally. 
Compliance with court orders 
In general, actions by the executive and by its members in the course of their ofﬁcial duties have 
always been subject to scrutiny by the courts. The 1957 State Liability Act provides that a wrong-
doing by a ‘servant of the state’, in principle, will give rise to a claim in contract or delict against 
the state, as long as he or she was acting within the scope of his or her employment.134 However, 
where a speciﬁc action is authorised by statute, it cannot be wrongful and this may prevent a 
successful claim in delict, since wrongfulness is an element of delictual liability. Nevertheless, the 
former Appellate Division pointed out that an administrative body does not have immunity from 
liability simply because damage was caused ‘in the course of implementing a general policy’.135 
Since 1994, the Constitution has given substantial new grounds to the courts to review leg-
islation and executive action against the standards of the Bill of Rights and other provisions. As 
noted above, the Constitutional Court has been active in ruling on a wide range of cases.
In particular, Section 33 of the Constitution has given speciﬁc protection to the right to ‘just 
administrative action’, thus entrenching the power of the courts to engage in judicial review of 
administrative action.136 The Promotion of Administrative Justice Act (PAJA)137 has been passed 
to give effect to this right, as required by Section 33(3) of the Constitution. The act builds on a 
long tradition of judicial review of the exercise of public power by the courts, under the pre-
1993 common law. In terms of Section 33 and the PAJA, however, only ‘administrative action’ 
is reviewable. This has led the courts to develop the principle of legality, to denote a standard of 
conduct that has to be complied with when bodies are exercising public power that does not 
qualify as administrative action, and thus falls outside the scope of Section 33.138 The principle of 
legality is a constitutional principle implied in the rule of law entrenched as a founding provi-
sion of the Constitution.139 The exercise of public power by members of the executive and other 
bodies is routinely reviewed against the standards contained in Section 33 and the PAJA, as well 
134 The State Liability Act, 1957 (Act 20 of 1957). See also Mohlomi v Minister of Defence 1996 (12) BCLR 1299 (CC); 1997 (1) 124 
(CC), relating to damages arising from a shooting.
135 East London Western District Farmer’s Association v Minister of Education and Development Aid 1989 (2) SA 63 (A).
136 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, (Act 108 of 1996), Section  33: 
‘Just administrative action 
   (1) Everyone has the right to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair.’
137 The Promotion of Administrative Justice Act, 2000 (Act 3 of 2000), in the Government Gazette Vol. 416, No. 20853, 3 February 
2000.
138 This principle was prominently developed by the Constitutional Court in these cases: Fedsure Life Assurance v Greater 
Johannesburg Metropolitan Council 1999 (1) SA 374 (CC); President of the Republic of South Africa v South African Rugby Football 
Union 2000 (1) SA 1 (CC); Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA: In re Ex parte President of the Republic of South Africa 
2000 (2) SA 674 (CC).
139 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, (Act 108 of 1996), Section 1(c).
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as against the principle of legality. Court rulings in this regard are, as a rule, complied with.
Rulings against the state by the Constitutional Court are generally respected and imple-
mented. However, there have been contentious cases where a judicial decision was not or could 
not be implemented. In the case of Mohamed v the President,140 the applicant had been handed 
over to the FBI by the South African government and put on trial in New York. This happened 
without an undertaking by the United States government that he would not be subject to the 
death penalty should he be found guilty. The court afﬁrmed that the South African government 
could not expose a person to the risk of execution. Consequently, the court held that the appli-
cant had been illegally removed from the country. Since the applicant was already outside of the 
jurisdiction and control of the court, it ordered that the judgment should be brought to the atten-
tion of the trial court in New York. As noted above, the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) has 
repeatedly complained that the government has only partially complied with the Constitutional 
Court’s 2002 order to make the anti-retroviral drug, Nevirapine, available in public hospitals for 
the purpose of reducing the risk of mother-to-child transmission of HIV. The SAHRC has also 
criticised the government’s failure to implement fully the judgment of the Constitutional Court 
in the Grootboom case.141
It is also of concern that the Department of Home Affairs has on several occasions opposed 
in court the recognition of same-sex life partners, despite the provisions of Section 9 of the 
Constitution, which contains a presumption of unfair discrimination where legislation differen-
tiates between people on the basis of their sexual orientation.142 This happened in the case of J v 
Department of Home Affairs, where the applicant sought to have sections of the Children’s Status 
Act 82 of 1987 declared unconstitutional, insofar as they discriminated against permanent same-
sex life partners.143 Another example is the defence offered by the department against an applica-
tion to have sections of the Aliens Control Act 96 of 1991 declared unconstitutional, insofar as 
they discriminated against same-sex life partners.144 In both cases, the court ruled against the 
department. 
At provincial level, however, the government record in implementing court orders has often 
been poor. In particular, there have been a string of cases against different branches of the pro-
vincial government of the Eastern Cape, widely regarded as South Africa’s most dysfunctional 
province. 
The Eastern Cape Department of Social Development145 has found itself in contempt of 
court on numerous occasions for failing to adhere to high court rulings requiring it to deal with, 
140 Mohamed and Another v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2001 (3) SA 893 (CC).
141 See the case study on Grootboom, p.31.
142 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (Act 108 of 1996), Section 9(3).
143 J and Another v Director General, Department of Home Affairs, and Others 2003 (5) SA 621 (CC).
144 National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Home Affairs and Others 2000 (2) SA 1 (CC).
145 The Eastern Cape Department of Social Development changed its name from Department of Welfare on 20 May 2002, in 
terms of proclamation 23439.
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and pay out, pensions and other social grants timeously.146 In the case of Vumazonke, the court 
commented as follows:147
[10] The problem may be summarised in this way: notwithstanding that 
literally thousands of orders have been made against the respondent’s 
department over the past number of years, it appears to be willing to pay 
the costs of those applications rather than remedy the problem of malad-
ministration and inefﬁciency that has been identiﬁed as the root cause of 
the problem. […] the courts are left with a problem that they cannot resolve: 
while they grant relief to the individuals who approach them for relief, 
they are forced to watch impotently while a dysfunctional and apparently 
unrepentant administration continues to abuse its power at the expense 
of large numbers of poor people, the very people ‘who are most lacking 
in protective and assertive armour’ and whose needs ‘must animate our 
understanding of the Constitution’s provisions’. What escalates what I have 
termed a problem into a crisis, is that the cases that are brought to court 
represent only the tip of the ice-berg. (Footnotes have been omitted.)
There have been other reports of provincial departments failing to implement court orders. 
In November 1998, a rule nisi was issued against the Eastern Cape Member of the Executive 
Council (MEC) for Transport and Public Works, for failing to pay 35 employees’ voluntary sever-
ance packages and interest, pursuant to a court order. The MEC was called upon to show cause 
as to why he should not be arrested for failure to comply with the order. The payment was made 
before the return day.148  
This immense problem was also recognised by the Supreme Court of Appeal in 2004 in the 
Jayiya case.149 In that case, not only was the Provincial Department of Welfare in the Eastern Cape 
failing to provide the service, but it had also ignored a direct court order. The Supreme Court of 
Appeal held, however, that where an order is granted against a government department grant-
ing ﬁnancial relief to the applicant, that order cannot be executed against the State’s property, 
nor can an ofﬁcial responsible for the government department be imprisoned for contempt of 
court. The court held that the responsibility for a department’s performance lies solely with the 
political head of the department in a representative capacity, namely the national minister or the 
provincial member of the executive council—displaying a perhaps regrettable reluctance to hold 
individual ofﬁcials liable for their own incompetence. 
146 See, for example, Vumazonke and Others v MEC for Social Development, Eastern Cape Province (unreported case, Case Nos: 
110/04; 826/04; 143/04; 2541/03, 25 November 2004); Ntame v MEC for Social Development, Eastern Cape Province (unreported 
judgment, Case Nos: 3667/04; 3634/04; 3635/04, 11 January 2005).
147 Vumazonke and Others v MEC for Social Development, Eastern Cape Province (unreported case, Case Nos: 110/04; 826/04; 
143/04; 2541/03, 25 November 2004).
148 ‘For the record’, Dispatch Online, 29 February 1999; ‘MEC to be arrested for contempt’, Mail & Guardian,  24 February 1999.
149 Jayiya v MEC for Welfare, Eastern Cape, and Another 2004 (2) SA 611 (SCA).
S O U T H  A F R I C A :  J U S T I C E  S E C T O R  A N D  T H E  R U L E  O F  L AW     3 1
A failure to obey court orders has not been limited to the Eastern Cape. In the case of Hardy 
Ventures CC,150 the Pretoria High Court cautioned that it would be preferable to issue a rule nisi 
against a state organ (Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality) that did not appear in court, instead 
of an order for contempt of court and committal. In the case of Settlers Agricultural High School,151 
the Constitutional Court issued a strongly worded rebuke to the Limpopo Provincial Department 
of Education for failing to pay the costs of a previous judgment, granted against it in the same 
matter. In another matter, a Correctional Services Department spokesperson who claimed that 
the Pretoria High Court had erroneously granted bail to Eugene Terreblanche, leader of the 
extremist right-wing Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB), was found in contempt of court 
and ﬁned with an option of imprisonment.152
150 Hardy Ventures CC v Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality 2004 (1) SA 199 (T).
151 Head of Department, Department of Education Limpopo Province v Settlers Agricultural High School and Others 2003 (11) BCLR 
1212 (CC).
152 ‘Correctional services ofﬁcial guilty of contempt’, Mail & Guardian, 22 August 2000.
Case study:  Government’s failure to comply with the 
Grootboom judgment
In the case of The Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and 
Others, the Constitutional Court was asked to consider a constitutional challenge to the 
national housing programme by a group of people, collectively known as the Wallacedene 
community (510 children and 390 adults). The community had been forcibly removed from 
municipal land that they had illegally occupied, which had been earmarked for a low-income 
housing project. The court found that the fact that the national housing programme, whilst 
providing permanent housing to people on the provincial waiting lists, did not cater to the 
immediate needs of people in the situation of the Wallacedene community, was unreason-
able, and therefore in violation of the right of access to adequate housing (Section 26 of the 
Constitution). 
The Court issued two orders (which are often confused). The ﬁrst order contained a detailed 
arrangement between the parties, which provided for the supply and maintenance of toilets, 
water taps and building material. The court’s second order, issued a month later with full 
reasons, declared that Section 26(2) of the Constitution imposed on the state the obligation to 
deal with people in crisis, such as the applicants. It ordered the state to devise and implement 
a programme that would do so, but speciﬁed no particular action. The court’s judgment was 
the ﬁrst to deal with the positive obligations imposed on the state to progressively realise the 
socio-economic rights stated in the Constitution.
The South African Human Rights Commission, which had made a submission to the court 
as amicus curiae, assumed the responsibility of monitoring the implementation of the court’s 
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C.  Investigation of executive action: commissions of enquiry
Section 84(2)(f) of the Constitution unconditionally empowers the president, as head of state, 
to appoint commissions of enquiry.153 A commission of enquiry is ordinarily headed by a retired 
judge or a senior member of the legal profession, and operates in terms of clearly deﬁned 
terms of reference. A commission of enquiry drafts a report on the questions put to it and will 
then hand the report to the president. These reports are, in almost all cases, published within a 
reasonable time after they are completed. A commission has no enforcement mechanism at its 
disposal. 
Commissions of enquiry are generally provided for in the outdated Commissions Act,154 and 
orders (itself confusing the references made in the judgment to imply that it should monitor 
the ﬁrst rather than the second order). It submitted a report to the Constitutional Court outlin-
ing the extent to which the state had failed to fulﬁl the speciﬁc commitments to improve the 
situation of the Wallacedene community. It concluded that, while the state had appeared to 
comply with the immediate obligations imposed in the ﬁrst order, it had failed to maintain san-
itation and water services on an ongoing basis, and the standard of provision thus deteriorated 
quickly.  However, since there was no further application by those affected, the Constitutional 
Court had no mandate to engage with the issue. The SAHRC does not have the power to force 
the state to take action on its report, and the implementation of policy rightly remains a func-
tion of the executive. 
The government has, however, supplemented the national housing programme with two 
other programmes that go some way towards ﬁlling the gap identiﬁed by the litigation: an 
Emergency Housing Programme (2003), which provides temporary housing to people who 
have lost their homes in natural disasters or are facing an imminent threat of eviction; and the 
Informal Settlement Support Programme (2004), which is aimed at the upgrading of existing 
informal settlements. Implementation is proceeding at a slow pace, but in the end the immedi-
ate families involved in this groundbreaking litigation have seen few results.
S O U R C E S :  
The Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC); and 
Grootboom and Others v The Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others  (CCT38/00);
Kameshni Pillay, ‘Implementing Grootboom, Supervision needed’, ESR Review, July 2002, is available at http://
www.communitylawcentre.org.za/ser/esr2002/2002july_grootboom.php;
‘Nine years under the kgotla tree’, Mail & Guardian, 3 May 2004; and
The South African Human Rights Commission, ‘The Right Of Access To Adequate Housing’ 5th Economic and 
Social Rights Report: 2002/03, 21 June 2004, is available at http://www.sahrc.org.za/5th_esr_housing.pdf. 
153 Ibid., Section 84(2)(f):
 ‘84 Powers and functions of president
 (2) The president is responsible for –
 (f) appointing commissions of inquiry; …’
154 The Commissions Act, 1947 (Act 8 of 1947).
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are speciﬁcally provided for in several pieces of recent legislation.155
Since 1994, there have been numerous commissions appointed to enquire into issues of 
national importance. Examples include:
• The Cameron Commission to enquire into illegal arms dealing by South Africa in 
1994;
• The Steyn Commission to enquire into objections raised against the Saldanha Steel 
Plant in 1995;
• The Hoexter Commission on the establishment of a system of family courts in 1996;
• The Satchwell Commission to enquire into the Road Accident Fund in 1998;
• The King Commission to enquire into Cricket Match Fixing in 2000;
• The Jali Commission to investigate allegations of corruption, mismanagement,  
intimidation and violence in South Africa’s prisons in 2001;156 and
• The Myburgh Commission to enquire into the rapid depreciation of the exchange rate 
of the rand in 2002.
At provincial level, the premiers are empowered to appoint commissions of enquiry in terms 
of Section 127(2)(e) of the Constitution. Several provinces have enacted provincial legislation 
dealing with provincial commissions.157 Examples of provincial commissions include:
• The Dreyer Commission in 1997, which was appointed by the premier of 
Mpumalanga after a report by the attorney-general to enquire into the Mpumalanga 
Rural Housing Project; and
• A Commission of Enquiry into Hospital Care Practices in 1999, appointed by the 
premier of Gauteng, to enquire into the poor levels of service in provincial hospitals.
Following the upsurge in political violence ahead of the local government elections, in the ﬁrst 
quarter of 2005 in KwaZulu-Natal, the provincial government has reportedly recommended 
the establishment of a commission. Two commissions of inquiry were appointed to investigate 
issues surrounding the prosecution of Schabir Shaik, adviser to former Deputy President Jacob 
Zuma, and of Zuma himself.
A further mechanism that allows for the investigation of executive action, is the occasional 
appointment by the president of Special Investigating Units (SIU) and special tribunals in terms 
155 For example, the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation Act, 1991 (Act 139 of 1991); the National Sport and Recreation 
Act, 1998 (Act 110 of 1998); the National Environmental Management Act, 1998 (Act 107 of 1998); and the Road Accident Fund 
Commission Act, 1998 (Act 71 of 1998).
156 For further discussion see Makubetse Sekhonyane, ‘The Jali Commission on Prison Corruption’, SA Crime Quarterly No. 2, 
Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria,  November 2002.
157 For example, in Gauteng: the Provincial Commissions Act, 1997 (Act 1 of 1997); the Western Cape Provincial Commissions 
Act, 1998 (Act 10 of 1998); the Provincial Commissions Act (Eastern Cape), 1994 (Act 5 of 1994).
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of the Special Investigating Units and Special Tribunals Act.158  In terms of the act, the purpose of 
SIUs is to investigate serious misconduct relating to the administration of state institutions, state 
assets and public money, and other serious conduct that may harm the public. Special tribunals 
are set up to adjudicate upon civil matters, emanating from investigations by SIUs. Initially, the 
act required the appointment of a judge as head of an SIU, but this requirement was held to 
be unconstitutional, since the head of an SIU was performing essentially executive functions, 
including investigation of offences and subsequent prosecution.159 SIUs have been appointed on 
numerous occasions, and a special tribunal has been appointed and adjudicated in two reported 
cases since 1996.160
158 The Special Investigating Units and Special Tribunals Act, 1996 (Act 74 of 1996), in the Government Gazette, Vol. 453, No. 
25024, 14 March 2003.  
159 South African Personal Injury Lawyers v Heath and Others 2001 (1) SA 883 (CC).
160 Special Investigating Unit and Another v Mfeketo and Twenty Similar Matters 2001 (1) SA 1089 (SpT); Special Investigating Unit v 
Kim Diamonds (Pty) Ltd 2004 (2) SA 173 (SpT).
Case study: The Schabir Shaik and Jacob Zuma prosecutions
 
In 2003, stories in the media based on leaked information indicated that the then National 
Director of Public Prosecutions (NDPP), Bulelani Ngcuka, was investigating Schabir Shaik, 
head of Nkobi Holdings and ﬁnancial adviser to Deputy President Jacob Zuma, and the Deputy 
President himself, for corruption in relation to a highly controversial arms deal. Tensions sur-
faced between the African National Congress (ANC) and the NDPP. 
In August 2003, the NDPP announced that while there was a prima facie case against the 
Deputy President for corruption, he would not be prosecuted because the prosecution services 
were not conﬁdent they could secure a conviction—leading to accusations that he was abusing 
his position. 
Former Transport Minister Mac Maharaj (a member of the ANC who was also being investi-
gated by the ofﬁce of the NDPP), and Mo Shaik (the brother of Schabir Shaik, a special adviser 
to the foreign affairs minister and a former ANC intelligence operative), accused Ngcuka of 
having been a spy for the apartheid government and claimed that the investigations were the 
result of obligations to his former paymasters. A commission of enquiry was established under 
Judge Joos Hefer (known as the Hefer Commission), which cleared Ngcuka in January 2004 
and made clear that there had been little or no evidence to substantiate the allegations made 
by Maharaj and Shaik; but not until after there had been heated allegations and counter-alle-
gations in the media. The commission was harshly criticised, both by opposition parties and 
by independent observers and academics such as Dr Barney Pityana, a former head of the 
SAHRC, as being an expensive deﬂection away from the main question, namely whether the 
arms deal was tainted by corruption. 
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D.  Pardons and amnesties
South Africa does not have legislation allowing for general amnesty.  However, an epilogue to 
the 1993 Interim Constitution, which governed the transitional period following the 1994 elec-
Shortly thereafter, the Public Protector Lawrence Mushwana began an enquiry into whether 
the NDPP had abused the power of his ofﬁce by investigating, and later not prosecuting, the 
Deputy President. Mushwana found that Ngcuka had infringed the Deputy President’s right to 
dignity and had prejudiced him when he made the statement that there was a prima facie case 
against the Deputy President. The report was adopted by an ANC-dominated parliamentary 
committee, in which Ngcuka was denied a hearing, despite requests by members of opposi-
tion parties to hear him. Bulelani Ngcuka resigned in September 2004.  The Minister of Justice 
and Constitutional Development, Penuell Maduna, who had also been implicated in the media 
coverage of the issue and who was Ngcuka’s political superior, retired from active politics after 
the 2004 general elections. 
Legal proceedings against Schabir Shaik were launched in the latter part of 2004.  In May 
2005, he was convicted of two charges of corruption and one of fraud related to his rela-
tionship with the deputy president—which the court stated was ‘generally corrupt’—and 
sentenced to an effective ﬁfteen years imprisonment. Shortly after this decision was handed 
down, the president ‘relieved’ the deputy president of his duties. The ANC Youth League, 
meanwhile, argued that the judgment of the Durban High Court against Schabir Shaik should 
be disregarded because the judge concerned had once been a member of the Rhodesian 
Parliament; the SAHRC condemned this statement for being based purely on the race of the 
judge concerned, and not the actual content of the judgment.
Bulelani Ngcuka’s successor, Vusi Pikoli, reversed the National Prosecuting Authority’s (NPA) 
decision not to prosecute the Deputy President, and two charges of corruption were instituted 
amid allegations of a ‘conspiracy’ against him.  This case was still ongoing as this report went 
to press; and the allegations of improper pressure on the NPA were also being investigated 
by a further commission of inquiry.  In addition, a new political storm erupted over a search 
operation conducted at the deputy president’s Johannesburg home and that of his legal 
adviser, with allegations being made that this operation was a ‘ﬁshing expedition’ improperly 
carried out after charges had already been instituted.  In August 2005, the Johannesburg High 
Court declared that the search warrant, issued in respect of the former Deputy President’s legal 
adviser, was unlawful. 
S O U R C E S :
Media stories, including Wally Mbhele and Mawande Jack, ‘Hefer probe “a waste of money”’, News24.com,  
25 October 2003, available at http://www.news24.com/News24/South_Africa/Hefer_probe/0,6119,2-7-1536_
1435903,00.html;  
Devan Pillay, ‘Conspiracy theories ﬂourish as the spy story subplot thickens’, Sunday Times, 30 Nov 2003,is avail-
able at http://www.suntimes.co.za/2003/11/30/insight/in06.asp;  
‘Racial attack on judge “unwarranted”’, SAPA, 6 June 2005, available at http://www.mg.co.za/articlePage.
aspx?articleid=242532&area=/breaking_news/breaking_news__national/; and
The minutes of the parliamentary committee deliberations can be found on the Parliamentary Monitoring Group’s 
website, available at http://www.pmg.org.za/viewminute.php?id=4112.
See also Chapter 5.C on independence of the prosecution service.
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tions until the ﬁnal Constitution was adopted in 1996, provided that ‘amnesty shall be granted in 
respect of acts, omissions and offences associated with political objectives and committed in the 
course of the conﬂicts of the past’. In accordance with this provision, the Promotion of National 
Unity and Reconciliation Act was passed in 1995.161 The act provided for amnesty from civil 
and criminal liability to any person who made full disclosure of all facts relevant to an act that 
was ‘associated with a political objective committed in the course of the conﬂicts of the past’.162 
Aside from this exceptional legislation, the Constitution makes general provision for presidential 
pardons. These two mechanisms will be discussed here.
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), created in terms of Section 232(4) of the 
Interim Constitution163 and established and regulated by Chapter 2 of the Promotion of National 
Unity and Reconciliation Act,164 played an important role in South Africa’s transition from the 
apartheid era to the present constitutional dispensation. In order to avoid a general amnesty 
provision, the Amnesty Committee of the TRC had, under section 20(1) and (7), the power to 
grant individuals immunity from civil and criminal liability, where perpetrators of human rights 
violations made full disclosure of their role. Further, the state was immune to civil liability if the 
perpetrator committed the human rights violations under the employ of the state. In all, 849 
people had been granted amnesty (out of 7 112 applicants) by the TRC, by the time it wound up 
its operations in 2001.165
In the case of AZAPO v The President,166 the Azanian Peoples’ Organisation, on behalf of three 
families of killed activists (the Bikos, Mxenges and Ribeiros), argued before the Constitutional 
Court that by providing amnesty from civil liability, as well as from criminal prosecution, the act 
violated the right to access to court provided for in the Interim Constitution. The court ruled, 
however, that the Interim Constitution, in its epilogue provision, specially authorised Parliament 
to pass legislation as broad as the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act. 
Provision is made in Section 84(2)(j) of the Constitution for presidential pardons. While the 
discretion is granted to the president, the DoJCD prepares the documentation when considering 
an application for pardon. In so doing, the DoJCD considers the following guidelines: 
• The age of the offender at the time of the commission of the offence;
• Whether a reasonable period has lapsed since conviction;
• Circumstances surrounding the commission of the offence;
161 The Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, 1995 (Act 34 of 1995), ofﬁce of the president, No. 1111, 26 July 1995.
162 Ibid., Section 20(1)(b).
163 The Interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1993 (Act 200 of 1993).
164 The Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, 1995 (Act 34 of 1995), ofﬁce of the president, No. 1111, 26 July 1995, 
Section 2(1).
165 For further information, see the Truth and Reconciliation Commission website, available at http://www.doj.gov.za/trc/trc_
frameset.htm.
166 Azanian Peoples’ Organisation (AZAPO) and Others v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 1996 (4) SA 671 (CC); 
1996 (8) BCLR 1015 (CC).
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• The nature and seriousness of the offence;
• Personal circumstances of the offender at the time of the application for pardon;
• Interests of the state and the community; and
• Interests of the victim.167
The DoJCD maintains that it is the president who makes the ﬁnal decision,168 as he must decide 
if the action is to be lawful. The decision by the president is furthermore subject to the Bill of 
Rights. In the case of Hugo, the Constitutional Court found that the power of presidential pardon 
is granted to the president to be exercised when, in his view, ‘the public welfare will be better 
served by granting a remission of sentence or some other form of pardon’.169 This was the case 
in at least two instances, namely to correct mistaken convictions and reduce excessive sentences 
in individual cases, and where such action would be in the public interest. Although the presi-
dent, by virtue of the discretion granted to him, had extensive powers in differentiating between 
groups, his actions still had to comply with the requirements of the Bill of Rights (which the 
court found they did).
In May 2002, President Mbeki granted pardons to 33 cadres of former armed groups during 
the liberation struggle.170 These included members from the Azanian Peoples’ Liberation Army 
and the Pan African Congress.171 Civil society organisations such as Human Rights Watch, 
Amnesty International and the Centre of the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, raised the 
concern that pardoning individuals who had applied for amnesty to the TRC, but had been 
unsuccessful, could undermine the entire work of the TRC, with potentially serious conse-
quences for the future of justice and reconciliation in South Africa.172 
The DoJCD reported that it received 1 251 applications for pardons in 2003, of which 645 
related to politically motivated offences.173 The department has indicated that it is considering 
drafting legislation to deal with these cases appropriately. 
One recent instance in which a presidential pardon was granted, amid criticism from 
opposition political parties, is the case of Allan Boesak. President Mbeki granted a pardon to 
ANC member and anti-apartheid activist Boesak, who was sentenced to a six-year prison term 
167 The DoJCD, ‘The Process for presidential pardons in terms of section 84(2)(j) of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa—a special reference to Dr Allan Aubrey Boesak’s case to expunge criminal records’, Public Statement, 18 January 2005, 
available at http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/2005/05011815151001.htm.
168 Ibid.
169 The President of the Republic of South Africa and Another v Hugo 1997 (4) SA 1 (CC); 1997 (6) BCLR 708 (CC), Paragraph [44].
170 The DoJCD, ‘Pertaining to the ofﬁcial release of names of people granted presidential pardon in terms of section 84 (2) (j) of 
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa’, Public Statement, 19 May 2002, is available at http://www.info.gov.za/speeche
s/2002/02052009461006.htm. 
171 The Herald, Port Elizabeth, 22 May 2003.
172 Human Rights Watch, World Report 2003, New York, 2003, p. 74; a joint document by Amnesty International and Human 
Rights Watch, Truth and Justice: Unﬁnished Business in South Africa, 13 February 2003, available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/
Index/engAFR530012003?OpenDocument&of=COUNTRIES percent5CSOUTH+AFRICA. 
173 The DoJCD, Annual Report 2003/04, p. 34.
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for fraud and theft during his tenure as the chairperson of the Foundation for Peace and Justice, 
in January 2005.  The opposition Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) criticised this move as favouring 
a person who was linked to the ruling party. The IFP argued that it had submitted a list of 394 
prisoners who had committed politically motivated crimes to the president for consideration of 
a presidential pardon, without success.174
Apart from these politically signiﬁcant instances, President Mandela pardoned imprisoned 
mothers with children under 12 years of age in May 1996. This presidential pardon was chal-
lenged by a male prisoner on the grounds that the action discriminated on the basis of gender. 
However, the Constitutional Court rejected the case.175
174 The Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), ‘Boesak’s pardon a tip of the iceberg,’ 17 January 2005; this press statement is available at 
http://www.ifp.org.za/Releases/170105apr.htm. 
175 The President of the Republic of South Africa and Another v Hugo 1997 (4) SA 1 (CC); 1997 (6) BCLR 708 (CC).
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3
Management of the justice system 
The Department of Justice and Constitutional Development (DoJCD) is the national government 
department responsible for the administration of justice, and since 1994, has been subject to 
substantial reorganisation. Budget and resource allocation to the DoJCD takes place at a national 
level, and the department regularly faces under-funding, leading to pressure on resources. 
Despite improvements in the department’s ﬁnancial management in recent years, ﬁscal account-
ability issues remain. Nonetheless, the courts are in a reasonable state of repair (though less so 
in rural areas), staff are generally punctually remunerated, and legislation and jurisprudence are 
publicly available.176
A.  Planning and ﬁnancial management 
In South Africa, several ministries are broadly considered to comprise the justice sector, 
namely the South African Police Service (SAPS), the Department of Correctional Services and 
the DoJCD. They are further grouped with the Department of Defence and the Independent 
Complaints Directorate (ICD) to form the Justice and Protection Services cluster. The DoJCD is 
the national government department in South Africa responsible for the ongoing planning and 
determination of priorities and objectives for the administration of justice. Therefore, in what 
follows, only the DoJCD will be evaluated in detail.
The DoJCD has been subject to ongoing and intermittent restructuring since 1994. At 
present, its governance and operational arrangements are based on a model of internal business 
units (also referred to as branches), each with a clear set of functions. The DoJCD currently con-
sists of units and two semi-autonomous structures. Of the eight units, four have the responsibil-
ity for delivering core justice functions:
176 In addition to included footnotes, see Annex D for a full list of sources used in answering this section. 
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• Court services;
• Legal advisery services;
• Legislative and constitutional development; and
• Master’s ofﬁce.
Four units (listed below) deliver support services to each of the core units above:
• Financial services/ofﬁce of the chief ﬁnancial ofﬁcer;
• Human resource development; 
• Public education and communication; and
• Information systems and management.
Besides these eight units, two semi-autonomous structures play a pivotal role in the delivery of 
justice services: the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) and the Legal Aid Board.
Communication and co-operation amongst the units and semi-autonomous bodies within 
the DoJCD is secured through an executive committee, which is chaired by the chief executive 
ofﬁcer (also referred to as the director-general) and which includes managing directors (also 
referred to as deputy director-generals) from each unit. The executive committee is responsible 
for the development, monitoring and evaluation of the strategic plans of each unit. The minis-
ter is also assisted by a board of directors, which operates in a consultative capacity and which 
includes the chief justice, the chairperson of the Legal Aid Board and the National Director of 
Public Prosecutions (NDPP) as non-executive members, as well as representatives from all units 
as executive members.177
Strategic planning 
After 1994, the DoJCD faced the challenge of restructuring the national department existing 
prior to 1994, as well as incorporating the previous ‘homeland’ departments of justice. A number 
of high-level ‘umbrella’ documents were drafted and approved as departmental policy for this 
purpose. These included, amongst others, an overall strategic plan adopted in 1997 called Justice 
Vision 2000, and a comprehensive Gender Policy Statement of May, 1999.178 
Currently, the DoJCD is in the process of adopting a new medium-term strategic plan. This 
plan is supplemented by three additional tactical or operational plans, namely the departmental 
operational plan or Medium-Term Strategic Framework (MTSF), three-year plans for each opera-
tional unit and an annual action plan.179
The strategy of the DoJCD provides for two key strategic result areas, each with their own 
performance indicators. The key strategic result areas are: ensuring access to justice for all, and 
the transformation of the administration of justice. 
177 A telephone interview with the DoJCD’s webmaster, on 8 April 2005.
178 The Justice Vision 2000 & Gender Policy Statement, May 1999, available at www.doj.gov.za, (documents section).
179 The DoJCD, Annual General Report 2003/04. 
S O U T H  A F R I C A :  J U S T I C E  S E C T O R  A N D  T H E  R U L E  O F  L AW     4 1
A third key strategic area relating to modernisation has also recently been added. The exact 
parameters of this new strategic result area are currently under discussion.180 
The department has been subject to almost continuous internal restructuring and organi-
sational transformation since 1994. This has often meant that plans were not actualised as 
implementation responsibilities shifted and priorities were redeﬁned. Some policy analysts and 
commentators have noted the disjuncture between elaborate planning and limited implementa-
tion, in the case of many departmental initiatives.181 Two instances in which strategic plans have 
indeed formed the basis of action, are the e-Justice programme and the Re Aga Boswa project 
(which seeks to transform the court management system). Since 2000, there has also been some 
improvement in co-ordinating intra-departmental planning, implementation and monitoring. 
Efforts are made to mainstream women and vulnerable groups in both the stafﬁng of 
the DoJCD and the adoption of strategic priority areas. The Gender Policy Statement plays an 
important role in this regard. The department has recognised the importance of compliance with 
the Employment Equity Act,182 and gender transformation speciﬁcally. The DoJCD has created a 
dedicated Gender Unit, which is currently located within the ofﬁce of the director-general. This 
unit is tasked with promoting a gendered perspective across all departmental planning, as well 
as ensuring that speciﬁc gender-related interventions are given priority. In addition, there is a 
sub-unit focusing on vulnerable groups, which is located within the Court Services unit. The 
purpose of this sub-unit is to plan and implement speciﬁc programmes contributing to the pro-
tection of vulnerable groups. Examples of such projects include the sexual offences courts, the 
new priority given to family and children’s courts, as well as programmes aimed at addressing 
victim empowerment and restorative justice.
Financial resources and management
In terms of the Constitution, the administration of justice is a national function. Thus budget 
planning and resource allocation to the DoJCD takes place exclusively at the national level. The 
division of resources amongst the national, provincial and local spheres of government is a 
political process based on negotiation. As in all developing countries, resource allocation is a 
vexed process: there is an ongoing need to allocate resources to various urgent and competing 
priorities ranging from health, education, housing, job-creation, poverty alleviation, policing and 
so forth. Within the Justice and Protection Services cluster, the DoJCD receives a relatively small 
share of the budget. The DoJCD is not fully funded, in the sense that it does not receive all the 
resources it needs to fulﬁl all its functions and implement all its strategic priorities. As a result, 
the justice department often has to revise its plans and scale down on some of its interventions 
and initiatives. 
180 The information provided was done so on the basis of conﬁdentiality; the interview was with an ofﬁcial at the DoJCD, 
December 2004.
181 See, for example, Stack & Soggot, Enhancing Policy Implementation—Lessons from the Justice Sector, Centre for Policy Studies, 
Johannesburg, October 2001; Chaskalson & de Jong Consulting—Family Courts Policy Document, Cape Town, December 2002.
182 The Employment Equity Act, 1998 (Act 55 of 1998).
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The South African Treasury makes allocations to national government departments in two 
stages. The ﬁrst stage is an initial allocation to each government department, which takes into 
account governmental-spending priorities. Once these baseline allocations have been made, 
each national department may submit a bid for additional discretionary Treasury funding. 
In the 2004/05 budget, a total amount of R58 269 million183 was allocated to the Justice and 
Protection Services cluster.184 Within the total allocation to this cluster, the DoJCD budget of R5 
054 million is signiﬁcantly smaller than that of the SAPS (R24 500 million), the Department of 
Defence (R20 257 million) and even the Department of Correctional Services (R8 400 million). 
The DoJCD budget for 2004/05, as a percentage of the national overall budget, constitutes 3.4 
per cent.  
South Africa has a three-year rolling budget called the Medium-Term Expenditure 
Framework (MTEF). The MTEF process is managed by the National Treasury, with co-operation 
from provincial treasuries as well as national and provincial departments. Policy priorities for 
the MTEF period are set and revised annually by the cabinet. They are informed in this regard 
by a host of technical, ﬁscal and sector-speciﬁc teams and advisers, including ofﬁcials from 
the various government departments. South Africa’s budget-formulation process is generally 
regarded as transparent and participative. There is considerable access to good-quality budget 
information, and ﬁrm structures are in place to facilitate participation on the part of the legis-
latures, the executive and civil society. The DoJCD plays an active role in the MTEF process. It 
prepares submissions to the MTEF and seeks political support to get its priorities funded.185
The medium-term baseline allocations to the DoJCD186 for the upcoming MTEF period, 
are set out in Table 3.1 below. Table 3.2 shows the baseline ﬁnancial resources available to the 
department in 2005/06, once expenditure on transfers, subsidies187 and capital works has been 
subtracted. Table 3.3 outlines how the remaining baseline budget for 2005/06 is divided to meet 
departmental expenditures.
 
Table 3.1: Medium-term baseline allocations to the DoJCD 2005/06—2007/08
2005/06 2006/07 2007/08
R5 608 357 R5 985 041 R6 284 293 
183 As of 1 April 2005, 1 US dollar was equivalent to 6.25 South African rands.
184 As pointed out above, the cluster includes SAPS, the Department of Correctional Services, the Department of Defence, the 
Independent Complaints Directorate (ICD) and the DoJCD.
185 For further information, see the most recent Treasury guidelines, available at www.treasury.gov.za.
186 Information contained in this section was provided by the ofﬁce of the chief ﬁnancial ofﬁcer of the DoJCD.
187 Transfers and subsidies relate to money which the DoJCD holds for other autonomous or semi-autonomous institutions, for 
example the Legal Aid Board, the SAHRC and the Gender Commission. 
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Table 3.2: Financial resources of the DoJCD, from the baseline allocation for 2005/06 
Available budget R5 608 million
Less transfers and subsidies  R   664 million
Less capital works R   450 million
Remaining budget R4 493 million
Table 3.3: Expenditure of the remaining DoJCD baseline allocation for 2005/06
Compensation of employees R3 084 million
Goods and services R1 409 million
Total R4 493 million
In its bid for additional discretionary funding over the next three years, the DoJCD has requested 
a total amount of R6 797 million from the Treasury. These bids are costed and revised on a 
quarterly basis. Table 3.4 sets out the bids for additional revenue for the upcoming MTEF period 
of 2005/06 to 2007/08.
Table 3.4: Bids for additional DoJCD funding for 2005/06 to 2007/08
2005/06 2006/07 2007/08
R1 963 799  R2 446 471 R2 387 069 
The additional resources requested by the DoJCD are to be used for expenditure on priority 
projects, which are not funded by the baseline allocations. These amounts, when added to the 
baseline allocations, give a reﬂection of the department’s views on the total budget it requires to 
perform its functions properly. 
South Africa’s Public Finance Management Act188 provides for the establishment of clear 
and comprehensive ﬁnancial reporting and auditing procedures in government departments. 
These procedures are generally regarded as effective and supportive of ﬁscal accountability and 
transparency. There are both internal and external audit procedures. Internal auditing functions 
are performed by a dedicated unit located at the ofﬁce of the director-general. This internal audit 
unit also has a regional presence in DoJCD ofﬁces throughout the country. An audit committee 
within the department, under the leadership of an external and independent person, is active and 
fulﬁls an important oversight role.
188 The Public Finance Management Act, 1999 (Act 1 of 1999).
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External auditing is performed by the ofﬁce of the auditor-general, a body mandated by 
section 188 of the Constitution. The auditor-general’s functions include auditing all government 
departments to ensure that sound ﬁnancial-management policies are followed, and that fruitless 
and wasteful expenditure is avoided. The auditor-general has extensive powers and obligations 
conferred on his or her ofﬁce in terms of the Auditor-Generals’ Act.189 The report of the auditor-
general is published on an annual basis, together with the DoJCD annual report, and both are 
tabled in Parliament.
There are two main parliamentary sub-committees which play an important oversight role 
with respect to the DoJCD. The ﬁrst is the Justice Portfolio Committee, which tends to focus on 
issues relating to the administration of justice. The second is the Standing Committee on Public 
Accounts (SCOPA), which oversees the management of public ﬁnances within government 
departments. Both of these bodies scrutinise spending in the justice sector and may call for 
clariﬁcation from the department if necessary. 
The track-record of the DoJCD in the area of ﬁnancial management has improved consider-
ably over recent years. The DoJCD received a No Audit Qualiﬁcation (which is an unqualiﬁed 
audit approval) from the ofﬁce of the auditor-general for the ﬁrst time in more than ten years, 
in respect of the 2003/04 ﬁnancial year. However, this audit ﬁnding was in respect of the vote 
account only, which is the account in which the department’s budget funds are administered. In 
respect of discretionary funding received from Treasury, and more importantly in respect of the 
administration of agency funds (such as the administration of maintenance and guardianship 
payments), the department’s audit ﬁnding remained qualiﬁed, and this must be regarded as an 
area of great concern.
Access to planning and ﬁnancial information
There does not appear to be a clear DoJCD strategy to engage with civil society around plan-
ning and budgeting. At present, formal civil society involvement in planning and budgeting 
is minimal. The DoJCD publishes its annual report and its Estimates of National Expenditure 
(ENE) every year, and as such, the information they contain is in the public domain. Yet there is 
no formal process of inviting comment or facilitating discussion with civil society organisations 
to inform planning or budgeting. 
The Open Society Foundation for South Africa (OSF-SA) has funded initiatives advocating 
and lobbying for access to information, in respect of the Promotion of Access to Information 
Act (PAIA).190 The act aims to promote transparency, accountability and effective governance of 
public bodies, an understanding of their functions and operation, and the ability to effectively 
scrutinise and participate in decision-making by public bodies that affect citizens’ rights. A leg-
islative framework, including the Budget Appropriation Act, the Division of Revenue Act, the 
Municipal Finance Management Act and the Public Service Act, provides clear guidelines to 
189 The Auditor-Generals’ Act, 1995 (Act 12 of 1995).
190 The Promotion of Access to Information Act, 2000 (Act 2 of 2000), in the Government Gazette Vol. 416, No. 20853, 3 February 
2000.
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government departments to provide access to their strategic plans, business plans, monthly and 
quarterly expenditure reports, performance reports, reports to the auditor-general, reports on 
ﬁnancial misconduct and oversight reports. The public can therefore demand access to various 
reports and in this way ensure accountability and transparency on the part of government depart-
ments.
An example of litigation which directly impacted on justice-sector planning and budgeting is 
the Moseneke case.191 In this case, the Constitutional Court conﬁrmed a high court decision that 
it was unconstitutional, in terms of section 23(7) of the Black Administration Act,192 an apartheid-
era law, that the master’s ofﬁce193 did not handle deceased estates of black people (which were 
rather handled by magistrates’ courts). The order that the legislation was invalid was, however, 
suspended for two years, and the master was permitted but not required to deal with black estates 
in the interim. In terms of the order, the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development was 
‘requested to ensure that this order is brought to the attention of all masters of the high courts 
and all magistrates dealing with the  administration of estates under the Black Administration 
Act 38 of 1927’. This order necessitated that the DoJCD set in place a consistent approach to all 
deceased estates, regardless of racial grouping. Although it appears that the master’s ofﬁce dealt 
with the interim period on an ad hoc basis, it was able to implement the order when the suspen-
sion of invalidity came to an end on 5 December 2002, despite the ruling adding an estimated 
additional 60 000 estates to the case load of the masters.194 
DoJCD budgets are disaggregated to court level, which means that a budget is drawn up 
for each individual court throughout the country. These budgets are broken down into two main 
categories: compensation of employees; and goods and services. However, the budget data is 
not disaggregated in such a way that spending on different types of services or beneﬁciaries 
can readily be identiﬁed or monitored. For example, it is not possible to distinguish how justice 
expenditure across courts is broken down amongst civil, criminal and family court matters. 
Likewise, there is no way to track, for example, what portion of total justice expenditure is used 
to provide services that directly beneﬁt women or children. In addition, justice budget data is not 
broken down to match or reﬂect the outcomes attached to the department’s various strategic pri-
orities. As such, the budget format does not allow the department to account for its expenditure 
on different programmes, in terms of the outcomes they have achieved.195
191 Moseneke and Others v The Master and Another 2001 (2) SA 18 (CC).
192 The Black Administration Act, 1927 (Act 38 of 1927).
193 The masters of the high court are involved with the administration of justice in estates of deceased persons and those declared 
insolvent, the liquidation of companies and close corporations, and the registration of trusts.  
194 The DoJCD,  Implementation of the Moseneke Decision by the Master’s Business Unit, Press Statement, 4 December 2002; 
speech by the Deputy Minister for Justice and Constitutional Development, at the launch of the masters of the high court 
Business Unit, Pretoria, 31 October 2002.
195 Information supplied by the ofﬁce of the chief ﬁnancial ofﬁcer, DoJCD, December 2004.
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B.  Court administration
The DoJCD is the ministry responsible for the administration of justice. As such, the executive 
plays an active role in court administration. There is, however, a debate around the institutional 
separation between administrative staff and the judiciary. 
The proposed Superior Courts Bill has been particularly controversial in this regard. The 
long title to this bill states that it is intended: ‘to rationalise, consolidate and amend the laws relat-
ing to the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court of Appeal and the high court of South Africa; 
to incorporate certain specialist courts into the high court of South Africa; to make provision for 
the administration of the judicial functions of all courts; to make provision for the administrative 
functions and budgetary aspects relating to the functioning of all courts; to make provision for 
the making of rules for all courts; and to provide for matters incidental thereto’. These purposes 
provoked a storm of discussion when the bill was made public. The main issue in contention 
surrounds Clause 15(1), which provides that ‘The minister exercises ﬁnal responsibility over the 
administrative functions of all courts referred to in section 165 [sic] of the Constitution, including 
the budget and ﬁnances of all courts’. Traditionally, such issues as the assignment of judges to 
cases and everything else connected to the adjudicative functioning of courts, have been admin-
istered by the most senior member of the court in question. In trying to improve the efﬁciency 
of courts in South Africa by relieving judges and magistrates of some of their administrative 
duties, Clause 15(1) runs the risk that the ‘administrative functions’ of courts will be deﬁned too 
broadly, thereby threatening judicial independence. The other aspect of the Superior Courts Bill 
that has attracted attention is the provision for ministerial involvement in the making of court 
rules, including rules of procedure.  This provision appears to run contrary to Section 173 of the 
Constitution, which provides that ‘the Constitutional Court, Supreme Court of Appeal and high 
courts have the inherent power to protect and regulate their own process…’.
In addition, through its Re Aga Boswa project (which aims among other things at the 
transformation of court administration), the department is seeking to decentralise the court 
management system with decision-making authority about court operations devolved to court 
managers. Previously, at the level of lower courts, court administration was the responsibility 
of the senior magistrate.196 In terms of the department’s model, court managers are clustered 
under the control of a senior court manager. Each cluster has a shared court-services centre, 
which provides the day-to-day support services for transactional (repetitive) matters required by 
the various courts. Non-transactional services (once-off services) are provided by the local court 
manager.197 Currently, court management falls under the operational responsibility of the Court 
Services Unit of the DoJCD.
196 Minister B Mabandla’s address at the Re Aga Boswa Launch, Durban, 29 November 2004, is available at http://www.doj.gov.
za/2004dojsite/m_speeches/sp2004/2004 percent2011 percent2029_min_boswa.htm.
197 Re Aga Boswa—Extended Steering Committee Meeting, Business Unit Court Services, April 2003; S Jiyane, Criminal Justice 
Strengthening Programme—Work Plan, 2002; Price Waterhouse Coopers, Shared Services Organisational Study, 2002; the DoJCD 
Annual Reports.
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Training and remuneration of court staff
The training of administrative staff (that is, public servants who provide administrative support 
to judicial ofﬁcers) is conducted on an in-service training model, with occasional support from 
the DoJCD’s Justice College. Training is supplemented with various specialised training courses 
by the department. This training is either conducted following the in-service model or by means 
of external trainers hired by speciﬁc projects. 
During 1998, the government passed the Skills Development Act.198 This act aims at facilitat-
ing and promoting skills development in the private and public sectors. Its purpose is to improve 
the country’s competitiveness and productivity, and to address the education inequalities of the 
past. Twenty-ﬁve sectors were identiﬁed. The justice sector falls under the ambit of the Police, 
Private Security, Legal, Correctional Services and Justice Sector Education and Training Authority 
(Poslec Seta), which was established in 2000 and has the mandate to provide for training and 
skills development through the planning and monitoring of progressive skills development in 
the sector.199
Training by the Poslec Seta is accredited in terms of the South African Qualiﬁcations 
Authority Act.200 A project-management skills programme for court managers is currently 
running and three further learnerships are envisaged, namely the court services learnership, the 
court interpretation learnership and a family law learnership. 
Administrative staff are public servants. The terms and conditions of employment in the 
public sector are regulated by the Public Service Act of 1994.201 This act provides for the power 
and duties of the Minister for Public Service Administration, including the making of policy with 
respect to employment practices, salaries and other service conditions. Increases are negotiated 
annually between the Department of Public Service and Administration and the relevant labour 
unions.202
There are no reports of systematic non-payment of administrative staff members within the 
justice system. It should however be noted that the DoJCD makes use of numerous temporary 
appointments to fulﬁl administrative functions. These contract workers sometimes experience 
difﬁculties in receiving payments on time. This appears to be related to administrative difﬁcult-
ies, and is receiving attention as part of a broader updating of the departmental payroll system.
Internal disciplinary systems are in place to respond to allegations of corruption and other 
misconduct by administrative staff. However, these procedures are frequently very slow. This 
may result in staff members being transferred or suspended on full pay for substantial periods 
of time, pending the outcome of proceedings. In 1999, the DoJCD adopted a ‘Charter for Service 
198 The Skills Development Act, 1998, (Act 97 of 1998).
199 Further information on the Poslec Seta is available at www.poslecseta.org.za.
200 The South African Qualiﬁcations Authority Act, 1995, (Act 58 of 1995).
201 The Public Services Act, 1994 (Act 103 of 1994).
202 The relevant current pay scales are available from the Human Resources unit of the DoJCD.
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Delivery for Court Users’.203 The charter sets out standards of service delivery that citizens can 
expect from court ofﬁcials, and sets out procedures to be followed when standards are not met. 
It does not, however, create a dedicated ofﬁce to deal with complaints arising out of poor service, 
and implementation of the charter is likely to suffer as a result of this.
Delays in court proceedings occur for a variety of reasons, including the absence of wit-
nesses, incomplete police investigation or the absence of legal representation. The absence of 
court staff, particularly court interpreters, also occurs regularly and is a cause for concern.
Record keeping
There are a myriad of different types of ﬁles utilised by the DoJCD in its day-to-day activities. 
These ﬁles can be broken broadly into two categories, which dictate how they are handled 
after they are no longer active. ‘A’ category ﬁles are those types of ﬁles which have to be sent to 
archives twenty years after they are ﬁnalised, in terms of internal policy. Category ‘D’ ﬁles are 
ﬁles which may be destroyed after a ﬁxed period of time has elapsed from closure of the ﬁle. 
There are also further sub-categories and the applicable time period varies according to category. 
The list of the DoJCD prescripts in this regard is contained in a master document called ‘Code 
Archives’. After 1994, the ﬁles belonging to the former ‘homeland’ states became governed by 
Code Archives.204
Current records of criminal court proceedings are kept in a ﬁreproof safe with restricted 
access. At the conclusion of a criminal case, these records are transferred to a secure ﬁling area 
where they are kept for a deﬁned regulatory period. After this, they are destroyed. Civil records 
are kept in controlled-access ﬁling areas and are also reasonably secure. It should be noted that 
for the most part, such civil records are available to members of the public and are thus treated 
with less conﬁdentiality than the records of criminal trials. Some civil courts are experiencing 
severe ﬁling constraints and in these courts, old records are often stored in ofﬁces and corridors. 
These records are therefore not very secure, but they are also unlikely to contain conﬁdential 
information. 
Most records in the South African court system are not stored on computer. There are a 
number of current initiatives to examine the feasibility of digital ﬁle storage, but no action has 
been taken so far.  The DoJCD’s e-Justice programme aims to modernise the court system and 
introduce the extensive use of automation. The programme can best be described as falling into 
four main categories: a digital infrastructure including computer equipment and both local and 
wide-area networks; various programmes dealing with the ﬁnancial matters of a court; a work-
ﬂow project which is currently focused on civil and criminal workﬂows in court; and a project 
ofﬁce aimed at running this ambitious undertaking and ensuring that management information 
is available and utilised. The e-Justice programme has met with mixed success.205 
203 ‘The Charter for Service Delivery for Court Users’, 1999, is available at http://www.doj.gov.za/2004dojsite/policy/misc/cour-
tusers.htm.
204 Information provided by DoJCD ofﬁce services, December 2004.
205 Further information on the e-Justice programme is available at www.doj.gov.za.
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With adequate understanding of the court-ﬁling process, it is possible for a member of the 
public (or his or her legal representative) to track the progress of his or her case through the court 
system. Legal professionals generally have little problem in obtaining the relevant information. 
Without knowledge of the court-ﬁling process, members of the public may struggle to do the 
same. It is generally far easier to obtain the relevant information in the high courts than in a large 
magistrates’ court. In high-volume courts, ﬁles are more likely to be moved around the court as 
different service providers work on different aspects of the matter. From time to time, some ﬁles 
are temporarily or permanently misplaced or lost. 
In terms of the PAIA,206 citizens are entitled to request information that is held by both state 
and private bodies. Unfortunately, in practice, it is sometimes difﬁcult to access information 
relating to court cases, particularly when information is not contained in a court ﬁle.207 Section 7 
of the act exempts from the operation of the act, any records that are requested for the purpose 
of criminal or civil proceeding after their commencement. Obtaining information while engaged 
in litigation is subject to the Rules of Court dealing with discovery (disclosure of documents), 
though documents may be requested prior to litigation in terms of the PAIA.
Physical conditions and facilities 
Generally speaking, court buildings in South Africa are in reasonable repair, both those belong-
ing to high courts and most magistrates’ courts. Certain rural courts have run into disrepair, but 
the DoJCD is working actively to address these problems. The department is particularly con-
cerned with providing new court buildings in previously ignored areas. For example, more courts 
are to be located in rural areas, as opposed to more established peri-urban and urban areas. In 
2003/04, 12 new court buildings were completed, including the Constitutional Court. A further 
16 buildings are currently under construction.
There was a total appropriated budget of R229.7 million for new court buildings in the 
2003/04 ﬁnancial year. Currently, 65 DoJCD buildings have been earmarked for renovation or 
new construction. Of the planned new buildings, the overwhelming majority are in rural areas. 
The stationery and furniture available for use in courts are normally suitable for the needs 
concerned. However, once again, certain lower courts face more difﬁculties in this regard. At 
times, court staff experience bureaucratic hurdles to gain access to stationery, fax machines and 
so forth. Once the relevant procedures have been complied with, access is normally granted. For 
example, some courts request that a staff member return his or her old pen before a new pen 
will be issued. Other courts, for instance, insist that authorisation must be obtained before using 
a fax machine. 
There is thus variation across courts, in terms of accommodation and access to resources. 
The pattern of variation seems to correlate closely with the status of the court—whether it is a 
high court or a lower court—and with its proximity to urban areas. Generally speaking, isolated 
206 The Promotion of Access to Information Act, 2000 (Act 2 of 2000), in the Government Gazette Vol. 416, No. 20853, 3 February 
2000.
207 For further information, see the website of the Open Democracy Advice Centre, available at www.opendemocracy.org.za/pub-
lications.html.
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rural magistrates’ courts face more problems in this regard than urban high courts. 
C.  Availability of legislation and jurisprudence
Legislation
The Constitution regulates the national legislative process and stipulates that the publication of 
bills is an essential requirement in the enactment of legislation. Section 81 of the Constitution 
provides that ‘a bill assented to and signed by the president becomes an Act of Parliament, must 
be published promptly, and takes effect when published or on a date determined in terms of the 
act’.  The president is always presented with two copies of a bill for signature. Normally, bills are 
initially drafted in English and one other language determined by the minister presenting the 
bill. This ensures that the full text of a principal or amendment act, irrespective of when it was 
enacted, is available in at least two ofﬁcial languages. The publication requirement applies to 
all legislation, including delegated legislation such as regulations and proclamations, which are 
usually drafted in English only.
The Government Printer publishes all acts and regulations promulgated in terms of legisla-
tion, in the Government Gazette. Since the Government Printer is an ofﬁcial government service 
provider and not a commercial entity in the strict sense of the word, gazettes containing legisla-
tion can be bought for a small price. However, they are not commonly available in public libraries 
or stores, and this will impede access by persons living outside of urban centres. 
The Government Printer publishes amendment acts as and when they are promulgated, 
separately from the relevant principal acts. However, it does not consolidate principal acts so 
as to reﬂect any amendments. The two main commercial publishers of legal material in South 
Africa, namely Juta and LexisNexis (Butterworths), publish consolidated versions of amended 
legislation. The hard copies and electronic versions of legislation, published by the aforemen-
tioned private publishers, are generally used by the members of the legal fraternity as an easily 
accessible source of South African statutory law. Access to these databases is expensive, however, 
and beyond most individuals’ means.
Legislation is widely available electronically over the internet, both from government web-
sites and civil society organisations. National departments, for example, often publish legislation 
administered by them, and Parliament’s website reﬂects legislation that has been enacted since 
1994. 
Several important acts have been published and disseminated in ‘plain language’ and 
‘pocket book’ formats. Some government departments, either on their own initiative or in com-
pliance with statutory obligations, issue brochures and booklets regarding the legislation admin-
istered by them. The DoJCD also disseminates brochures and pamphlets on a regular basis, in 
an attempt to provide user-friendly information on certain pieces of legislation. The following 
are, amongst others, available to members of the public:
• The Family Advocate, a pamphlet that explains the role of the family advocate;
• Equality of All, a booklet explaining the provisions of the Promotion of Equality and 
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Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act, 2000 (Act 4 of 2000), and the functions of 
the equality courts;
• Small Claims Court, a pamphlet giving information on how to institute a claim in the 
small claims court (established in terms of the Small Claims Courts Act of 1984);
• Domestic Violence Destroys Our Society, a booklet providing information relating to the 
Domestic Violence Act of 1998;
• Sheriffs, which contains information on the duties of sheriffs, their training and 
contact details for the South African Institute of Sheriffs; and
• Law Talk for Children, an information booklet that describes how some laws affect the 
rights of children and provides practical suggestions on how children can access the 
justice and legal system.208
This list is not exhaustive and there are many other publications, including a recent maintenance 
booklet and a booklet aimed at explaining the Constitution to citizens. The updating of these 
publications, however, occurs infrequently.
Jurisprudence
The availability of court transcripts to interested parties is regulated in terms of the Magistrates’ 
Courts Act209 and the Supreme Court Act.210 Rules 30 and 66 of the Magistrates’ Courts Rules of 
Court211 deal with the records of proceedings in civil matters, and the records of criminal cases, 
respectively. Rule 30(7) provides that a transcript of proceedings is to be supplied to any person 
upon payment of the cost thereof. Rule 66 contains a similar provision, as far as it relates to 
records of criminal cases.  The same principle applies in respect of the records of the high court 
and Rules 39 and 56 of the Uniform Rules of Court, which regulate high court practice. These 
rules regulate access to such records. 
In all cases, litigants are furnished with a typed copy of the judgment as soon as it is avail-
able. A copy is then also placed in the court ﬁle. Copies of judgments that are not reported in the 
law reports, may then be viewed by gaining access to the court ﬁle. The transcription of judg-
ments is done reasonably speedily and they are made available at a reasonable cost. However, 
after some time has elapsed, access to stored court ﬁles may present some difﬁcultly.
Law reports are regularly published by Juta and LexisNexis. These private publishers make 
the decision as to whether to report a judgment in their respective publications, or not. At times, 
a case will be reported in one law report and not in another. Lay people would be unlikely to 
purchase, and generally ﬁnancially unable to purchase, these reports, but the libraries of all law 
faculties of the universities in South Africa make provision for public access. The DoJCD does 
not provide law reports and textbooks to all magistrates’ courts and high courts from a central 
208 These publications are available at http://doj.gov.za/2004dojsite/brochure_list.html.
209 The Magistrates’ Courts Act, 1944 (Act 32 of 1944).
210 The Supreme Court Act, 1959 (Act 59 of 1959).
211 The Magistrates’ Courts Rules of Court. These rules are made in terms of an act of Parliament, called the Rules Board for 
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distribution point. The acquisition of these manuscripts must be speciﬁcally budgeted for by the 
various ofﬁces, which competes with other needs of the ofﬁce. Most courts, however, have access 
to law reports.
The judgments of the Supreme Court of Appeal are available on its website,212 dating back 
to March 1999. Decisions by the Constitutional Court are available on its website,213 dating back 
to 1995. It is possible to subscribe to an electronic mailing list of the Constitutional Court, which 
notiﬁes interested members of the public when decisions are handed down and provides a link 
to that judgment. The Constitutional Court has also played a leading role in providing the public 
with access to legal documents through its library, which is now also accessible electronically.214
Expert commentary 
There are numerous South African legal textbooks that are widely published on an ongoing 
basis. These textbooks are used by the legal profession, but prove beyond the ﬁnancial means of 
the average person. In relation to the availability of textbooks to courts, one should draw a dis-
tinction between the superior courts, which have well-equipped libraries and dedicated budget 
resources to keep these updated, and the lower courts, where the situation varies from court to 
court and budgetary constraints mean updated textbooks are often not available.
D.  Access to information about the courts
As a rule, the courts must be open to members of the public.215 In certain instances—such as 
those involving maintenance enquiries, cases involving minors or when a speciﬁc application for 
an in camera hearing has been granted—court proceedings are closed to members of the public. 
The print media generally have access to court proceedings except where prohibited or limited 
by statute. For example, reportage in maintenance matters needs the permission of the director-
general (the most senior civil servant in the department) and may not be of such a nature that 
the identity of any minor child concerned can be ascertained. There are analogous provisions 
in the Divorce Act. Recent court applications have been made to allow for broadcast coverage of 
high-proﬁle court proceedings, but these have been largely unsuccessful.
The government keeps statistics on the number of cases before the courts. This informa-
tion, in so far as it relates to criminal matters, is collected by the National Prosecuting Authority 
(NPA) and is analysed by the Court Nerve Centre of the DoJCD (the nodal point for the man-
agement of all information relating to the courts throughout the country). The information is 
readily available to DoJCD employees by way of an internal intranet. It appears that there would 
Courts of Law Act 107 of 1985. The rules are updated when it is deemed necessary.
212 The Supreme Court of Appeal website is available at http://wwwserver.law.wits.ac.za/sca/index.php.
213 The Constitutional Court website is available at http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/site/home.htm.
214 The Constitutional Court online library is available at http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/site/thelibrary/aboutthelibrary.
htm.
215 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, (Act 108 of 1996), Section 34. 
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be no objection, on legitimate request, for the release of such information to non-DoJCD staff 
members. 
The number of appeals is collected by means of the department’s annual return, which is 
submitted by all courts once per year, and which is available as a total annual ﬁgure, per court. 
This is not readily published, but is available on request from the department. 
The records relating to civil case statistics, including family-law matters, are less accurate 
and up-to-date than those relating to criminal matters.216
Case study: Media access to court hearings
Over recent years, there has been a trend within western countries to make the workings of the 
judicial system more accessible to members of the public, by carrying live radio and television 
feeds. The United States of America and Australia have played a leading role in this regard. In 
South Africa, the Constitution requires that court hearings be public, and this includes access 
to the media. However, no live broadcasts of court proceedings are normally carried on radio 
or television. 
After 1994, repeated calls have been made for live broadcasts of court proceedings. This has 
been fuelled by the live broadcast of the workings of various commissions during this period, 
such as the Truth and Reconciliation Committee (TRC), which actively sought such coverage 
in order to expose the content of its hearings as widely as possible to citizens of South Africa. 
The King Commission into cricket match-ﬁxing and related matters was also made available 
for public broadcast, and similarly received a large following. A third example of a commission 
which carried live radio and television broadcasts is the Hefer Commission of Enquiry, which 
dealt with whether the head of the NPA had been an apartheid spy or not.217 On the other 
hand, the enquiry led by Public Protector Selby Baqwa into the arms deal that the NPA had 
been investigating, was closed to the broadcast media.
The argument in favour of allowing live broadcast of judicial proceedings gains strength from 
the fact that South Africa has a low literacy rate, and most people receive information over the 
radio or on television. Furthermore, the live broadcast of proceedings may be more accurate 
than summaries of the day’s proceedings provided by print journalists. On the other hand, 
there is a strong concern that live broadcast by electronic media may have a signiﬁcant impact 
on witnesses, who may be intimidated.
Two recent examples of attempts by the electronic media to gain access to court proceedings 
that were of particular public interest, are the trial of Schabir Shaik in the Durban High Court 
and court proceedings in the Cape High Court relating to Sir Mark Thatcher’s involvement 
in an alleged coup in Equatorial Guinea. The application by the independent broadcaster e.tv 
to cover the Shaik trial was refused on the basis that witnesses might be intimidated by the 
presence of the electronic media. The application by the state broadcaster, the South African 
Broadcasting Corporation (SABC), to cover the proceedings against Thatcher was allowed on 
the basis that it was an application which consisted of legal argument only, and thus witnesses 
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were not required and could not be intimidated by the presence of electronic media. In that 
case, the court allowed the SABC to record a daily package of edited highlights for delayed 
broadcast.
S O U R C E S :
216 Information provided by Court Nerve Centre, DoJCD, December 2004.
217 See the case study on the Schabir Shaik and Jacob Zuma prosecutions, p.34.
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4 
Independence and accountability of 
judges and lawyers
The separation of powers between the judiciary and executive is ﬁrmly enshrined in the 1996 
Constitution, and is also well recognised in South African case law. Since 1994, the appointment 
process for judges and magistrates has been substantially revised, greatly increasing institutional 
protection for the independence of the judiciary. Constitutional provisions also require progress 
in achieving racial and gender transformation. Although a large number of black judges have 
been appointed since 1994, white judges are still in the majority, in part a reﬂection of the limited 
number of suitable black candidates for appointment. To date, there have been no accounts of 
direct interference in the independence of the judiciary from the executive, although controversy 
over afﬁrmative action has led some to voice concerns that a rapidly accelerated process of trans-
formation could lead to a decline in the quality and independence of judges.
A. Judges and magistrates
Judicial independence
The Constitution makes speciﬁc provision for the separation of powers between the judiciary, 
executive and legislative arms of government.218 In terms of Section 165 of the Constitution, the 
judicial authority of South Africa is vested in the courts, which are independent and subject only 
to the Constitution and the law. The section further provides that no person or organ of state may 
interfere with the functioning of the courts and that organs of state, through legislative and other 
measures, must assist and protect the courts to ensure their independence, impartiality, dignity 
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and effectiveness. The section concludes by stating that an order or decision of a court binds all 
organs of state and persons to whom it applies. The separation of powers is a well-recognised 
doctrine in South African case law.219
Adjudication in the South African justice system is provided by judges at Constitutional, 
Supreme and high court level and by magistrates at lower court level. The appointment process 
for judges and magistrates has been substantially revised since 1994, and provides signiﬁcant 
protection against overtly political appointments. 
Section 174 of the Constitution provides for the appointment and removal of all judicial 
ofﬁcers (including both judges and magistrates). In the case of judges, appointments are made 
by the president, after consultation with a specially constituted body called the Judicial Services 
Commission (JSC).220 The JSC is made up of 23 people: the chief justice, the president of the 
Supreme Court of Appeal, one judge president of the high court, the Minister of Justice (or 
nominee), two advocates nominated by the profession, two attorneys nominated by the profes-
sion, one legal academic nominated by academia, six members of the National Assembly (three 
from opposition party ranks), four delegates from the National Council of Provinces and four 
presidential nominees. The process of appointment of other judicial ofﬁcers is to be set out by 
an act of Parliament.
There is no formal conﬁrmation procedure of judges in the legislature and the only scope 
for civil society input (other than the legal profession) would be in terms of presidential nomi-
nees to the JSC. There is no particular qualiﬁcation requirement regarding presidential nomi-
nees, though they are usually distinguished legal practitioners. 
In general, the appointment of judges commences when the head of a court (the presiding 
judicial ofﬁcer) informs the JSC of a vacancy. The vacancy is then published and nominations 
are solicited. Written nominations, together with letters of written consent and curriculum vitaes 
(CVs), are sent to the secretary of the JSC. These documents are then circulated to members of 
the JSC. A sub-committee is then tasked with drawing up a shortlist and forwarding this to the 
full committee for consideration. After approval of the shortlist, the names of the candidates are 
then published. This aspect of the appointment of judges has been criticised, on the basis that 
the public is not aware of the identity of candidates who did not make the shortlist.221 The JSC 
invites comments on the shortlisted candidates from members of the public, and it is customary 
for the relevant professional bodies to respond to this call. The candidate’s professional organisa-
tion is further required to formally submit a letter of ‘good conduct’. Finally, interviews, which 
are open to members of the public, are held.
218 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, (Act 108 of 1996), Chapters 5 & 8. 
219 Some recent examples are Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Others 2004 (4) SA 490 (CC); 
Khosa and Others v Minister of Social Development and Others 2004 (6) SA 505 (CC); United Democratic Movement v President of 
the Republic of South Africa and Others 2003 (1) SA 488 (CC); Geuking v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2003 
(3) SA 34 (CC); and Van Rooyen and Others v The State and Others (General Council of the Bar of South Africa Intervening) 2002 
(5) SA 246 (CC).
220 The JSC was established in terms of the Judicial Service Commission (JSC) Act, 1994 (Act 9 of 1994). 
221 Carmel Rickard, The South African Judicial Service Commission, October 2003, available  at http://www.law.cam.ac.uk/docs/view.
php?doc=879.
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Because of the ANC’s dominant position in the National Assembly and the National Council 
of Provinces, a majority of the JSC could conceivably be constituted from persons over whose 
appointment the ANC has direct control, which could be perceived as amounting to undue politi-
cal inﬂuence over the judicial appointments process. However, there are very few countries in the 
world where judicial appointments are not politically controlled, and the ANC’s de facto control of 
judicial appointments is therefore not, on its own, a reason to question the independence of the 
judiciary in South Africa. However, the civil society participation in the process could be strength-
ened, in particular by making available the names of persons nominated for consideration by the 
JSC, but not shortlisted for interview.
Section 176 of the Constitution provides the framework which governs the terms of ofﬁce 
of judges. This framework is supplemented by the Judges’ Remuneration and Conditions of 
Employment Act.222 Constitutional Court judges are appointed for a non-renewable term of 12 
years. Constitutional Court judges were initially required to retire at the age of 70. Currently, 
Constitutional Court judges continue their service until either they reach the age of 70 or they 
complete 12 years of service, whichever event comes ﬁrst.223 High court judges hold ofﬁce until 
the age of 70 provided that by this age, they have served a period of at least ten years of active 
service. In the event that this is not the case, they may continue to serve as a high court judge 
until such time as the ten-year period has been completed.224 
The removal of judges is governed by section 177 of the Constitution. The grounds for such 
removal are incapacity, gross incompetence or gross misconduct. A judge may only be removed 
on the above-listed grounds on such a ﬁnding by the JSC or by the National Assembly, should 
either one adopt a resolution to this effect. Such a resolution requires at least two-thirds support. 
Since the inception of the current Constitution, such an event has not occurred.
All judges are exempt from civil liability for their actions properly undertaken while exercis-
ing their ofﬁcial duties. Where a civil action arises out of conduct that does not lie within the 
scope of the judge’s duties, the Supreme Court Act225 provides in Section 25 that no summons 
or subpoena in a civil action may be issued out of any court against the chief justice, a judge of 
appeal or any other judge in the high court divisions, unless that court has given consent. In the 
case of a summons or subpoena issued out of an inferior court, the provincial division that has 
jurisdiction to decide an appeal in a civil action from that court, must consent to the issuing of 
the summons or subpoena. 
Section 174(7) of the Constitution provides that other judicial ofﬁcers (including magistrates) 
must be appointed in terms of an act of Parliament. This act must ensure that the appointment, 
promotion and transfer of judicial ofﬁcers, as well as any dismissal steps against them, must take 
place without favour or prejudice. 
222 The Judges’ Remuneration and Conditions of Employment Act, 2001 (Act 47 of 2001), in the Government Gazette Vol. 462, 
No. 25638, 10 December 2003. 
223 Ibid., Section 3(1).
224 Ibid., Section 3(2).
225 The Supreme Court Act, 1959 (Act 59 of 1959).
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Magistrates are appointed in terms of the Magistrates’ Act of 1993,226 read with the 
Magistrates’ Courts Act of 1944.227 The former establishes the Magistrates’ Commission,228 a 
body that considers all applications for vacant posts, transfers, promotions, as well as matters 
relating to misconduct and the dismissal of magistrates. The composition of the Magistrates’ 
Commission is set out in Section 3 of the Magistrates’ Act. The procedures followed for these 
processes are governed by the ‘Regulations for Judicial Ofﬁcers in Lower Courts’, published in 
1994 in terms of section 16 of the Magistrates’ Act. The Magistrates’ Commission makes recom-
mendations to the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development, who then decides on 
appointments, transfers or the promotion of magistrates. The minister also sets the salaries of 
the magistrates. With regard to misconduct or dismissals, the Magistrates’ Commission makes 
recommendations to Parliament to remove the magistrate with whom fault has been found, or 
to impose any other appropriate sanction. 
The tenure of magistrates in ofﬁce is governed by Section 13 of the Magistrates’ Act, which 
provides that a magistrate may serve until he or she reaches the age of 65. At this stage, the 
Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development may, after consultation with the Magistrates’ 
Commission, extend such an appointment for a speciﬁed period.
Before the Magistrates’ Act came into effect in 1994, magistrates were regarded as ordinary 
civil servants, whose appointment and conditions of service were regulated by the Public Service 
Act 111 of 1984. The establishment of the Magistrates’ Commission therefore undoubtedly rem-
edied what would have been an unconstitutional state of affairs.  Nevertheless, according to one 
calculation, 21 of the 27 members of the Magistrates’ Commission are still appointed in one way 
or another by the ruling party.229 This, and other features of the statutory framework governing 
the magistrates’ courts, were challenged in the Van Rooyen case. In a judgment handed down by 
the Pretoria High Court,230 the Magistrates’ Commission was found not to be sufﬁciently inde-
pendent of the executive, mainly on the basis of the commission’s composition. This decision 
was, however, overturned by the Constitutional Court.231 In the Constitutional Court’s view, it 
could not be inferred from the mere fact that a majority of the Commission owed their appoint-
ment to the ruling party, that they would not perform their duties ‘with integrity’. 
In several other cases, the Constitutional Court adopted a reading of ambiguous sections 
that strengthened the role of the Magistrates’ Commission and limited the discretion of the 
minister in taking decisions relating to magistrates. Its ﬁndings relevant to this question may be 
summarised as follows:
226 The Magistrates’ Act, 1993 (Act 90 of 1993).
227 The Magistrates’ Courts Act, 1944 (Act 32 of 1944).
228 The Magistrates’ Act, 1993 (Act 90 of 1993), Section 2.
229 See Jane Franco & Cathi Powell, ‘The meaning of institutional independence in Van Rooyen v The State’ (2004) 121 South 
African Law Journal 562 at 568.
230 Van Rooyen and Others v The State and Others, 2001 (4) SA 396 (T).
231 Van Rooyen and Others v The State and Others (General Council of the Bar Intervening), 2002 (5) SA 246 (CC).
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• The fact that the executive had a strong inﬂuence in the appointment of the members 
of the Magistrates’ Commission did not mean that magistrates’ courts lacked 
institutional independence.232
• Appointment criteria for members of the Magistrates’ Commission (and in particular 
the power of recall granted to the minister) had to be objective, and could not 
accommodate the subjective opinion of the minister.233
• The fact that the executive was actively involved in processing complaints against 
magistrates, as well as in their appointment and the determination of the conditions 
of service, did not in itself pose a threat to the independence of the judiciary.234
• Although magistrates did not have the same ﬁnancial protection as judges did, in 
that there was no provision preventing their salaries from being reduced, this did not 
threaten the independence of magistrates, because there were sufﬁcient safeguards in 
place, such as the requirement to consult the Magistrates’ Commission and the fact 
that only the legislature could reduce salaries.235 
• The grounds for removal of a magistrate, namely for ‘misconduct, continued ill-health 
or incapacity’ was constitutionally permissible, but procedures had to ensure that a 
member of government should not be given the power to exercise discipline over 
judicial ofﬁcers, and that the Magistrates’ Commission was decisively involved at 
every stage.236
This decision has been criticised on the grounds that it ignores the differences in composition 
and functions between the JSC and the Magistrates’ Commission, and places too much weight 
on the judicial review of magistrates’ court decisions by the high court.237 Concerns have also 
been raised that in terms of the Magistrates’ Act, magistrates remain under the control of the 
executive and the Magistrates’ Commission exercises a mainly recommendatory function.238 As a 
practical matter, however, the outcome of the Van Rooyen case has foreclosed further discussion 
of the independence of the magistracy in South Africa.
In general, judges and magistrates are not subject to harassment or pressure from the execu-
tive. However, there have been some instances of criminal attacks on magistrates or magistrates’ 
courts. An example of a magistrate having being killed in a gang-related incident, which occurred 
as a result of a high-proﬁle (but unreported) trial in Cape Town, is the killing of Magistrate Pieter 
Theron. Shortly before his killing, he had sentenced one member of a vigilante group, known as 
232 At [71] and [73].
233 At [93] to [95].
234 At [100] and [101], [123] and [124], [213] and [214], and [241].
235 At [147] to [149].
236 At [162], [165], and [170] to [201].
237 Franco & Powell, op cit.
238 Lazarus Kgalema & Paul Gready, Transformation of the Magistracy: Balancing Independence and Accountability in the New 
Democratic Order, Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, June 2000.  
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People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD), to prison and was at the time of the killing, 
presiding over a trial of two others. Prior to this, the same magistrate presided over a trial against 
Ebrahim Jeneker that was halted as a result of a pipe bomb outside the Wynberg Magistrates’ 
Court, which deterred or killed essential witnesses. Government ministers have also blamed 
PAGAD for attacks that included the shooting of the Wynberg magistrate and the bombing of 
targets in Constantia, Gatesville, Observatory and central Cape Town, but were unable to prove 
or disprove such claims.239
Composition of the judiciary
Section 174(2) of the Constitution speciﬁcally requires that the appointment of judges must 
reﬂect the racial and gender composition of the broader population. This section was included 
in the Constitution in an attempt to correct the imbalances in the composition of the judiciary, 
which existed before 1994. 
In the context of South Africa, the need to transform the racial and gender composition of 
the judiciary is inevitably linked in public discussion with issues of judicial independence (see 
the case study on transformation of the judiciary, on page 62).  As the information below shows, 
both the superior and the lower courts are still dominated by white men, feeding a perception 
that the courts are not ‘independent’ in the sense of being free from racial or gender bias. Thus, 
in a number of criminal cases, white male judges and magistrates have been accused of wrongly 
failing to convict persons charged with inter-race crimes, or of failing to impose adequate sen-
tences.240 On the other hand, there are concerns in some quarters that competent white male 
lawyers are being unfairly excluded from appointment to judicial ofﬁce, especially to the high 
court.241
Table 4.1 below sets out the most recent ﬁgures available on the number of superior court 
judges, together with a breakdown of their race and gender. Currently, no information as to 
religion or ethnicity is recorded.242 It is clear from the data that there is still an urgent need to 
transform the composition of the bench. The JSC has publicly committed itself to redress the 
imbalances. 
239 Dixon & Johns, Gangs, Pagad and the State: Vigilantism and Revenge Violence in the Western Cape, Institute for Security Studies, 
Violence and Transition Series, Vol. 2, May 2001 For more on PAGAD, see case study on PAGAD, p.106.
240 For example, in 2001, the decision by a Vryburg magistrate to acquit 15 white parents on charges of assaulting black pupils. 
Khadija Magardie, ‘Public must root out racist judges’, Mail & Guardiuan, 17 August 2001.
241 See, for example, Serjeant at the Bar, ‘White men can judge’, Mail & Guardian, 23 July 2004.
242 Information provided by the Human Resources Directorate of the DoJCD, in December 2004.
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‘White’ ‘Black’ ‘Coloured’ ‘Indian’
M F M F M F M F
Constitutional Court 11 4 1 4 1 1
Supreme Court of Appeal 18 13 2 2 1
High courts
Kimberley 6 2 1 2 1
Grahamstown 9 7 2
Port Elizabeth 8 5 1 2
Cape Town 28 16 3 5 2 1 1
Bloemfontein 13 10 2 1
Pretoria 29 19 1 8 1
Johannesburg 33 18 3 5 3 4
Pietermaritzburg 10 5 4 1
Durban 14 5 1 3 2 1 2
Mmabatho 5 1 1 2 1
Umtata 7 2 1 3 1
Bisho 4 1 2 1
Venda 2 2
Land claims court 4 1 2 1
Labour court 6 1 1 1 1 1 1
TOTAL 207 110 14 48 8 8 2 13 4
Table 4.2 on page 62 reﬂects the most recent information available on the composition of the 
presiding ofﬁcers in magistrates’ courts.243
243 Information provided by the Secretariat of the Magistrates’ Commission, December 2004.
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Table 4.2: Composition of presiding ofﬁcers in magistrates’ courts
Rank All 
magistrates
‘White’ ‘Black’ ‘Coloured’  ‘Indian’
M F M F M F M F
Regional court 
president
10 3 0 3 2 0 1 0 1
Regional magistrate 305 162 32 64 23 7 3 4 10
Special grade chief 
magistrate
1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
Chief magistrate 22 8 1 8 2 0 1 0 2
Senior magistrate 143 43 17 67 10 1 1 2 2
Magistrate 1341 437 200 377 121 60 33 51 62
TOTAL 1822 653 250 520 158 68 39 57 77
Case study: Transformation of the judiciary in South Africa
South Africa, after 1994, inherited a judiciary that was overwhelmingly white and male. Section 
174(2) of the Constitution acknowledges the obvious need for transformation—it requires that 
the need for the judiciary to reﬂect broadly the racial and gender composition of South Africa, 
must be considered in the appointment of judicial ofﬁcers. The implementation of this require-
ment has not been without controversy, however.
The ﬁrst problem is that as a result of South Africa’s apartheid legacy, there are a limited 
number of black, coloured and Indian legal practitioners who have the necessary skills and 
qualiﬁcations for appointment to the bench. These potential candidates often have lucrative 
legal practices and may be reluctant to take signiﬁcant salary decreases in order to accept 
appointments to the bench. In a meeting of the Justice Portfolio Committee in 2003, the chief 
justice expressed strong concern about this.
Tensions around the appointment of a high court judge to the Cape Bench arose in late 2004, 
where close to two-thirds of the bench remained white. Two candidates were shortlisted, one 
white and the other black. While both candidates were suitably qualiﬁed, the white candi-
date had an outstanding human rights track record and his exceptional qualities were widely 
acknowledged. When the black candidate was ultimately appointed, heated public debate 
ensued around the weight that should be given to the need for racial transformation, which 
included statements from opposition politicians as well as senior members of the bench. At 
the same time, the Minister for Justice and Constitutional Development, Ms Mabandla, also 
raised the need for gender transformation of the bench, which continues to lag behind racial 
transformation.
This debate was taken up by the ruling party, the ANC, early in 2005. In a statement by the 
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Judicial qualiﬁcation, training and remuneration
Section 174(1) of the Constitution provides that any ‘appropriately qualiﬁed woman or man, who 
is a ﬁt and proper person, may be appointed as a judicial ofﬁcer’. There is no further legislative 
or other requirement regarding the qualiﬁcations of a judicial ofﬁcer, although section 174(5) 
requires that ‘at least four members of the Constitutional Court must be persons who were 
judges at the time they were appointed to the Constitutional Court’. Currently, the Constitutional 
Court bench consists of 11 members.
In early 2005, the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development told Parliament that 
her department was drafting legislation to ensure that Justice College was used to train aspirant 
judges. Amongst these pieces of legislation were: the Judicial Services Amendment Bill; the 
Judicial Conduct Tribunal Bill; South African National Justice Training College Draft Bill; and the 
Superior Courts Bill.244 Their collective aim is to rationalise the superior court structure in South 
Africa, to strengthen procedures for the investigation of complaints against judges, and to extend 
existing arrangements for magistrates’ training at the Justice College to judges. In response to 
arguments that some of the provisions in these bills are unconstitutional, the minister has indi-
cated that an amendment to Section 165 of the Constitution would not be out of the question.
In relation to judicial qualiﬁcations, the objections to these bills include concerns over the 
extent to which the executive may properly be involved in the disciplining of judges, the manner 
in which complaints against judges should be investigated, particularly in the current context of 
rapid transformation of the judiciary, and the extent of executive inﬂuence over judicial training. 
National Executive Council (NEC) of the ANC, on 8 January 2005, the NEC called for the trans-
formation of the ‘collective mindset of the judiciary to bring it into consonance with the vision 
and aspirations of the millions who engaged in struggle to liberate our country’. This call for 
popular accountability of the judiciary caused a strong reaction in the media, among opposi-
tion politicians as well as civil society organisations. Two days later the ANC issued a further 
statement, in which it afﬁrmed its commitment to the independence of the judiciary, but also 
re-afﬁrmed its position on the need for popular accountability and visible, speedy transforma-
tion of the judiciary.
The vehemence of the debate caused the chief justice to issue a statement in which he 
expressly afﬁrmed the judiciary’s commitment to ongoing transformation. The debate has not 
died down, but is continuing in the context of the minister’s efforts to introduce training for 
judicial ofﬁcers under the auspices of the DoJCD.
S O U R C E S :
News24, ‘White judges not good enough’, 2 November 2004; 
Minister B Mabandla’s address at the Women Judges Conference, August 2004, is available at www.doj.gov.
za/speeches;
http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/pr/2005/pr0108.html; and
Judge Chaskalson CJ, Public Statement, January 2005, at www.derebus.org.za/current.
244 ‘Debating the transformation of the judiciary: rhetoric and substance’, E-politics SA, IDASA, Edition 3, 2005.
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Much of the detail of these provisions is still under discussion.
The qualiﬁcations required for the appointment of magistrates are dealt with in Section 9 
of the Magistrates’ Court Act. That section provides that a person must hold a Bachelor of Law 
(LLB) degree from a South African university or have passed the Public Service Senior Law 
Examination, or an examination deemed by the minister to be the equivalent to that examina-
tion. In terms of Section 10 of the Magistrates’ Court Act, all magistrates have to pass the Civil 
Service Lower Law Examination or an equivalent examination, and the Magistrates’ Commission 
may give preference to a person who has passed the Civil Service Higher Law Examination. In-
service training takes place on an ad hoc basis in the Magistrates’ Courts, and formal training is 
conducted by the Justice College, an internal DoJCD training unit.
According to information supplied by the Department of Justice, the training of magistrates 
through the Justice College has integrated constitutional values, human rights, sensitisation to 
issues of discrimination and cultural difference into all its courses.245
At Magistrates’ Court level, judicial quality assurance inspections are conducted on a regular 
basis by magistrates serving in the National Judicial Quality Assurance ofﬁce. In the high courts, 
performance assessment is less formal and conducted by the senior presiding ofﬁcer in each 
court. Promotions at the lower-court level are done on a combination of length of service and 
ability. High court promotions are all advertised and approved on application to the JSC. 
The salaries, allowances and beneﬁts of judges are determined by the president and must 
be approved by Parliament. Judges’ salaries may not be reduced246 and are administered by the 
DoJCD, but they are reﬂected as a direct charge against the National Revenue Fund.247 Judges 
receive a car allowance and medical aid contributions, in addition to their salary.  
Table 4.3: Judges’ salaries 248
Designation of ofﬁce Salary per annum
Chief justice R 688 537
Deputy chief justice and president of the Supreme Court of Appeal R 676 930
Deputy president of the Supreme Court of Appeal R 666 076
Judge of the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal R 633 825
Judge president of the high court and the labour court R 629 948
Deputy judge president of the high court and the labour court R 619 811
Judge of the high court and the labour court R 615 130
245 The DoJCD, Annual Report 2003/04, p.72-73.
246 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, (Act 108 of 1996), Section 176(3).
247 The Judges’ Remuneration and Conditions of Employment Act, 2001 (Act 47 of 2001), in the Government Gazette Vol. 462, 
No. 25638, 10 December 2003, Section 3(5).
248 In terms of Notice 1374, Government Gazette 27025, 26 November 2004.
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Acting judges receive the same salary as permanent judges, and an additional amount of R 237 per 
day as practice allowance. Concerns have been raised repeatedly over how judges’ salaries compare 
unfavourably with earnings in private practice, where a senior member of the bar may expect to 
earn at least three to four times as much as a high court judge. This impacts particularly on the 
availability of senior counsel to act on the high court bench. In addition to their salaries, parties 
above the rank of regional magistrate receive a car allowance, and all magistrates receive a housing 
allowance and medical-aid beneﬁts equivalent to those of a deputy director in the civil service. 
Table 4.4:Magistrates’ salaries249
Designation of ofﬁce Salary per annum
Special grade chief magistrate R 388 941
Regional court president R 388 941
Chief magistrate and regional magistrate R 314 162
Senior magistrate R 284 245
Magistrate R 258 576
Oversight of the judiciary
The Judicial Services Commission (in respect of high court judges) and the Magistrates’ 
Commission (in respect of magistrates) are responsible for maintaining appropriate standards 
of judicial conduct.
Misconduct is grounds to remove either a magistrate or a judge from the bench. In the case 
of judges, the appropriate procedure is set out in Section 174 of the Constitution. In terms of that 
section, a judge may be removed from ofﬁce only if the JSC ﬁnds that the judge is guilty of gross 
misconduct (or, in terms of the section, suffers from an incapacity or is grossly incompetent), 
and if the National Assembly calls for that judge to be removed by a resolution supported by at 
least two-thirds of its members. The president may suspend a judge pending an investigation by 
the JSC, but only on the advice of the JSC.
In the case of magistrates, the Magistrates’ Act of 1993 provides for the establishment of reg-
ulation by a complaints committee that must be accessible to the public, investigate allegations 
of improper conduct, and thereupon report to the Magistrates’ Commission.250 The Commission 
makes recommendations to the Minister of Justice regarding the magistrate’s temporary or 
permanent suspension. A magistrate must be removed from ofﬁce by the minister, upon the 
passing of a resolution by Parliament to that effect.251 The Magistrates’ Act also makes provision 
for the drafting of a code of conduct by the Magistrates’ Commission.252 
249 In terms of Notice 1375, Government Gazette 27025, 26 November 2004.
250 The Magistrates’ Act, 1993 (Act 90 of 1993), Sections 6A, 6B & 7.
251 Ibid., Section 13.
252 Ibid., Section 4.
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No judge has been removed from ofﬁce for misconduct. Several magistrates have faced 
enquiries, however. At the beginning of 2005, Parliament was awaiting the reports and recom-
mendations by the Magistrates’ Commission in several instances of alleged misconduct by 
magistrates.253 In the case of Lapping,254 the high court had to consider the implications for an 
accused, where the presiding magistrate was suspended on suspicion of fraud and facing crimi-
nal charges. The court found that in such a case, where it was possible to repeat the presentation 
of evidence in a relatively short time, it would not infringe the accused’s right to a fair trial and 
that the proceedings could thus begin afresh.
In addition to these formal procedures, the process of appeal forms a system of oversight 
for lower-court judges. A number of advocacy groups engage in public-interest litigation to 
determine constitutional questions and thus set a precedent binding on lower courts.255 The 
institutions established by Chapter 9 of the Constitution,256 in support of democracy, have also 
intervened in selected court cases. Both the bar (advocates) and particularly the side-bar (attor-
neys) have formalised programmes by which pro bono assistance is provided in cases that do not 
qualify for legal aid, but which raise legal issues of public importance. There are no publicised 
cases in which a violation of a previous higher-court order or human rights norm was allowed to 
stand, because of the inadequacy of appeal procedures.
B. Lawyers 
Structure and composition of the legal profession
The South African legal system makes provision for a bar and a side-bar. The bar consists of those 
who specialise in representing clients in court, known as advocates, while the side-bar consists of 
attorneys who may handle contentious or non-contentious matters. Advocates must be briefed 
via an attorney, and may not accept funds or instructions directly from a client.257 Traditionally, 
only advocates had the right to appear (argue in person before the court) in high court matters. 
Since 1995, attorneys have been entitled to appear in the high court if they have been admitted 
to do so, in terms of Section 4 of the Right of Appearance in Courts Act.258 
The most recent ﬁgures available from the General Bar Council of South Africa,259 indicate 
that there were 1 871 practising advocates in 2004. 
253 See IDASA, Parliamentary Update No. 6, week of 22 March 2005 to 8 April 2005.
254 S v Lapping [1998] 1 All SA 331 (W).
255 For example, the Legal Resources Centre, IDASA, the Women’s Legal Centre, the Centre for Applied Legal Studies (CALS), 
and the Lesbian & Gay Equality Project have all intervened in litigation as amici curiae, or funded litigation that they considered 
of particular importance.
256 For example, the Commission on Gender Equality and the SAHRC.
257 De Freitas and Another v Society of Advocates of Natal and Another 2001 (3) SA 750 (SCA).
258 The Right of Appearance in Courts Act, 1995 (Act 62 of 1995).
259 Dated April 2004.
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Table 4.5: Racial and gender composition of members of the bar
‘Black’ ‘White’ ‘Indian’ ‘Coloured’
M F M F M F M F
Silks260 7 - 281 10 16 2 7 1
>  5 years 58 8 670 89 37 8 9 4
<  5 years 136 32 283 107 37 30 23 16
Total 201 40 1234 206 90 40 39 21
According to the Law Society of South Africa (LSSA) in 2004, there were 11 245 male attorneys, 4 
226 female attorneys, 2 156 candidate male attorneys, and 1 778 candidate female attorneys. The 
LSSA does not have statistics on the racial composition of its members,261 but it would be safe to 
say that the majority are still white. 
The DoJCD released a draft Legal Practice Bill262 in August 2000. The draft bill provides for 
all the various component members of the legal profession (attorneys, advocates, inhouse legal 
advisers and paralegals) to be regulated by a single umbrella body, the Legal Practice Council. 
According to the bill, no person would be entitled to offer legal services of any kind unless he or 
she were registered as a legal practitioner by the council. Though the bill is not very clear on this, 
it would appear that this rule would also cover paralegals who would need to register as legal 
practitioners in terms of the bill. The current restrictions on their capacity to appear on behalf of 
clients in court, however, would be maintained.
The response to the draft Legal Practice Bill was not uniformly positive, with the organised 
attorneys’ profession in particular raising concerns that it threatened the independence of the 
profession.263 In April 2001, the Minister of Justice accordingly appointed a task team to look into 
the development of the bill. The task team produced its report in April 2002, but was unable to 
reach consensus on a new draft, with the Law Society of South Africa producing its own draft 
bill for consideration. Both the task team’s bill and the Law Society’s bill remain committed to 
the idea of a comprehensive re-regulation of the legal profession, under a single Legal Practice 
260 A ‘silk’ is an advocate of proven experience and skill, who after at least ten years of practice is appointed by the president of 
South Africa as a senior consultus (SC). Each year the bar councils make recommendations about who should be appointed as 
silk.
261 The Law Society of South Africa’s response to a questionnaire, December 2004.
262 Available at http://www.info.gov.za/bills/2000/draftlpb.htm#draft. 
263 See ‘Draft Legal Practice Bill “threatens the independence of the profession”’, De Rebus, October 2000, available at  http://
www.derebus.org.za/archives/2000Oct/news/bill.htm. 
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Council. There are still considerable differences of opinion, however, over the degree to which 
the various components of the legal profession should be allowed to regulate themselves.
Independence 
In general, lawyers are not harassed by government or private individuals and thus conduct their 
professional activities within acceptable conditions. There have been isolated cases of criminal 
pressure being placed on individual lawyers and magistrates, but such instances are not the 
norm.  
Legal training
Both attorneys and advocates are generally required to fulﬁl all the requirements of an LLB 
degree at a South African university,264 although there may be some exceptions determined by 
the minister. Currently, the LLB-degree requirements include courses dealing with human rights 
and legal ethics.
In addition, before an individual may join the bar (although it is possible to practise as an 
advocate without joining the bar, as a so-called ‘independent advocate’) or the side-bar, further 
practical training and examination is provided by the relevant professional body, which in both 
cases involves training and an examination in ethics. 
Before beginning to practise at the bar, a ‘pupillage’ programme of one year’s duration 
is compulsory. This includes a bar examination and a practical course in advocacy training, 
conducted under the supervision of the National Advocacy Training Committee of the General 
Council of the Bar of South Africa. 
After obtaining a four year LLB, a candidate attorney may elect to attend a six months 
Practical Legal Training (PLT) course at one of nine schools around the country. Thereafter, the 
candidate does a year of ‘articles’ (a traineeship) at a suitable ﬁrm or other organisation, such as 
a justice centre. The other alternative available to a candidate attorney is to undertake two years 
of articles. After the two years of articles (or six months of PLT and one year of articles) are com-
pleted, the candidate then sits for the board examination for admission as an attorney. 
The legal training provided to candidate attorneys generally includes components of human 
rights law. Often, the lecturers are well known human rights lawyers or judges, who provide a 
human rights-based approach to essential legal courses.
Disciplinary systems 
The formal professions of both attorneys and advocates have well-established disciplinary 
systems. In general, the profession maintains high standards and ensures that its members 
follow acceptable standards of practice. Both bodies conduct disciplinary enquiries as and when 
required. Where appropriate, members are removed from the respective rolls. Advocates who 
practice independently (that is, they are not members of the bar) and pupils are also subject to the 
264 In terms of Section 3 of the Admissions of Advocates Act 74 of 1964, and Section 2 of the Attorneys Act 53 of 1979.
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disciplinary rules of the bar, and candidate attorneys are subject to the discipline of the side-bar. 
In the case of De Freitas,265 the Supreme Court of Appeal pointed out that the requirement 
that advocates may not receive instructions or funds directly from a client, is to ensure that the 
restrictions placed on attorneys in handling clients’ trust funds continue to protect the public. No 
such protective requirements apply to advocates.
Where a court is made aware of unprofessional conduct by a member of the profession, 
the court will refer its judgment to the relevant body.266 This happens regularly, though not fre-
quently.
265 De Freitas and Another v Society of Advocates of Natal and Another 2001 (3) SA 750 (SCA).
266 For example, this recently happened in Jaftha v Schoeman and Others 2005(1) BCLR 78 (CC).
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5
Criminal justice
South Africa continues to face an extremely high violent crime rate, and issues relating to polic-
ing and prisons remain in need of attention, despite the substantial progress made since 1994. 
Prior to 1994, the South African Police Service (SAPS) was in effect an enforcer of the 
apartheid state, and since then reform has been far-reaching. Rigorous training of ofﬁcers has 
been introduced, accountability mechanisms set up (both civilian oversight secretariats and the 
Independent Complaints Directorate), and a ‘prevention of torture’ policy instated. However, 
public lack of faith in SAPS persists, due in part to limited access to policing in traditionally black 
areas, as well as continuing allegations of abuse, corruption and poor service delivery. 
Prison overcrowding has become an increasing cause for concern, reﬂecting an extremely 
high incarceration rate. Although this cannot be attributed to any one factor, it has led to debate 
on the effects of minimum sentencing as introduced under the 1997 Criminal Law Amendment 
Act, and exploration of alternative sentencing options. Widespread delays in bringing cases to 
court are also contributing to prison overcrowding. 
A. Protection from crime 
Incidence of crime
South Africa has one of the highest rates of violent crime in the world. According to police 
statistics, 19 824 people were murdered in the ﬁscal year 2004/05, a rate of more than 40 per 
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100 000 people each year.267 The recorded murder rate has, however, been falling since 1994, 
when 25 965 people were murdered, including many in political violence leading up to the 
ﬁrst democratic elections. Reported crime rates for other violent crimes are also extremely 
high, including in particular rape and other violent crimes against women. Debates over polic-
ing policy and the rights of accused persons take place against the background of vocal public 
concern at this high level of violent crime. 
The accuracy of police crime statistics has been a controversial issue for some years.268 
Crime statistics are collected from all police stations and units according to a coding system dis-
tributed to station commissioners and published, nowadays, on the police service website.269  In 
July 2000, Police Minister Steve Tshwete controversially suspended publication of police crime 
statistics pending a review of how they were collected.270 Publication of statistics was resumed in 
2001. While criticisms remain, and this is a controversial subject in the South African media, 
both SAPS statistics and independent victim surveys show a drop in crime between 1998 and 
2003.271    
The 2003 National Victims of Crime Survey, conducted by the Institute for Security 
Studies,272 found that just more than one-ﬁfth (22.9 per cent) of all South Africans had been a 
victim of crime in the 12 months preceding the survey. This is slightly less than the overall victi-
misation rate recorded by the 1998 survey, in which one-quarter (24.5 per cent) of South Africans 
had experienced crime over the preceding year. This means that overall, the victimisation rate 
dropped by 1.6 per cent over the previous ﬁve years. According to the SAPS Annual Report for 
2003–2004, reports of all contact crimes (that is, crimes during which persons have been killed, 
seriously injured and/or traumatised) decreased over the previous year (with the exception of 
robbery with aggravating circumstances).273
Despite the decline in crime rates indicated by the victim surveys and the ofﬁcial crime sta-
tistics, South Africans felt less safe in 2003 than they did in 1998. The number of respondents 
feeling unsafe in the 2003 victim survey had doubled over the previous ﬁve years—from 25 per 
cent in 1998 to 58 per cent in 2003.274 
267 See statistics for crime in South Africa, for the period April to March 1994/95 to 2003/04, SAPS, Crime Information Analysis 
Centre (CIAC), available at  http://www.saps.gov.za/statistics/reports/crimestats/2004/_pdf/crimes/rsa_totals03_04_new.pdf. 
268 See for example, Antony Altbeker, ‘Puzzling statistics: Is South Africa really the world’s crime capital?’, Institute for Security 
Studies, Crime Quarterly No. 11, Pretoria, 2005 .
269 The SAPS website is available at http://www.saps.gov.za. 
270 See for example, Martin Schönteich, ‘Moratorium on crime ﬁgures’, in Focus, Helen Suzman Foundation, Johannesburg, 
September 2000.
271 See for example, Borrie la Grange, Pieter du Toit & Liezel de Lange, ‘Crime stats: Mixed response’, News24, Cape Town, 21 
September 2004.
272 Patrick Burton, Anton du Plessis, Ted Leggett, Antoinette Louw, Duxita Mistry & Hennie van Vuuren, National Victims of Crime 
Survey South Africa 2003, Institute for Security Studies, Monograph 101, Pretoria, July 2004.
273 The SAPS, Annual Report 2003-2004.
274 Antoinette Louw, Citizen Perceptions of Crime and Policing in South Africa, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Johannesburg, 1999.
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None of the survey work undertaken has been able to determine what percentage of actual 
crimes is reported to the police. It is generally accepted, however, that except for murder and 
major property crime, few victims report their experiences to the authorities, although the trend 
is that reporting is increasing.275 
Arrest, prosecution and punishment of criminal offenders
The National Victims of Crime Survey also tests perceptions of police performance, in a ques-
tionnaire to all respondents on how they think the police are doing in their area of residence. In 
2003, just over half (52 per cent) of South Africans said that the police were doing a good job in 
their area, while more than two out of ﬁve (45 per cent) thought they were doing a bad job.276 
The number of cases taken on by the prosecution service has declined at a time when 
recorded crime is increasing. The number of serious crimes, as recorded by the SAPS, increased 
by 24 per cent (481 000) between 1994 and 2000. In 1994/95, 350 200 prosecutions and 260 
900 convictions took place. This decreased to 271 100 prosecutions and 211 800 convictions 
in 2000. There was, however, a slight increase in the number of prosecutions and convictions 
between 1999 and 2000. Yet, while the number of recorded serious crimes increased by 24 per 
cent between 1994 and 2000, the number of prosecutions dropped by 23 per cent and convic-
tions by 19 per cent. The chances of the average offender being caught and punished conse-
quently declined after 1994.
Table 5.1: Number of prosecutions, convictions, cases brought to court and crime recorded277
  
 
275 Burton et al, National Victims of Crime Survey South Africa 2003, p.106.
276  Duxita Mistry, ‘Falling crime, rising fear: 2003 National Victims of Crime Survey’, Institute for Security Studies, Crime Quarterly 
No. 8, Pretoria, June 2004.
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The ﬁgures in table 5.2 below278 suggest that the criminal justice system is not performing 
optimally. Only a small percentage of the crimes reported to the police result in anyone being 
convicted (it should be noted, however, that this is true in all countries). 
Table 5.2: Key statistics for the criminal justice system
Crimes recorded in 2000 2 575 617 100 %
Cases referred to court in 2000 609 928 24 %
Cases brought to trial in 2000 271 057 11 %
Convictions in 2000 211 762 8 %
Nevertheless, of the 271 057 cases the prosecution service took to trial in 2000, convictions were 
obtained in 211 762 cases. That is, once cases are successfully processed through most of the 
criminal  justice system, with the suspects ending up in the accused box in court, their chances 
of being convicted are a high 78 per cent. Unlike the police, however, prosecutors have the luxury 
of being able to decide which cases to take on.
B. Policing
Legal framework
Section 12(1) of the Constitution asserts the right of everyone to freedom and security of the 
person. This includes the right to be free from all forms of violence, from either public or private 
sources. Section 205(3) of the Constitution provides for the police service ‘to prevent, combat and 
investigate crime, to maintain public order, to protect and secure the inhabitants of the republic 
and their property, and to uphold and enforce the law’.
Legislation pertaining to policing in South Africa has undergone substantial reform since 
the 1994 democratic elections. The central piece of legislation, the South African Police Service’s 
Act279 was passed in 1995. Since 1994, several other pieces of legislation have been passed which 
impact on policing. These include the Domestic Violence Act;280 the Firearms Control Act,281 
which establishes a comprehensive regulatory system for the possession and ownership of ﬁre-
arms; and the Prevention of Organised Crime Act.282 The constitutionality of the Prevention of 
278 Statistics and information provided from Criminal Justice Monitor, Institute for Security Studies, on performance of the justice 
sector. Information on arrests rendered unavailable. See also the South African Law Commission, ‘Conviction rates and other 
outcomes of crimes reported in eight South African police areas’, Research Paper 18 (no date).
279 The South African Police Service’s Act, 1995 (Act 68 of 1995).
280 The Domestic Violence Act, 1998 (Act 116 of 1998), in the Government Gazette Vol. 414, No. 20778, 30 December 1999.
281 The Firearms Control Act, 2000 (Act 60 of 2000), in the Government Gazette Vol. 430, No. 22214, 10 April 2000.
282 The Prevention of Organised Crime Act, 1998 (Act 121 of 1998), in the Government Gazette Vol. 402, No. 19553, 4 December 
1998.
7 4     S O U T H A F R I C A : J U S T I C E S E C T O R A N D T H E R U L E O F L A W
Organised Crime Act, which allows for civil as well as criminal forfeiture of property, has been 
challenged on several occasions,283 but so far unsuccessfully.
The 1998 Judicial Matters Amendment Act284 changed the law relating to the use of force 
in making an arrest. It enacted an amendment to the Criminal Procedure Act285 (1 of 27 amend-
ments since 1994) that introduced a proportionality requirement for the use of force by a police 
ofﬁcer making an arrest, and set clear limitations on when lethal force may be used. The amend-
ment was only signed into law by the minister in June 2003, almost ﬁve years after it was passed 
by Parliament. This was despite a decision by the Constitutional Court handed down in May 
2002,286 declaring the largely unconstrained permission granted by the Criminal Procedure Act 
to use lethal force in affecting an arrest, to be unconstitutional. Several other proposed pieces of 
legislation that will impact on the police service, such as a new Sexual Offences Bill and the Child 
Justice Bill, have not yet been passed into law.
Forces responsible for policing
The South African Police Service (SAPS) is the main force responsible for policing in South 
Africa. Membership of the SAPS as per the 2003/04 annual report stood at 134 857. This makes 
it one of the biggest police services in the world on a per capita basis, representing one functional 
police member to 450 citizens. However, distances and the geographic size of the country mean 
that resources are spread particularly thin in rural areas. In addition, South Africa’s high crime 
rate means that it has only 1 ofﬁcer per 6 recorded murders per year, as compared to 12 ofﬁcers 
per 6 murders in Zambia, 93 per 6 in Egypt and 249 per 6 in Malaysia.287
Metropolitan or municipal police agencies are a relatively new feature in South Africa, and 
have a mandate that includes crime prevention, trafﬁc and by-law enforcement. These agencies 
have been established in the metropolitan areas of Johannesburg, Tshwane, Cape Town, Durban 
and Ekurhuleni. Local-level police agencies are provided for by the South African Police Service’s 
Act of 1995 and the Constitution.288 
The South African National Defence Force has been used in support operations with the 
police, as well as in border duties and in patrolling rural areas, largely consisting of commercial 
farmland. The use of the army—in particular reserve units known as commandos—in rural 
283 National Director of Public Prosecutions and Another v Mohamed NO and Others 2003 (1) SA 1 (CC); National Director of Public 
Prosecutions v Seevnarayan 2003 (2) SA 178 (C); Phillips v National Director of Public Prosecutions 2003 (6) SA 447 (SCA); and 
National Director of Public Prosecutions v Prophet 2003 (6) SA 154 (C).
284 The Judicial Matters Amendment Act, 1998 (Act 122 of 1998), in the Government Gazette Vol. 402, 
No. 19590, 11 December 1998.
285 The Criminal Procedure Act, 1977 (Act 51 of 1977).
286 Ex parte Minister of Safety and Security and Others: In re S v Walters and Another 2002 (4) SA 613 (CC).
287 Ted Leggett, Antoinette Louw, Martin Schönteich & Makubetse Sekhonyane, Criminal Justice in Review: 2001/2002, Institute for 
Security Studies, Pretoria, October 2002. See ‘Annex E: Policing in South Africa’, for a list of state and private bodies involved in 
policing in South Africa. 
288 Gareth Newham, Local Level Civilian Oversight of the Metropolitan Police Departments in South Africa, Centre for the Study of 
Violence and Reconciliation, Johannesburg, June 2004.
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safety in particular has been controversial, with some units being accused of serious abuses 
against those they have apprehended.289 The use of the military both for border patrols relating to 
the control of immigration and crime, and for rural safety, is being phased out and both respon-
sibilities will be taken over by the SAPS.290
The private security industry has expanded rapidly over the last decade and now stands at 
almost four private security members to every SAPS member. There were roughly 216 000 
uniformed security guards to 90 000 uniformed SAPS members in 2000.291 A 2004 press 
report alleged that as many as four out of ﬁve police ofﬁcers take second jobs to supplement their 
very low pay.292 These ofﬁcers often ﬁnd work in the security industry. Although this potentially 
gives rise to conﬂicts of interest, there have been no serious allegations of outright hire of SAPS 
members by powerful businesses or for political interests.  
In addition, most South Africans (61 per cent according to the 2003 Institute for Security 
Studies Victim Survey) participate in volunteer neighbourhood watches and anti-crime organisa-
tions.293  There have been occasional reports of community crime-prevention initiatives degener-
ating into vigilantism.294 Recently, in a move to introduce uniformity and a standard code, neigh-
bourhood watches have been offered training under the auspices of the Provincial Departments 
of Community Safety, and have registered with local community police forums.
Policing strategy
The SAPS strategic plan for 2004 to 2007 targets a seven per cent reduction in contact crimes.295 
These crimes refer to physical contact between victim and perpetrator and include murder, 
attempted murder, rape, attempted rape and assault. These crimes account for some 40 per 
cent of serious crime reported. Within this framework, the SAPS have set themselves four 
strategic priorities: combating organised crime; combating serious and violent crime; reducing 
the incidence of violence against women and children; and improving service delivery at police 
stations. 
The strategic plan ﬂows from the National Crime Combating Strategy, adopted by the police 
in April 2000, which set out a two-phase approach to achieving these goals. Phase 1, from 2000 
to 2003, sought to stabilise crime levels, and Phase 2, from 2004 to 2010, aims to normalise 
crime and policing. 
289 Human Rights Watch, Unequal Protection: The State Response to Violent Crime on South African Farms, New York, 2001.
290 Minister for Safety And Security, Mr Charles Nqakula’s Parliamentary media brieﬁng on Justice, Crime Prevention and Security 
Cluster, 28 October 2004, is available at http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/2004/04110114451001.htm.
291 The Institute for Security Studies, Crime Index, Vol. 4, No. 3.
292 Graeme Hosken & Bongani Mthembu, ‘Cops for hire: Meagre salaries lead to rampant moonlighting’, The Star, 20 May 
2004.
293 Burton et al, National Victims of Crime Survey South Africa, 2003.
294 The Institute for Security Studies, The Development of Vigilantism in South Africa, Monograph No. 72, March 2002.  See also 
Section 5.F on ‘Non-state action against crime’, p.104.
295 The Ministry for Safety and Security, Strategic Plan of the South African Police Services 2004-2007, 2004, is available at www.saps.
gov.za/saps_proﬁle/strategic_framework/strategic_plan/2004_2007/strategic_plan.htm. 
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The initial phase of this policing plan sets an approach where the police identify those police 
stations with the highest crime rates (those areas where more than 50 per cent of the most 
serious reported crimes occur, as identiﬁed by the SAPS’ Crime Information Analysis Centre) 
and adopt measures to stabilise crime in their catchment areas. The rationale was that once 
this had been achieved, it would be possible to undertake ‘normal ’ crime management. Under 
this plan, approximately 140 station areas were identiﬁed for particular attention from a total of 
almost 1 200 stations. In parallel to this, a number of priority crimes have been identiﬁed, par-
ticularly those impacting on women and children.296
Following the stabilisation phase, the normalisation component of the strategy activated in 
2004 requires each station to come up with a crime-prevention plan which is wider than just 
policing, and in the process, to engage with non-government role-players in the station area. 
These crime-prevention projects aim to present a multi-pronged strategy that seeks to provide a 
proactive policing service to discourage the incidence of all types of crime, especially serious and 
violent crime, organised crime and crimes against women and children.  
The SAPS have moved to establish a system of Sector Policing, breaking station areas 
into smaller, manageable geographical zones known as sectors, and establishing a system of 
communication and contact between dedicated ofﬁcers stationed in the sector and the affected 
community.
However, a lot remains to be done. While considerable effort has gone into equitable allo-
cation of policing, resources remain skewed to former historically white areas. For example, in 
small rural towns, the only police station is usually located in the centre of town and in the his-
torically white area. Access to policing in urban areas is likely to be better than in the countryside. 
Equally, one of the ways in which an effort has been made to upgrade the facilities in police sta-
tions, is in the provision of private facilities for taking statements from complainants. However, 
in many rural areas or among the busier urban stations, the lack of privacy for the reporting 
of sensitive crimes, such as rape, is evident. Victims of these crimes are being discriminated 
against by the absence of such facilities.297 These problems arise largely as a result of the legacy 
of apartheid, rather than current discrimination, as well as population demographics, infrastruc-
ture and geographical terrain. But they do call into question the ability of the SAPS to meet its 
constitutional obligations, which are to provide equal protection to all.298 
296 Ted Leggett, Antoinette Louw, Martin Schönteich & Makubetse Sekhonyane, Criminal Justice in Review: 2001/02, Institute for 
Security Studies, Pretoria, October 2002.
297 Sipho Ntuli & Antoinette Louw, ‘The challenge of policing rural crime’, in the Institute for Security Studies Crime Index, Vol. 2, 
1998; Eric Pelser, Antoinette Louw & Sipho Ntuli, Poor Safety: Crime and Policing in South Africa’s Rural Areas, the Institute for 
Security Studies, Pretoria, May 2000.
298 Antoinette Louw & Mark Shaw, ‘Putting the police in place: The distribution of policing resources in South Africa’, in Crime 
Index, Vol. 2, the Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, 1998. 
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Civilian input into policing decisions
In addition to the police’s internal strategic-planning processes, structures have been established 
to obtain input from non-police ofﬁcials and the general public into police decision-making. The 
two most important mechanisms for doing so are the civilian secretariats, established at national 
and provincial level, and the community police forums (CPFs) at each police station.
In light of South Africa’s history, those involved in drafting the Constitution were particu-
larly concerned with ensuring that South Africa’s security forces would be brought ﬁrmly under 
democratic control. As one of the measures to achieve this, Section 208 of the Constitution pro-
vides that ‘[a] civilian secretariat for the police service must be established by national legislation, 
to function under the direction of the cabinet member responsible for policing’. In accordance 
with this provision, the South African Police Service’s Act, passed in 1995, sets out the mandate 
of the National Secretariat for Safety and Security, and also provides for secretariats to be estab-
lished in each province. Their responsibilities include advising the minister for safety and secu-
rity in the exercise of his powers, and promoting democratic accountability and transparency in 
the police service. The ﬁrst national secretary for safety and security was appointed in 1995, and 
the national and provincial secretariats were established shortly thereafter.  Initially, many of the 
people stafﬁng the secretariats had histories in non-governmental organisations, which inﬂu-
enced the nature of the secretariats and gave them a strong emphasis on transformation of the 
police service. In the ﬁrst ﬁve years of the National Secretariat’s existence, it played a prominent 
role in formulating policy and overseeing its implementation.  After 1999, with a new minister 
in place, its capacity and inﬂuence diminished; some functions were transferred to the SAPS, 
and the head of the secretariat lost his intended inﬂuential role, which was as a civilian counter-
balance to the police leadership.
The provincial secretariats are autonomous bodies, answerable to the provincial executives 
and independent of the National Secretariat. Some of the provincial structures are well funded, 
with budgets and staff complements varying from one province to another.  Each of the provin-
cial secretariats has a different conﬁguration, but they broadly carry out the same type of work, 
including policy monitoring, responding to service-delivery complaints, and conducting crime 
awareness campaigns in their provinces. 
A recent evaluation of the National and Provincial Secretariats for Safety and Security indi-
cates that these civilian oversight mechanisms have had, at best, mixed success and have made 
a limited contribution to police transformation.299 
Simultaneously, there have been efforts to increase civilian input into policing decisions at 
community level, in an attempt to build community trust in South Africa’s historically illegiti-
mate police service.  Starting from the early 1990s, and initially on an ad hoc basis, community 
police forums were established at police-station level. The 1993 Interim Constitution made the 
ﬁrst ofﬁcial reference to the establishment of CPFs, and the 1995 South Africa Police Service’s 
Act formally established and detailed the functioning of the CPFs, emphasising their role in 
299 Duxita Mistry & Judy Klipin, ‘Keeping the police in check: Assessing the Secretariats for Safety and Security’, Crime Quarterly, 
No.10, the Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, 2004. 
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improved policing as well as greater local accountability. 
 Most police stations have these structures, which are at various levels of effectiveness. The 
police and community members co-operate in identifying key concerns and seeking appropriate 
solutions. Joint activity allows for the community to take greater responsibility for both crime 
prevention and for addressing the underlying social causes of crime. In general, the CPFs hold 
regular meetings, normally at the local police station. Members of the forum may visit victims, 
assist in mediating in conﬂict situations or engage the broader community on crime-preven-
tion initiatives. To undertake some of these functions requires resources such as administrative 
support and transport to visit victims. Such support is not always forthcoming and is thus, in 
fact, limiting the role of the forum. The strength and effectiveness of CPFs varies considerably, 
and is reliant on strong leadership and adequate resources. In the context of highly unequal com-
munities (such as rural farming areas), they are, perhaps inevitably, often dominated by powerful 
interests, at the expense of more vulnerable groups.300
Civil society engagement with the legislative process, in relation to policing, has been 
substantial. For example, an extensive civil society project to monitor implementation of the 
Domestic Violence Act identiﬁed a number of deﬁciencies in police response. The consortium 
of organisations involved have subsequently lobbied to have the remedies identiﬁed incorporated 
into the regulations governing the police service.301 ‘Gun Free South Africa’ has led a successful 
advocacy campaign against the possession of guns, which has impacted signiﬁcantly on the 
legislation and its regulations.302 Civil society has also been vocal on the provisions relating to 
the use of force. 303
The National Assembly has legislative power and oversight over the police as a national 
department. This oversight is carried out through the National Portfolio Committee of Safety 
and Security. The National Council of Provinces deals with provincial affairs. In this regard, it 
considers any proposed legislation and policy before it from a provincial perspective, and doing 
so can pass, reject, amend or propose any legislation. This work is carried out through the 
Select Committee on Security and Constitutional Affairs, and links strongly to the provincial 
legislatures and their respective portfolio committees. While the quality of oversight has varied, 
the committee has made an important contribution to the improved accountability of the police 
service. 
300 The Human Rights Committee of South Africa, ‘Popular justice’, Quarterly Review, January 2001, p. 94; Eric Pelser, Johann 
Schnetler & Antoinette Louw, ‘Not everybody’s business: Community policing in the SAPS’ priority areas’, the Institute for Security 
Studies, Pretoria, 2002.
301 Penny Parenzee, ‘While women wait … Monitoring the Domestic Violence Act’, in Crime Index, Vol. 5, the Institute for Security 
Studies, Pretoria, 2001; see also the Gender Advocacy Program, available at http://www.gender.co.za 
302 See the Gun Control Alliance website, available at http://www.gca.org.za/.
303 David Bruce, ‘Use of Force Review as a learning pocess’, in Crime and Conﬂict, No. 20, Centre for the Study of Violence and 
Reconciliation, Winter 2000. 
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Qualiﬁcation, training and remuneration of police ofﬁcers
The entry-level qualiﬁcation for the SAPS is now a matric or senior certiﬁcate qualiﬁcation 
(which refers to school-leaving certiﬁcates generally obtained after at least 12 years of schooling 
and national examinations), being ﬂuent in English and one other South African language, and 
having a driver’s licence. The applicant may not have a criminal record or ‘any visible tattoos that 
are contrary to the objectives of the SAPS’.304
Police training has been signiﬁcantly transformed since 1994. A few milestones highlighted 
in an article on police transformation in South Africa,305 include:
• The introduction of a rigorous selection system for new members; 
• The revision of the entire basic training curriculum; 
• The introduction, in 1997, of a code of conduct for the police; 
• The implementation of a Special Service Order on the use of force in affecting arrest, 
intended to bring the regulatory framework relating to the use of lethal force more in 
line with the Constitution; 
• The development and introduction of an anti-torture policy; and
• The reorganisation and retraining of public-order police. 
Currently, basic training is structured over three phases and 24 months:
• Phase 1: Basic training and tactical policing programme—6 months;
• Phase 2: Field training as student constable in uniform—6 months (three inside the 
service centre and three outside); and
• Phase 3: In-service training—12 months. 
A three-month Detective Learning Programme has also been introduced, which provides for 
specialised detective training. 
A human rights training curriculum has been developed for the SAPS, although there is 
debate as to whether this curriculum should be provided as a stand-alone module during basic 
training or threaded throughout all functional training. The head of the Independent Complaints 
Directorate (ICD) recently questioned the impact of current training: ‘As the ICD, while we 
understand the difﬁculties faced by the police in terms of policing and reducing crime effectively, 
as well as the killing of police ofﬁcers, we feel that more should still be done in inculcating a 
culture of policing within a human rights ethic.’306 
The SAPS Code of Conduct, adopted in 1997, includes an obligation that in carrying out 
duties, police ‘shall at all times uphold the Constitution and the law ; be guided by the needs of 
304 Application for appointment in terms of the South African Police Service’s Act, 1995 (Act No. 68 of 1995).
305 David Bruce, New Wine from an Old Cask, The South African Police Service and the Process of Transformation, Centre for the Study 
of Violence and Reconciliation, 2002.
306 Advocate Karen MacKenzie, quoted in Business Day, 23 September 2004.
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the community ’; will ‘uphold and protect the fundamental rights of every person; act impartially, 
courteously, honestly, respectfully, transparently and in an accountable manner ’; and will ‘exer-
cise the powers conferred upon … (them) in a responsible and controlled manner ’.307
Salary levels for rank and ﬁle police ofﬁcers are low, while those with the rank of director 
and  upwards enjoy higher remuneration levels. Eighty-ﬁve per cent of SAPS’ functional staff 
are inspectors and lower. Inadequacy of pay levels are therefore cited as major reasons for moon-
lighting by police ofﬁcers.308
Table 5.3: SAPS per annum salary rates
National commissioner R 752 000—R 811 000
Provincial/divisional commissioner R 584 000—R 752 000
Assistant commissioner R 447 126—R 518 889
Director R 408 000—R 440 000
Senior superintendent R 202 548—R 227 640
Superintendent R 168 291—R 202 000
Captain R 96 792—R 112 704
Inspector R 77 937—R 96 549
Sergeant R 52 452—R 63 708
Constable R 44 205—R 51 534 
Police abuses   
Before 1994, the South African police force had been one of the main enforcement mechanisms 
of the apartheid state, and was routinely involved in torture, summary execution and other 
abuses. Although the situation has improved considerably since the end of the apartheid era, 
allegations of misconduct by police ofﬁcials have continued. Statistics in this area are, however, 
unreliable, not least because complaints may be reported to any one of a number of agencies—
the police themselves, the ICD, the SAHRC or others—so there is no consolidated register of 
complaints.309 
Largely in response to ongoing allegations of abuse, the SAPS introduced a ‘prevention of 
torture’ policy in 1998/99.310 Nevertheless, civil society monitoring efforts (which are less numer-
307 The SAPS Code of Conduct is available at  www.saps.gov.za. 
308 Graeme Hosken & Bongani Mthembu, ‘Cops for hire: Meagre salaries lead to rampant moonlighting’, The Star, 20 May 
2004. 
309 Themba Masuku, ‘Numbers that count: National monitoring of police conduct’, Crime Quarterly, No. 8, Centre for the Study 
of Violence and Reconciliation, 2004.
310 An extremely informative paper on police misconduct is by Piers Pigou, Monitoring Police Violence and Torture in South Africa, 
Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, April 2002.
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ous than before 1994) continue to reveal the prevalence of police violence. The KwaZulu-Natal 
Campaign against Torture, for example, monitored six police stations in KwaZulu-Natal twice 
weekly for six months, between 2001 and 2002, ﬁnding 79 alleged incidents of torture. 
Compliance with issues such as the use of minimum force remains contentious. According 
to the ICD, delays in implementing rules governing the use of lethal force by the SAPS, have 
contributed to the high number of deaths by shooting at the hands of police.311 During 2004/05, 
652 cases of death in custody or as a result of police action were reported to the ICD, compared 
to 714 received in 2003/04 (a decrease of 9 per cent). Three hundred and sixty-six of these deaths 
occurred as a result of shootings.312 In the same period, reports of serious criminal offences com-
mitted by the police increased by 18 per cent to 1 731 cases (compared to 1 473 in 2003/04). Cases 
of less serious misconduct decreased by 8 per cent from the previous year, to 3 407, according 
to reports.
Amnesty International has also conducted research in this area and has noted its serious 
concerns.313 Human Rights Watch has reported abuses carried out by Farm Watch units set up 
in rural areas, which are private units but whose members are frequently police reservists who 
co-ordinate activities with the police.314 The US State Department, in its reports on human rights, 
has registered similar concerns.315  
The SAPS investigated over 14 600 alleged crimes involving its members in 2000. Figures 
for previous years have been similar.316 According to ﬁgures released by the minister of safety 
and security, on average 1 200 ofﬁcers were convicted of criminal offences every year between 
1995 and 1998.317 During the same period, approximately 170 SAPS members were convicted 
311 Business Day, 23 September 2004.
312 The ICD presentation to the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee, June 2005, is available at http://www.pmg.org.za/docs/2005/
050622icd.htm. The 652 death cases include: 128 natural deaths; 42 suicide cases; 45 cases of injuries sustained in custody; 71 
cases of vigilantism, i.e. cases of injuries inﬂicted by members of the public prior to detention of the suspects; and 366 cases 
of shootings. The 45 cases of injuries sustained in custody, mainly refer to incidents where detainees fatally attacked fellow 
detainees.
313 Amnesty International, Policing to Protect Human Rights: A survey of police practice in countries of the Southern African 
Development Community, 1997-2002, London, 2002.
314 Human Rights Watch, Unequal Protection: The State Response to Violent Crime on South African Farms, New York, 2001. See also, 
Human Rights Watch, World Report 2005, New York, 2005, in an excerpt dealing with South Africa, which is available at http://hrw.
org/english/docs/2005/01/13/safric9886.htm.
315 The US Department of State, Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2004, is available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/
hrrpt/2004/. 
316 Sibusisu Masuku, ‘Policing the police: SAPS members charged and convicted of crime’, Crime Index, 
Vol. 5, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, 2001.
317 Statistics provided by the minister of safety & security in June 1998 show that 3 767 ofﬁcers were convicted over a three-year 
period, for a range of crimes from murder and rape, to petty offences. This included 252 convictions for serious assault and a 
further 556 convictions for assault;  ‘Nearly 4 000 police guilty of a range of crimes’, Cape Argus, 24 June 1998.
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of murder, and a further 220 for attempted murder—it is not clear how many of these cases 
involved incidents that occurred during the course and scope of policing duties.318 The ICD 
reported to Parliament that its investigations had resulted during 2003/04 in 12 police ofﬁcers 
being convicted of murder, 7 of attempted murder, 2 of culpable homicide and others of several 
other offences.319
Between 1996 and 2001, 20 779 corruption cases were reported to the SAPS’s anti-cor-
ruption unit. The closure of the unit (with the intention that the work should be handled by the 
ICD) has made it difﬁcult to ascertain levels of corruption and has raised suspicion around sub-
sequent ﬁgures. In 2001 and 2002, only 2 370 cases were recorded.320 The SAPS annual report 
for 2003/04 stated that 347 police ofﬁcers were suspended because of alleged involvement in 
corrupt activities.321 
There has also been criticism raised against the police of targeting illegal immigrants in the 
search and seizure operations associated with the National Crime Combating Strategy. Research 
carried out by the Institute for Security Studies noted that ‘concerns were expressed regarding 
the sometimes crude manner in which suspected illegal immigrants were identiﬁed or, in some 
instances, incorrectly identiﬁed. Disquiet was also expressed at the treatment that suspected 
illegal immigrants (have) received at the hands of the police and ofﬁcials of the Department of 
Home Affairs’.322
In June 2005, the Constitutional Court found the Ministry for Safety and Security liable for 
the rape of a woman by three policemen, against the ministry ’s arguments that the men were off 
duty and had acted in a private capacity. The court found that although their conduct was a devia-
tion from their duty, there was a close enough relationship between their employment and their 
wrongful conduct to make the ministry vicariously liable. The case highlights the ongoing threat 
to women of abuse and assault at the hands of the police, but also goes some way to exposing the 
culture of silence and denial in the SAPS that keeps the police from acknowledging this problem 
and assuming responsibility. This judgment, after a long battle through the lower courts, is an 
important milestone in providing the remedies necessary to address such abuses. 323  
A survey by the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA), on behalf of Gun-Free 
South Africa, revealed that between 1997 and 2001, two-thirds of ﬁrearms recovered by the SAPS 
318 Piers Pigou, Monitoring Police Violence and Torture in South Africa, Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, April 
2002. According to the ICD, 383 deaths occurred in police custody in 2003/4 and a further 384 as a result of police action (includ-
ing, for example, individuals who died in crashes involving police vehicles). The majority of the deceased were male, black, 
between the ages of 19 and 35, and had died on the scene of the alleged crime.
319 See the ICD brieﬁng on the 2003/04 annual report to the Safety and Security Portfolio Committee, 5 November 2004, which 
is available at http://www.pmg.org.za/viewminute.php?id=4827. 
320 Themba Masuku, Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, input to Policing Workshop, 21—23 September 2004. 
321 The SAPS Annual Report, 1 April 2003 to 31 March 2004, p.9.
322 Eric Pelser, ‘Operation Crackdown: The new policing strategy’, Crime Index, Vol. 4, the Institute for Security Studies, 2000.
323 Jenni Evans, ‘Rape by cops: State loses court case’, the Mail & Guardian, 13 June 2005.
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could not be accounted for.324 According to the auditor-general’s annual report in 2004, a total 
of 935 ﬁrearms valued at more than R2 million were lost by or stolen from police members in 
2003/04.325 This was up from 921 the previous year. R47 million is spent on ﬁrearms annually by 
the SAPS, of which some R16 million goes towards ammunition and spares.326 The loss by value, 
therefore amounts to some 6.5 per cent of the total annual SAPS expenditure on ﬁrearms.
Investigation of complaints against the police
In the context of South Africa’s past of human rights abuses at the hands of the police, the draft-
ers of the Interim Constitution that came into effect in 1994 emphasised the need for civilian 
oversight of the police, not just in setting agendas (as with the establishment of the National 
and Provincial Secretariats for Safety and Security) but also in investigating public complaints of 
police abuse. Section 222 of the Interim Constitution made provision for the establishment of an 
independent complaints mechanism to ensure ‘that complaints in respect of offences and mis-
conduct allegedly committed by members of the service, [were] investigated in an effective and 
efﬁcient manner’.327  In accordance with this provision, the Independent Complaints Directorate 
(ICD) was established by Section 50 of the South African Police Service’s Act 68 of 1995; it began 
operating in 1997. Although—unfortunately—the ﬁnal 1996 Constitution did not include refer-
ence to the ICD among the institutions mandated by Chapter 9,328 the ICD remains in place as a 
statutory body. It has ofﬁces in all the provinces, and as of 2005, a total staff of 186 people.329
The ICD’s mandate includes the investigation of deaths in police custody, and as a result, of 
police action and of complaints against the police. Under the South African Police Service’s Act, 
the police are obliged to report to the ICD any cases of death in custody or as a result of police 
action, a requirement that, when introduced in 1995, immediately and dramatically increased 
the numbers of reported deaths involving the police.330 Nevertheless, there are concerns that the 
police, who are required to report cases of deaths in their custody, do not always do so in time and 
in consequence, a true reﬂection of the full extent of such deaths may not be shown.331
324 ‘SAPS “lose track of ﬁrearms’”, the Mail & Guardian, 26 March 2004; see also ‘Stats sheet, May 2002’, available on the Gun 
Control Alliance website, at http://www.gca.org.za/facts/briefs/44.htm. 
325 The SAPS, 21 September 2004.
326 Themba Masuku, Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation input to Policing Workshop, 21—23 September 2004.
327Fur further discussion, see Human Rights Committee of South Africa, Access, Vol. 1, Quarterly 2, April 1999, p. 21.
328 For further information on Chapter 9 institutions, see Section 6.H on ‘Ofﬁcial mechanisms to assert rights outside the court 
system’, p.124.
329 See the ICD presentation to the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee, March 2005, available at http://www.pmg.org.za/view-
minute.php?id=5621.
330 In 1995, the last year before the ICD began operating, for which ofﬁcial statistics are available, 226 deaths in custody or as a 
result of police action were reported by the police (under pressure from human rights organisations, who had previously indepen-
dently recorded only tens of deaths in custody each year). The ICD’s annual report for the year April 1997 to March 1998, recorded 
737 deaths. See Bronwen Manby, ‘The Independent Complaints Directorate: An opportunity wasted?’ in the South African Journal 
on Human Rights, Vol.12(3), 1996.
331 Piers Pigou, Monitoring Police Violence and Torture in South Africa, Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, April 2002.
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The mandate of the ICD is contained in three pieces of legislation. In the ﬁrst instance, 
Section 53(2) of the South African Police Service’s Act provides that the body :
• May mero motu, or upon receipt of a complaint, investigate any misconduct or 
offence allegedly committed by a member, and may, where appropriate, refer such 
investigation to the commissioner [of police] concerned;
• Shall mero motu, or upon receipt of a complaint, investigate any death in police 
custody or as a result of police action; and
• May investigate any matter referred to the [Independent Complaints] Directorate 
by the minister [of safety and security] or member of the executive council [of a 
provincial government].332
Section 18 of the Domestic Violence Act333 also provides for the ICD to investigate failure by a 
police ofﬁcer to comply with obligations under the Domestic Violence Act or a national instruc-
tion issued under this act. The national commissioner of police is required to report to Parliament 
on steps taken to implement recommendations from the ICD. In terms of Section 64 of the 
South African Police Service’s Act, read with Regulation 9 and Annexure 5 of the Regulations for 
Municipal Police Services, the ICD has been given the same civilian oversight duties in respect 
of newly established municipal police services that it has in respect of the SAPS.
During the year April 2004 to March 2005, the ICD received 5 790 complaints falling 
within its mandate, a decrease of two per cent compared to the same period in the ﬁnancial year 
2003/04, when it recorded 5 903 complaints334—by comparison, in the ﬁrst two years of the 
ICD’s existence it administered only 1 500 complaints, an indication of the increasing impor-
tance of this body.335 
In practice, for most of the complaints it receives, the ICD only monitors investigations 
carried out by the Internal Investigation Units of the SAPS. Even in the case of deaths, which 
the South African Police Service’s Act requires the ICD to investigate directly, it does not do so 
in all cases.
The ICD receives no more than a third of the complaints investigated by the police them-
selves. To a large extent, this is due to the fact that only in the case of police-related deaths is 
there an obligation on the SAPS to report the incident to the ICD. No such obligation exists in 
the case of assault with intent to do grievous bodily harm, which is the category used to capture 
torture. Several commentators have questioned whether the ICD has the resources and capacity 
to effectively fulﬁl its mandate. Even where the ICD does carry out its own investigations, it has 
had problems recruiting and training sufﬁcient numbers of skilled investigators, as recognised 
332 The ICD, Annual Report 2002/03, 2003.
333 The Domestic Violence Act, 1998 (Act 116 of 1998).
334 The ICD presentation to the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee, June 2005, available at http://www.pmg.org.za/docs/2005/
050622icd.htm. 
335 The Human Rights Committee of South Africa, Access, Vol. 1, Quarterly 2, April 1999, p. 21.
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by the ICD itself in its reports to Parliament.336 Finally, the ICD has only reporting powers, and 
no disciplinary or other powers over the police in order to enforce its ﬁndings.337 
The Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Safety and Security, responsible for oversight of 
the ICD, has also raised signiﬁcant concerns about its performance, including a lack of capacity 
to respond to the duties placed on it, failure to submit reports to the committee, a lack of detail 
and data in its reports, and problems in accounting for expenditure.338 Following a series of meet-
ings, the committee made recommendations to the minister for safety and security in August 
2005, including one on the need to ensure that the ICD had the capacity to fulﬁl its mandate in 
terms of the Domestic Violence Act and the inspection of police cells. In addition, the commit-
tee proposed that the minister should look at the feasibility of developing separate legislation to 
govern the functioning of the ICD, instead of retaining this in the SAPS’s Act. The committee 
also raised concerns about the role and capacity of two new units within the ICD, a research 
unit established to enable better analysis and reporting on the complaints received, and a new 
‘anti-corruption command’, which was intended to take over the previous SAPS’s anti-corrup-
tion unit. 
A review of the ICD’s operations is clearly needed, with possible restructuring as a result. 
In this process, it is important that the key role of this institution—already downgraded with its 
omission from the list of Chapter 9 institutions in the 1996 Constitution—is maintained and 
strengthened. International experience shows that independent civilian oversight of the police is 
of crucial importance in ensuring effective performance that is also respectful of human rights.
The ICD is supported by a range of other agencies and institutions with varying degrees 
of oversight over the police, including the auditor-general, the public protector, the SAHRC, 
the civilian Secretariats for Safety and Security and the Parliamentary Portfolio Committees. 
However, this raises problems of its own: the absence of a single complaints register makes it 
difﬁcult to know exactly how much abuse is being reported or to track cases. And in practice, 
most cases reported are referred back to the SAPS for investigation, and are then given capacity 
limitations within these various bodies. 
C. Fair trial
Right to representation
Section 35 of the Constitution provides for the rights of detained, arrested and accused persons. 
An accused has the speciﬁc right to a fair trial, which includes the right to an interpreter during 
trial, the right to choose one’s legal counsel, and the right to have legal counsel provided at state 
expense when ‘substantial injustice would otherwise result’.339 The absence of legal representation 
336 The ICD Annual Report, 2003-2004.
337 For example, Piers Pigou, Monitoring Police Violence and Torture in South Africa, Centre for the Study of Violence and 
Reconciliation, April 2002; Bronwen Manby, ‘The South African Independent Complaints Directorate’, in Andrew Goldsmith & 
Colleen Lewis (eds.), Civilian Oversight of Policing: Governance, Democracy and Human Rights, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2000.
338 Minutes of the Portfolio Committee, available at http://www.pmg.org.za/viewminute.php?id=6122. 
339 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, (Act 108 of 1996), Section 35(3)(g).
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may lead to delays in proceedings, but on the whole, all persons accused of serious crimes are 
afforded legal representation—though often only at trial stage, and not on arrest or at a bail 
hearing. 
Legal representation to indigent persons is provided by the South African Legal Aid Board. 
The Legal Aid Board is an independent statutory body established in terms of the 1969 Legal 
Aid Act.340 The board provides for legal assistance to members of the public who cannot afford 
representation, and in situations where injustice would result if those persons remained unrep-
resented: since 1994, the Legal Aid Board has undergone substantial reorganisation, in order 
to reorient it from a situation in which it mostly provided assistance to white defendants using 
lawyers in private practice. In 1996, the Legal Aid Act was amended to comply with the con-
stitutional right to a fair trial.341 The board maintains a close operational relationship with the 
DoJCD.
The Legal Aid Board now provides legal assistance through the following methods: justice 
centres (where individuals can get assistance from state-employed lawyers); the ‘judicare’ system 
(by which the state compensates lawyers in private practice); and through partner organisations, 
including legal aid clinics at universities across the country and public interest organisations.342 
There are presently 56 justice centres, 13 units based at high courts across the country and 27 
satellite ofﬁces. In those areas where there are no justice centres, the board provides services 
through the judicare system and partner organisations. 
According to the Legal Aid Board, 76 per cent of the cases it handled between April 2003 
and March 2004 were ﬁnalised through the justice centre system. The balance of matters were 
ﬁnalised through partner institutions and organisations, and the judicare system. Legal fees, in 
the case where the Legal Aid Board will not provide assistance, are prohibitive to poor members 
of society, although some public-interest litigation groups have stepped in to ﬁll this gap.343
While the system’s primary focus is on criminal cases, increasingly it has responded to pro-
viding assistance in civil matters. From 1 April 2003 to 31 March 2004, the Legal Aid Board had 
received 300 139 new cases, of which 27 280 were civil cases.344 
Independence of the prosecution service 
Section 179 of the Constitution establishes a single, independent National Prosecuting Authority 
(NPA), which will have the authority to institute criminal proceedings on behalf of the state 
340 Legal Aid Act, 1969 (Act 22 of 1969).
341 The Legal Aid Amendment Act, 1996 (Act  20 of 1996).
342 Partner organisations are the following: Odi Community Law Centre (Gauteng Province); University of Pretoria (Gauteng); 
University of the Witwatersrand (Gauteng); University of the North West—Maﬁkeng (North West); University of the North 
West—Rustenburg (North West); University of Potchefstroom Law Clinic (North West); Association for Community and Rural 
Advancement (Northern Cape); Lawyers for Human Rights—Karoo (Northern Cape); Lawyers for Human Rights—Overberg 
(Western Cape); and Lawyers for Human Rights—Umtata (Eastern Cape). See http://www.legal-aid.co.za/about/report2004/
chairperson.htm.
343 See also Section 6.C, on ‘Financial access’, p.111.
344 The DoJCD, Annual Report 2003/04, p.82.
S O U T H  A F R I C A :  J U S T I C E  S E C T O R  A N D  T H E  R U L E  O F  L AW     8 7
‘without fear, favour or prejudice’ (Section 179(4)). The functions of the NPA entail determining 
a prosecuting policy, which must be observed in the prosecution process; issuing policy direc-
tives; intervening in the prosecution process when a policy directive is not followed; and review-
ing a decision to prosecute or not to prosecute.345 The NPA is regulated in detail by the National 
Prosecuting Authority Act of 1998.346
The Constitution and the enabling legislation provide safeguards against political interfer-
ence in the execution of the NPA’s powers, functions and duties. Section 32(b) of the National 
Prosecuting Authority Act explicitly provides that no organ of state shall improperly interfere 
with, hinder or obstruct the prosecuting authority in the exercise, carrying out of powers, func-
tions and duties of the national director of public prosecutions (NDPP). Arguably, this institu-
tion, under the inaugural NDPP Bulelani Ngcuka,347 adopted a robust approach to prosecutions 
under the law. In general, there is no executive interference in the prosecution process. In one 
case, however, when the NDPP was investigating the behaviour of Shabir Shaik, ﬁnancial adviser 
to the deputy president, NDPP Bulelani Ngcuka experienced strong pressure as a result of the 
exercise of his functions, although this pressure was not applied directly.348
Political responsibility over the NPA rests with the minister, but the NDPP has indepen-
dence in undertaking his or her tasks.349 The DoJCD remains responsible for prosecutors’ sala-
ries and other operational costs, and the NPA is represented on the department’s consultative 
board of directors. In terms of the National Prosecuting Authority Act, the institution is account-
able to Parliament in relation to its powers, functions and duties.350 The act further provides that 
annual reports shall be submitted to the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development for 
tabling in Parliament. The NDPP is required to submit reports to the minister on decisions taken 
on cases, and the prosecution policy and directives.351
The appointment of the NDPP is made by the president. However, in the event that the pres-
ident recommends to suspend the NDPP, section 12(6)(b) of the National Prosecuting Authority 
Act states that this decision should be communicated to Parliament within 14 days. Parliament 
has 30 days within which to pass a resolution to conﬁrm or overrule this recommendation. 
Legal protections against abuse of process
In South Africa, an interdictum de homine libero exhibendo (the equivalent of the habeas corpus pro-
cedure) was available to any person under the common law prior to 1994.  Since 1994, section 
345 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (Act 108 of 1996), Section 179 (5).
346 The National Prosecuting Authority Act, 1998 (Act 32 of 1998).
347 Ngcuka resigned from the position of NDPP in September 2004.
348 See the case study on ‘The Schabir Shaik and Jacob Zuma prosecutions’, p.34.
349 The National Prosecuting Authority Act, 1998 (Act 32 of 1998), Sections 32 and 33.
350 Ibid., Section  35.
351 Ibid., Section  33(1).
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12(1) of the Constitution guarantees the freedom and security of the person, and section 33(1) 
entitles everyone to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair. Section 
33 is given effect by the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act (PAJA).352 All accused persons, 
including persons convicted by a special court, have the right of appeal to, or review by, a higher 
court in terms of Section 35(3)(o) of the Constitution.
There have been some concerns about the abuse of process in military courts that have juris-
diction over persons who are subject to the Military Code in terms of Section 104 of the Defence 
Act.353 This includes all permanent members of the National Defence Force; and members of the 
citizen force (the commandos or the reserve), are subject to the Military Code when they are in 
service or training. Persons who are subject to the Military Code are also subject to the jurisdic-
tion of civil courts, unless legislation provides otherwise in particular instances. Civil courts and 
military courts have concurrent jurisdiction to try persons subject to the code for civil, as well as 
military, offences. However, no military court may try a person subject to the Military Discipline 
Code for treason, murder, rape or culpable homicide.354
In the case of Freedom of Expression Institute v President, Ordinary Court Martial,355 the high 
court found that the ordinary court martial proceedings provided for in the Defence Act violated 
the constitutional rights conferred in Section 12(1) and 35 of the Constitution, since they lacked 
guarantees of judicial independence. The ordinary court martial framework also permitted lay 
persons to convict and imprison an accused person for up to two years, since there was no 
requirement that prosecutors or judicial ofﬁcers have legal training. The offending sections were 
repealed before the Constitutional Court, which conﬁrmed the declaration of this invalidity.
The establishment of a prosecuting authority for the military, by the Military Discipline 
Supplementary Measures Act,356 has been found not to offend Section 179 of the Constitution, 
which provides for the NPA.357 
The Constitutional Court has also found that members of the National Defence Force must 
be allowed to unionise.358 Subsequently, the high court found in the case of South African National 
Defence Union and Another and Another v Minister of Defence and Others,359 that this included the 
right to be represented by a union ofﬁcial in military disciplinary or judicial proceedings. 
Those with the most difﬁculty in asserting their rights, in cases of abuse of process, are 
immigration detainees, who for the most part are not accused of any crime. The South African 
Human Rights Commission and non-governmental human rights organisations have repeat-
edly had problems in accessing the Lindela Repatriation Centre, where individuals are held 
352 The Promotion of Administrative Justice Act, 2000 (Act 3 of 2000).
353 The Defence Act, 1957 (Act 44 of 1957).
354 Information obtained from the Law of South Africa (LAWSA), Vol. 7, First re-issue, Chapters 332-334.
355 1999 (2) SA 471 (C).
356 The Military Discipline Supplementary Measures Act, 1999 (Act 16 of 1999).
357 Minister of Defence v Potsane 2002 (1) SA 1 (CC).
358 South African National Defence Force Union v Minister of Defence and Another 1999 (4) SA 469 (CC).
359 2004 (4) SA 10 (T).
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awaiting deportation; and as recently as September 2005, the UN Working Group on Arbitrary 
Detention criticised the effective inability of immigration detainees to challenge the validity of 
their detention.360
Interpretation 
English and Afrikaans remain the dominant languages through which court proceedings are 
conducted.  
In a 1998 case, an accused argued that his case should be conducted in Zulu by the magis-
trate, citing Section 6 of the Constitution (which establishes 11 ofﬁcial languages, including Zulu). 
The court refused this and insisted that it had to be conducted either in English or Afrikaans, 
which led to a review by the high court. Documents submitted to court by the state showed that 
there were 37 regional court magistrates in KwaZulu-Natal, of whom only four had Zulu (the 
dominant language in the region) as their home language, while 33 had English or Afrikaans as 
their home language and had little or no knowledge of Zulu. There were 256 prosecutors in 50 
magisterial districts—of whom, at the most, 81 had Zulu as their home language and 175 had 
English or Afrikaans as their home language. There were 41 advocates in the attorney-general’s 
ofﬁce (now the director of public prosecutions) of whom only 6 had Zulu or Xhosa as their home 
language, while 35 had either English or Afrikaans as their home language and had little or no 
knowledge of Zulu. The judge concluded by saying that ‘[i]n this province at present, it is clearly 
not practicable for an accused person to demand to have proceedings conducted in … (any) lan-
guage other than English or Afrikaans’. 361
According to the National Census 2001 compiled by Statistics South Africa, Zulu was the 
most widely spoken home language, with English trailing as the ﬁfth most spoken language in 
South Africa.362 The demographics of the accused population suggest that most people would not 
understand the dominant languages in South African courts.  However, interpretation services 
are available in the courts, and guaranteed by Section 35(3)(k) of the Constitution. The DoJCD has 
established a unit for interpretation, which provides such services by recruiting suitable persons 
to assist with interpretation.363 Qualiﬁcations in court interpretation are available at several South 
African universities. Lack of availability of interpreters can cause delays to cases proceeding, and 
the DoJCD has recognised the need to improve the quality of interpretation.364
360 See case study on ‘Access to justice for immigration detainees’, p.115.
361 Mthethwa v De Bruin NO and Another 1998 (3) BCLR 336 (N); discussed in Thami Ndlovu, ‘Black Languages and the South 
African Courts’, De Rebus, April 2002.
362 National Census 2001, Statistics South Africa, at http://www.statssa.gov.za/census2001/digiAtlas/index.html.
363 The DoJCD, Annual Report 2003/04, p.44.
364 Re Aga Boswa: The New Court Management Model Designed To Enhance Court Efﬁciency, the DoJCD, 2004, available at http://
www.doj.gov.za/2004dojsite/brochure/Re percent20Aga percent20Boswa.pdf 
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Delays in bringing cases to trial
Section 35(1)(d) of the Constitution provides that every arrested person has the right to be brought 
before a court as soon as is reasonably possible, but no later than 48 hours after the arrest 
(excluding days which are not ordinary court days). An accused person has the right to have 
their trial begun and concluded without unreasonable delay, in terms of Section 35(3)(d). Factors 
that may determine the reasonableness of the delay include the waiting time while a case is on 
a court roll, progress in the police investigation, and postponement requests by the accused. 
Where there has been unreasonable delay, the matter is struck off the roll, but the person may 
be charged again.
The detention cycle time, or the average length of time awaiting-trial prisoners remained 
incarcerated until the ﬁnalisation of their trials, rose considerably between 1996 and early 2002. 
In June 1996, the average awaiting-trial prisoner spent 76 days in custody ; by February 2002 this 
had increased to 139 custody days. This means that, on average, accused persons are imprisoned 
for four-and-a-half months awaiting the ﬁnalisation of their trial.365 Frequently, there are further 
postponements during proceedings. Reasons for this delay include the time taken to complete an 
investigation of the case and to ﬁnd a slot on a full regional court roll. 
The regional magistrates’ courts, which handle cases such as robbery, rape and attempted 
murder, are experiencing an increasing backlog in cases. Between April 1999 and July 2001, 
regional courts ﬁnalised an average of 3 010 cases a month, but had an average of 43 500 cases 
per month outstanding on the courts’ rolls. The actual number of cases ﬁnalised per month by 
the regional courts increased over the 28-month period, but the number of new cases coming 
into the system increased at a greater rate. In July 2001, the average regional court was ﬁnalising 
just under ten cases a month, some ﬁve cases per month below target.
There are a number of possible reasons of for this. Firstly, the regional magistrates’ courts 
deal with almost 95 per cent of all cases. Secondly, the implementation of ‘Operation Crackdown’ 
since 2000,  a high-density cordon, search and seizure operation that is an integral component 
of the SAPS’ strategy in those hot-spots most affected by crime, has brought with it an increase 
in arrests. These arrests resulted in an additional 1.1 million cases entering the system during 
2001, and the regional courts have never managed to break the back of this sudden inﬂux. 
Thirdly, the introduction of mandatory minimum sentencing has meant that not only has the 
sentencing process itself become more onerous and thus more time consuming, but all cases 
sentenced in terms of this legislation are sent on automatic review to the high court, resulting in 
lengthy delays in the ﬁnalisation of cases. According to research conducted by the Institute for 
Security Studies at the end of 2000, 184 253 incomplete criminal cases in the lower courts were 
carried over into 2001.366 In 2001, 756 801 new cases entered the lower court system. Between 
April 1999 and November 2000, a district court, which deals with relatively minor offences such 
365 See statistics and information overview presented by the Institute for Security Studies on the justice sector, at http://www.
iss.co.za/CJM/Justice.html. See also, Martin Schönteich, Making Courts Work—A Review of the IJS Court Centre in Port Elizabeth, 
Institute for Security Studies, Monograph No. 75, October 2002, chapter 1. 
366 Ibid.
S O U T H  A F R I C A :  J U S T I C E  S E C T O R  A N D  T H E  R U L E  O F  L AW     9 1
as assault, theft and malicious damage to property as well as civil cases, on average, resolved 30 
cases a month, with an average of 134 outstanding cases over the same period.367 Because of the 
existing backlog, new cases cannot be placed on the court roll speedily.
The high court deals with appeals from the lower courts, referrals for conﬁrmation of sen-
tences from lower courts and is also a court of ﬁrst instance. Particularly busy divisions, such as 
the Witwatersrand Local Division and the Transvaal Provincial Division, also experience a large 
backlog in cases. According to the DoJCD, it can take an average of 134 days from the date of 
indictment to the date of hearing on the court roll.368 The same report shows that the longest 
period for a case to reach ﬁnalisation was 1 781 days.369 However, according to this report, most 
cases take between 150 and 300 days to reach ﬁnality in the high court system.   
Victim and witness protection
The DoJCD has stated that it views victim empowerment and support as an integral part of the 
delivery of access to justice. Thus there are several initiatives driven by the department to support 
victims of crime. Several are focused on the assistance to victims of sexual and domestic violence, 
in recognition of the fact that survivors can experience secondary victimisation in an alienating 
and ineffective criminal justice system.
One of the primary aims of the sexual offences courts370 is the reduction of secondary victi-
misation through a range of strategies, including the use of court preparation ofﬁcials and victim 
assistants to support victims and their families through the criminal justice process.371 National 
policy guidelines on victims of sexual offences outline detailed procedures for ofﬁcials to provide 
support in all relevant departments (police, health, social development and justice).372 
The department also has an extensive inter-sectoral programme on Victim Empowerment, 
which includes the development of a Victims’ Charter and the establishment of minimum stan-
dards for victim empowerment.373  
The witness-protection system is regulated by the Witness Protection Act,374 which came 
into force on 31 March 2000. The act aims to improve the protection of witnesses in criminal 
proceedings and also to allow witnesses not in civil matters to seek protection. Thus witnesses 
in commissions of enquiry, inquests, proceedings of special tribunals, and investigations of the 
ICD may receive such protection. The NPA manages the witness-protection system. According 
367 Martin Schönteich, Lawyers for the People—The South African Prosecution Service, Institute for Security Studies, Monograph 
No. 53, March 2001, chapter 6.
368 The DoJCD, Court Nerve Centre: An Analysis of Criminal Court Work in the High Court during 2002 and 2003, p.6; e-mail com-
munication from the director of court information, the DoJCD, Pretoria, 30 March 2005.
369 Ibid., p.6.
370 See the case study on ‘Sexual offences courts’, p.23.
371 The DoJCD, Annual Report 2003/04, p.20.
372 IDASA, Pilot Assessment: The Sexual Offences Courts in Wynberg and Cape Town, 2001, pp.8-13.
373  The DoJCD, Annual Report 2003/04, p.30.
374 The Witness Protection Act, 1998 (Act 112 of 1998).
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to government, 635 people were under state protection in 1999. In 2000, the number had 
increased to 746.375  
Prior to the revised system, the witness-protection system was decentralised and managed 
by the regional attorneys-general (formerly heads of the prosecution service in their regions). 
There have been a number of reported cases of a failure by the witness-protection system to 
adequately protect witnesses willing to testify in criminal proceedings. Numerous criminal cases 
against members of the People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD), a vigilante organisa-
tion based in the Western Cape, have seen witnesses killed.376 A number of witnesses were assas-
sinated before the trial against PAGAD member Ebrahim Jeneker, two witnesses were killed in 
relation to the trial for the murder of Ben Lategan, and the assassination of Ashraf Saban left no 
witnesses against those accused of planting a bomb outside the Wynberg Magistrate’s Court.377 
Another example is the case involving the death of a farm worker in Limpopo, in 2004. 
The persons arrested for the killing were the farm owner and several co-workers. Attackers 
reportedly assaulted a witness testifying against the accused, and the witness sustained injuries 
requiring medical attention. This occurred despite the witness being in the witness-protection 
programme.378 However, according to the NPA’s 2002/03 report to Parliament, there was no 
record of assassinations of witnesses under the protection programme. 
D. Appropriate remedies and sentencing 
Debate in South Africa over the appropriate response to a high crime rate is divided on the one 
hand between a demand for an end to widespread impunity for violent crime in particular; and 
on the other,  a recognition by those working in the sector that ever longer prison sentences are 
unlikely to have an effect in reducing crime, while creating conditions of detention in which any 
rehabilitation of offenders is rendered impossible.  Although the government has undertaken 
or supported interesting initiatives to divert offenders from prison and provide more appropri-
ate remedies to victims, these have so far proved inadequate to address the need for effective 
justice.
Women’s rights organisations, in particular, have pointed out the inadequacy of existing 
remedies for crime in the context of sexual and domestic violence. Advocacy by these organisa-
tions led ﬁrst to the passing of the Prevention of Family Violence Act (No. 133 of 1993), and then 
to its replacement by the Domestic Violence Act (Act No. 116 of 1998).  
The Domestic Violence Act is applicable to a range of familial and domestic relationships 
and covers both heterosexual and same-sex relationships. Under the act, a victim of domestic vio-
lence may apply for a protection order to stop the abuse and to stop the abuser from entering the 
mutual home, the victim’s residence or the victim’s place of employment. The court may place 
375 See the DoJCD Parliamentary Media Brieﬁng, 13 September 2000, available at  http://www.doj.gov.za/archives/mst_
archive/2000/sep_13_press percent20brief.htm.
376 The Human Rights Committee, Popular Justice: Human Rights Quarterly Review, 2001, pp.67-69.
377 Keith Gottschalk, Vigilantism v the State: A case study of the rise and fall of PAGAD, 1996-2000, Institute for Security Studies, 
Occasional Paper 99, February 2005. See also the case study on PAGAD, p.106.
378 The Sowetan, 15 March 2005.
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other conditions on the order, including that the police seize any weapons or help the victim 
retrieve property from her home. The court can evict the abuser from the home and force him to 
pay rent and/or emergency maintenance to the victim. The court also has the power to limit the 
abuser’s custody rights to children. If the court grants an interim or ﬁnal protection order, it must 
issue a suspended warrant for the arrest of the abuser that will become active if the abuser vio-
lates the order. In 2000, the Women’s Legal Centre (WLC) submitted a report to the Ministry of 
Justice showing the difﬁculty of making these remedies effective.379 According to the WLC, mag-
istrates failed to apply Section 10 of the act strictly, which allows for the withdrawal of a protection 
order on request of the complainant, but only if ‘the court is satisﬁed that good cause has been 
shown …’. The WLC argues that in cases where emotional power is exerted by the violent spouse, 
it frequently happens that a complainant is blackmailed to withdraw the complaint. Magistrates 
dealing with such cases too easily accept the request to withdraw the complaint at face value, and 
should not easily be satisﬁed that good cause has been shown. Secondly, Section 7 provides for 
an eviction order to be granted against a perpetrator, but it appears that this is regularly refused 
where the parties are married in community of property. A further concern raised by the WLC 
is that contraventions of protection orders are not regarded with sufﬁcient condemnation, and 
perpetrators will usually only receive a small ﬁne and rarely be subject to imprisonment. This 
severely limits the efﬁcacy of a protection order in the ﬁrst place. In addition, WLC research 
showed that only a small percentage of reported cases of sexual violence actually resulted in a 
conviction and/or the imprisonment of the perpetrators. 
In 1997, responding to widespread public demands for harsher action against criminals, 
Parliament passed legislation introducing minimum sentences ranging from ﬁve years to life 
in prison for a variety of serious offences, including corruption, drug dealing, assault, rape and 
murder.380 A court may impose a lesser sentence if ‘substantial and compelling circumstances’ 
exist.381 These minimum-sentencing provisions were introduced for a trial period of two years, 
but have been repeatedly extended, most recently for another two years, in April 2005. This 
hastily drafted law bypassed a review of sentencing guidelines being conducted by the Law 
Reform Commission at that time, and there was little public consultation about its detailed 
content or consideration of its effects. For example, there was apparently no thought to the effect 
of the new rules on prison overcrowding.  The constitutionality of the minimum-sentencing leg-
islation has been challenged in several cases, although the Constitutional Court has found that 
it is not unconstitutional, since it allows some discretion to the courts to ensure that a sentence 
ﬁts the crime.382  
379 Deborah Quenet, Domestic Violence: The Effectiveness of the Domestic Violence Act—an Assessment thereof  through Case Studies, 
Women’s Legal Centre, Cape Town, 2000.
380 The Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1997 (Act 105 of 1997). The act also provides that where a regional court has convicted 
a person of certain serious offences for which the minimum sentence is life imprisonment, or where the potential sentence 
exceeds the regional court’s jurisdiction, the matter must be referred to the high court. See also the case study on Minimum 
sentencing, p.96.
381 Section 51(3)(a) of the Act.
382 S v Dodo, 2001 (1), South African Criminal Law Reports 593.
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The impact of minimum sentencing on crime is difﬁcult to quantify. However, no substan-
tive claims have been made that crime has been reduced as a result; while (as noted above) fear 
of crime during the period it has been in operation has actually increased. The minimum-sen-
tencing rules have also not achieved one of their primary aims, that is, an increase in consistency 
of sentencing. Meanwhile, prison overcrowding has been exacerbated. A more comprehensive 
sentencing-reform initiative should be a matter of priority, reviewing the experience so far.383
While minimum-sentencing rules have responded to public pressure for harsher action 
against criminals, the government has also introduced other measures designed to divert people 
from prison. Chapter VI of the Correctional Services Act 111 of 1998 provides for different 
categories of ‘community corrections’ to be imposed as an alternative or supplementary pun-
ishment on an offender, in order to ‘enable persons subject to community corrections to live a 
socially responsible and crime-free life during the period of their sentence and in (the) future’. All 
persons subject to community corrections must be supervised in the community by correctional 
ofﬁcials. The sentence of correctional supervision, as it is known, was introduced in 1992, and is 
a community-based sentence which can be imposed for any offence, even serious offences such 
as murder—though such offences would usually receive a prison sentence. Under correctional 
supervision, an offender may be sentenced to imprisonment for an initial period, after which he 
or she may be required to serve the remainder of the sentence in the community. Alternatively, 
the offender could immediately serve correctional supervision in the community. Conditions of 
the sentence may include a period of house arrest; the requirement that the person be home 
between speciﬁed hours of the day; that he or she attends a treatment programme; abstinence 
from alcohol or drugs; prohibition from leaving a magisterial district; or a certain number of 
hours of community service. Any or all of these conditions may be imposed.384 
Although use of correctional supervision has increased since it was introduced, in general, 
the courts remain uncreative in their sentencing. Imprisonment and prison-related sentences 
are still the standard sentence imposed on most offenders, despite the fact that magistrates have 
wide discretionary powers to be creative in sentencing offenders.385
Incarceration is frequently ineffective and even counter-productive in preventing recidivism, 
suggesting that rehabilitation programmes within the prison system, or the prison sentence 
itself, are not effective. Researchers have found that resorting to sentencing options other than 
imprisonment enhances rehabilitation, and reduces the likelihood of recidivism.386 
Diversion from the criminal justice system is increasingly seen as necessary in the South 
383 See further, Julia Sloth-Nielsen & Louise Ehlers, L, ‘A pyrrhic victory? Mandatory and minimum sentences in South Africa’, the 
Institute for Security Studies, Occasional Paper 111, July 2005.
384 See also, Amanda Dissel, Alternative Sentencing in South Africa, the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, August 
1997.
385 Lukas Muntingh, After Prison—The Case for Offender Reintegration, the Institute for Security Studies, Monograph No. 52, March 
2001, Chapter 6. 
386 Lala Camerer, ‘Crime, violence and punishment—Putting victims on the agenda’, African Security Review, Vol. 6, No. 3, the 
Institute for Security Studies, 1997.
S O U T H  A F R I C A :  J U S T I C E  S E C T O R  A N D  T H E  R U L E  O F  L AW     9 5
African prison system. It has a dual function in that it, ﬁrstly, prevents further exposure to the 
rigours of the criminal justice process and, secondly, attempts to prevent further (criminal) 
offence by providing a variety of options. Diversion programmes are primarily used for juvenile 
offenders, although adults occasionally beneﬁt from this service.387 The ﬁrst formal diversion pro-
grammes were established in the early 1990s by the National Institute for Crime Prevention and 
the Reintegration of Offenders (NICRO) and Lawyers for Human Rights. In both instances, role-
players were concerned about the number of children being convicted, often for petty offences, 
and receiving a meaningless sanction from the court such as a suspended or postponed sen-
tence. Since these interventions, NICRO has developed ﬁve structured diversion programmes, 
which are available to the courts:
• Youth Empowerment Scheme: This offers a six-part life skills programme running 
over six weeks for one afternoon per week.
• Pretrial community service: In lieu of prosecution, the offender has to perform a 
number of hours of community service at a non-proﬁt organisation.
• Victim Offender Mediation: This programme creates the opportunity for the victim 
and the offender to meet and work out a mutually acceptable agreement with the 
assistance of a mediator, with the aim of restoring the balance.
• Family Group Conferencing: These conferences are similar to mediation in certain 
instances, except that they involve the families of both the victim and the offender in 
the mediation process.
• The Journey: The Journey Programme is aimed at high-risk children and juveniles.
Some of the aims of these diversion programmes, usually applied in cases of child offenders 
under the age of 18, are to provide an opportunity for reparations; providing rehabilitation and 
education programmes to beneﬁt victims/survivors and perpetrators; and to identify problems 
underlying the causes of crime.388 The Open Society Foundation for South Africa has recently 
completed a review of the many civil society interventions underway in the ﬁeld of diversion and 
reintegration.389
The long-awaited Child Justice Bill, ﬁrst tabled before Parliament in 2002 and into which 
there has been extensive civil-society input, will introduce, upon passage, a range of new diver-
sion options for juvenile offenders, both in respect of supervision within the home and com-
munity, as well as structured programmes. In addition, the bill introduces restorative justice 
processes such as Family Group Conferencing and Victim Offender Mediation, which can be 
used before the trial, during the trial and at the stage of sentencing.390  
387 Information on NICRO’s efforts to promote diversion from the criminal justice system, is provided at http://www.capegateway.
gov.za/eng/pubs/public_info/W/47590 .
388 Lukas Muntingh, The Effectiveness of Diversion Programmes—A Longitudinal Evaluation of Cases, NICRO, May 2001.
389 Francois Steyn, Review of South African Innovations in Diversion and Reintegration of Youth at Risk, OSF-SA, Cape Town,  2005.
390 Civil Society Prison Reform Initiative (CSPRI), Alternative Sentencing Review, May 2004, p.12.
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Case study:  The effect of the introduction of minimum  
sentencing on prison overcrowding
Minimum sentencing was introduced into law by the Criminal Law Amendment Act, in 
1997. The stated intention of the legislature, with the introduction of minimum-sentencing 
provisions, was to reduce serious and violent crime. Other motivations included ‘popular 
punitiveness’; the need for government to show its concern over high crime rates; the public 
perception that sentences are not sufﬁciently severe; the need to ‘be tough on crime’; sentenc-
ing as a deterrent; and retribution: the argument of just deserts/proportionality. 
In light of the overcrowding problem in South African prisons, the question has to be asked as 
to whether this legislation will have a long-term impact on prison numbers. Several commen-
tators, notably the inspecting judges of prisons, have ascribed worsening prison overcrowding 
to the impact of minimum sentences. Writing in The Advocate (April 2005), Judge Fagan says: 
‘The effect of the minimum-sentence legislation has been to greatly increase the number 
of prisoners serving long and life sentences.’  Judge Fagan records that sentences of seven 
years and less showed little change from 1997 (67 535) to 2004 (67 483), while sentences of 
more than seven years increased rapidly from 1997 (29 376) to 2004 (67 081). Life sentences 
increased from 638 in 1997 to 5 511 on 30 September 2004. He notes that in April 1998—
immediately before the implementation of the minimum-sentence legislation—only 18 644 
(19 percent) of the sentenced prisoners were serving a term of longer than ten years. This has 
since increased to 49 094 (36 per cent). Judge Fagan’s views are supported by the Department 
of Correctional Services, which is also concerned about the burgeoning prison population. 
It is an unassailable reality that the sentenced prison population in South Africa has increased 
rapidly since 1998. Moreover, the evidence shows overwhelmingly that a signiﬁcantly larger 
proportion of prisoners are serving long terms—with the number of prisoners serving sen-
tences of more than ten years having quadrupled from 10 000  to 40 000 in the past nine 
years. Nevertheless, critics argue that it cannot be conclusively shown that the increase in 
long-term and life sentences is necessarily due to the implementation of the minimum-sen-
tences legislation. It could, they assert, simply be due to a general increase in the prevalence of 
serious crime, or to a generally more punitive and intolerant mood among judicial ofﬁcers. It 
could even be the result of better police-clearance rates for serious offences. 
A case-by-case analysis would be needed to establish conclusively the link between the imple-
mentation of the legislation and the otherwise rather persuasive statistics shown above—such 
analysis was done ﬁve years ago during the South African Law Reform Commission’s investiga-
tion into sentencing, but this information would need to be updated. Furthermore, proper 
docket analysis is required before it can be proved, or disproved, if any improvements in police 
investigative capability account for the increased numbers of prisoners serving long-term or 
life sentences. 
Extract from: Sloth-Nielsen J & Ehlers, L, A Pyrrhic Victory? Mandatory and Minimum Sentences in South Africa, 
Institute for Security Studies, Occasional Paper 111, July 2005.
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E. Prisons 
Legal framework 
On 30 July 2004, the 1998 Correctional Services Act391 was brought into effect. The act’s pre-
amble states that it has the ‘object of changing the law(s) governing the correctional system and 
giving effect to the Bill of Rights in the Constitution, 1996, and in particular its provisions with 
regard to prisoners’. After the act was passed by Parliament in November 1998, it remained in 
limbo for over ﬁve years, with the exception of certain sections that came into operation in the 
interim. Because of this, a confused situation prevailed for some time, with the 1959 Prisons 
Act still in force but superseded by a range of policy changes. The minimum standards required 
to give effect to constitutional imperatives of ‘conditions of detention that are consistent with 
human dignity, including at least exercise, the provision of adequate accommodation, nutrition, 
reading material and medical treatment’, in accordance with Section 35 of the Constitution, 
remained elusive. Now, though, the act speciﬁes what measures need to be put in place not only 
to ensure that our prisons comply with the minimum requirements of detention with human 
dignity, but also for rehabilitation to take place.
These include provisions requiring cell accommodation with sufﬁcient ﬂoor and cubic capac-
ity to enable prisoners to move freely and to sleep, provision of adequate warmth, provision of 
separate beds for prisoners, together with bedding which complies with hygienic requirements, 
compulsory separation of children aged under the age of 18 from adult prisoners, and special 
minimum dietary requirements for incarcerated children aged between 13 and 18 years.392
A Draft White Paper released in December 2003, states that the primary responsibility of 
the Department of Correctional Services is ‘ﬁrst and foremost to correct the offending behaviour, 
in a secure, safe and humane environment, in order to facilitate the achievement of rehabilita-
tion, and avoidance of recidivism’. Civil society organisations support this vision, but feel that due 
to overcrowding and understafﬁng, the department should focus its energies on the creation of 
a secure, safe and humane environment. 
Civil society organisations have raised their concerns around the fact that no indication has 
been given of the resources required or of the ﬁnancial implications of what the White Paper 
proposes. The department has indicated that the cabinet requires that it draft an implementa-
tion plan and budget. It also indicated that the White Paper will not be implemented in the next 
Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) and it is clear from the budget vote for the year 
2003/04, that the Department of Correctional Services will be unable to do so.393
391 The Correctional Services Act, 1998 (Act 111 of 1998).
392 Julia Sloth Nielsen, ‘Milestone reached for the establishment of a human rights basis for corrections’, in Civil Society Prison 
Reform Initiative (CSPRI) Newsletter, October 2004.
393 Submission by the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation to a Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services, 3 
February 2004, p.1-2; Draft White Paper on Corrections in South Africa, December 2003, p.2.
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Rate of imprisonment
At the end of January 2005, there were 187 446 inmates in South African prisons; 52 326 await-
ing trial, and 135 120 who were sentenced offenders.394 At close to 400 prisoners per 100 000 
of the population, this represents the highest incarceration rate in Africa, and one of the highest 
in the world.
A large number of accused persons spend time in prison while awaiting trial. The number 
of accused persons awaiting trial in state prisons has grown since 1994. In July 1995, there 
were 22 282 awaiting-trial prisoners.395 By April 2000, the number had swelled to 64 000.396 
According to the Judicial Inspectorate of Prisons, an independent body established by the 1998 
Correctional Services Act as of 24 March 2003, 19 592 pre-trial detentions were as a result of 
prisoners being unable to afford bail amounts of as little as R50.397  This is a little over a third 
of pre-trial detainees over the same period. The ofﬁce of the inspecting judge has also criticised 
police for making unnecessary arrests: in 2003/04, 16 500 awaiting-trial prisoners remained in 
custody after appearing in court, only to be released after three months.398 Unaffordable bail and 
delays in completing cases are the other main causes.  Awaiting-trial prisoners remain in prison 
waiting to be tried for an average of three months, some for several years. About 60 per cent of 
them will not be convicted. 
The number of pre-trial detainees has an adverse impact on prison conditions, especially on 
overcrowding. An amendment to Section 63(A) of the Criminal Procedure Act of 1977, allows 
the head of a prison who ﬁnds that the conditions are becoming intolerable amongst the await-
ing-trial prisoners to apply to the magistrate who ﬁxed the bail to either reduce the bail, release 
the prisoner without bail, or place the prisoner under the supervision of a correctional ofﬁcer. 
This process targeted prisoners with bail at around R500, but also tried to reach those with bail of 
R1 000, though usually unsuccessfully.399
394 Budget vote address in the National Assembly by the Minister for Correctional Services, Ngconde Balfour, MP, 13 April 
2005.
395 The Judicial Inspectorate of Prisons, Annual Report 2002/03, p.26.
396 Ibid., p.27.
397 Ibid., p.27.
398 The ofﬁce of the inspecting judge, Annual Report 2003/04.
399 See the Parliamentary Monitoring Group, available at http://www.pmg.org.za/docs/2002/viewminute.php?id=1676.
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Table 5.4: Average period of incarceration of awaiting-trial prisoners, 1996—2000400

















































































Table 5.5: Composition of prisoners, end of February 2005401
Total number of prisoners 186 823
Unsentenced (awaiting trial or sentence) 51 080
Sentenced 135 743
Total female 4 171
Total male 182 652
Children (under 18) 3 035
Children (sentenced) 1 423
Children (unsentenced) 1 612
400 Martin Schönteich, Lawyers for the People—The South African Prosecution Service, the Institute for Security Studies, Monograph 
No. 53, March 2001, chapter 6.
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Conditions of detention 
Historically, South African prisons were run in a highly militarised fashion, and formed an 
integral part of the apartheid system of control. They were places of extreme violence, much of it 
mediated through an elaborate gang system that dated back to the 19th century and was reﬂected 
in the militarised structures of the prison administration. Although recent demilitarisation of the 
prison system has broken down the rigid gang structures to some extent, they remain power-
ful institutions inside the prisons.402 However, there are some indications that the incidence of 
violence is becoming less. In its report for 2003/04, the Department of Correctional Services 
recorded a reduction in assaults on both staff and offenders and, in line with this downward 
trend, a reduction in the number of unnatural deaths amongst offenders from 62 in 2002/03 to 
45 in 2003/04.403 Nevertheless, more than 7 000 assaults in prisons were reported to the system 
of Independent Prison Visitors (see below) during 2003, split roughly equally, between assaults 
by prison staff on inmates, and assaults among prisoners.404
Overcrowding in South African prisons makes detention conditions unacceptable—and has 
worsened since 1994. The resulting problems are associated with food, health, exercise, stress 
levels and rehabilitation. Prisoners’ human rights are violated and the Department of Correctional 
Services is unable to fulﬁl its mandate, which includes the rehabilitation of prisoners.
In 2002, the Judicial Inspectorate reported that conditions in prisons, especially for unsen-
tenced prisoners, were completely unacceptable and could not wait for long-term solutions. 
For example, one toilet is shared by more than 60 prisoners; there is the stench of blocked and 
overﬂowing sewage pipes; and a shortage of beds results in prisoners sleeping two on a bed, 
whilst others sleep on the concrete ﬂoors, sometimes with only a blanket. This is exacerbated by 
inadequate hot-water supply, no facilities for washing clothes, broken windows and lights, and 
insufﬁcient medical treatment for the contagious diseases that are rife, including HIV.405 In its 
report for 2003/04, the Judicial Inspectorate noted an escalation in the number of natural deaths 
in prison per year: in 1995, this was at 1.65 per 1 000 prisoners, but by 2003 it had risen to 9.1 per 
1 000 prisoners, reﬂecting the impact of HIV/AIDS on prisoner mortality.406 The Department 
of Correctional Services has produced a policy document on the management of HIV/AIDS in 
prisons.
Overcrowding not only results in a decline in staff morale, an inability to enforce basic 
discipline and order, and a breakdown in rehabilitative efforts, but the physical conditions of 
detention warrant serious concern: lack of ventilation; conditions conducive to increased sexual 
violence and the spread of infectious diseases; as well as water and plumbing systems collapsing 
under the strain. Indeed, conditions have reached such a point of degradation in some prisons 
402 See Jonny Steinberg, The Number, Jonathan Ball, 2004.
403 The Department of Correctional Services, Annual Report 2003/04, available at www.dcs.gov.za/annual_report/Annual_
Report2003/DCSAnnual04.pdf. 
404 The Judicial Inspectorate, Annual Report 2003/04, p.13.
405 The Centre for Conﬂict Resolution, Track Two, Vol. 11, No. 2, April 2002, p.10.
406 The Judicial Inspectorate, Annual Report 2003/04.
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that civil society lobby groups report contemplating constitutional litigation to highlight and 
address the numerous human rights breaches caused by overcrowding.407
In September 2005, the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention of the UN Commission 
on Human Rights visited South Africa. In its press release at the end of the visit, anticipating its 
report to the 2006 Session of the UN Commission on Human Rights, it noted concerns related 
to the high rate of incarceration in South Africa, leading to ‘an alarming rate of overcrowding in 
detention facilities’. 
In relation to conditions in pre-trial detention, the Working Group found that ‘the lack of 
adequate facilities are so blatant that they fall short of international guarantees’ and stressed that 
no juvenile should be detained at this stage of the court procedure, even for the most serious 
charges. 
The Working Group noted that the lack of a clear stipulation that time spent in pre-trial 
detention would be taken into account in the ﬁnal sentence, is not in conformity with interna-
tional law.408
Private prisons and detention facilities 
Section 103(1) of the Correctional Services Act empowers the minister to enter into joint ven-
tures with the private sector to design, construct, ﬁnance and operate any prison or part of a 
prison. Two such contracts were procured by the Department of Public Works on behalf of the 
Department of Correctional Services, using private-sector capital and expertise for their ﬁnanc-
ing, designing, construction, operation and maintenance.
The ﬁrst privately operated prison in South Africa is near Bloemfontein, and the second 
is in Limpopo. The Mangaung prison in Bloemfontein opened in July 2001 and became fully 
operational in January 2002. The prison in Limpopo opened in February 2002 and is run by a 
consortium led by the Florida-based Wackenhut Corrections Corporations.409 Both prisons are 
maximum-security institutions.
On the face of it, private prisons seem better and provide more humane conditions for pris-
oners. Prisoners receive three regular meals a day, stay in cells designed for only three to four 
prisoners and are, in general, treated with dignity. However, the use of private facilities is prob-
lematic in several ways; moreover, insofar as they do provide better conditions, this is because 
they are not subject to the same constraints as the state prison system. First, the private prisons 
are much more costly than the 225 state-run prisons, meaning that they may not be ﬁnancially 
viable in the long run. It is possible that future cost cutting to shore up proﬁts could well have 
a negative impact on the quality of meals, recreational opportunities and other programmes. 
Secondly, the private prisons can turn away inmates when full, and do not house any awaiting-
407 Julia Sloth Nielsen, ‘Milestone reached for the establishment of a human rights basis for corrections’, in Civil Society Prison 
Reform Initiative (CSPRI) Newsletter, October 2004.
408 ‘UN Panel on Arbitrary Detention ends visit to South Africa’, United Nations Press Release, 19 September 2005.
409 KC Goyer, Prison Privatisation in South Africa—Issues, Challenges and Opportunities, Institute for Security Studies, Monograph 
No. 64, September 2001, Chapter 6. 
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trial detainees (a constantly ﬂuctuating and unpredictable population in terms of numbers). 
They are not, therefore, subject to the same overcrowding pressures as state prisons, where 
the awaiting-trial facilities are the most overcrowded and the prison conditions are the poorest. 
Thirdly, there is a migration of staff from the Department of Correctional Services to private 
prisons, which weakens state capacity to provide satisfactory conditions of custody. And ﬁnally, 
because private prisons are in the business of keeping people in prison, this does not sit well 
with the rehabilitation and reintegration ambitions of the Department of Correctional Services, 
nor with attempts to reduce prisoner numbers. 
A private company operates the main centre for immigration detainees, the Lindela 
Repatriation Centre, where there have been serious concerns about conditions of detention, and 
in particular about the inability of detainees to challenge the validity of their detention (see the 
case study on ‘Access to justice for immigration detainees’, p.115 below).
Civilian oversight of prisons
The Correctional Services Act provides for the establishment of the ofﬁce of the inspecting judge 
of prisons (the Judicial Inspectorate of Prisons), the object of which is to facilitate reporting on 
issues such as the treatment of prisoners, prison conditions and any dishonest or corrupt prac-
tices in prison.410 The inspecting judge reports to the president and the minister of correctional 
services. Since its establishment, the Judicial Inspectorate has played an important role in high-
lighting unacceptable prison conditions, and its current director, Johannes (Hannes) Fagan, has 
been an outspoken advocate for prisoners. 
The inspecting judge reports on prison conditions in his own right, and also appoints 
Independent Prison Visitors (IPVs) who are required to visit prisons, interview prisoners and 
record complaints received. This also promotes community involvement in the correctional 
system, and provides an independent mechanism for monitoring and promoting the proper 
treatment of prisoners. By April 2003, there were IPVs based in all nine provinces.
Visitors’ committees are established in terms of Section 94(1) of the act, which provides 
that the inspecting judge may establish a visitors’ committee for a particular area. A visitors’ 
committee comprises all the IPVs appointed in that area, and meets monthly to discuss matters 
contained in the IPV manual. The functions of visitors’ committees include considering unre-
solved complaints; submitting complaints to the ofﬁce of the inspecting judge to be dealt with 
at national level; organising a schedule of visits; extending the community’s interest and involve-
ment in correctional matters; and submitting the minutes of its meetings to the inspecting 
judge.
The most common complaints received by IPVs from prisoners in 2003 relate to prisoner 
requests for transfers (usually to prisons nearer their families) and for better healthcare. The 
other most frequent complaints were about means for obtaining release from prison, including 
issues relating to appeals of conviction or sentence, and to parole and bail.
A shortcoming of this initiative is that IPVs are limited to making recommendations to the 
410 The Correctional Services Act, 1998 (Act 111 of 1998), Section 90(1).
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heads of prisons, and cannot actually solve problems themselves or ensure that their recommen-
dations are implemented. Also, many of the complaints relate to issues that are systemic and 
cannot be resolved on an individual basis. It is important for this function to gain credibility if it 
is going to be accepted by prisoners, and to ensure that it is sustainable in the long term.
Surveys concerning the effectiveness of IPVs indicate that most people were of the opinion 
that the very presence of IPVs in prisons impacted positively on prisoners’ rights, and provided 
an important additional avenue for dealing with prisoners’ complaints. However, the view was 
also expressed that despite the presence of IPVs, conditions in South African prisons had not 
changed substantially. Another concern was that IPVs did not possess sufﬁcient understanding 
of the context and systemic issues pertaining to prison reform, for them to be able to intervene 
and report effectively.411
Section 99(1) of the Correctional Services Act states: ‘a judge of the Constitutional Court, 
Supreme Court of Appeal or high court, and a magistrate within his or her area of jurisdiction, 
may visit a prison at any time.’ Section 99(2) provides that ‘a judge and a magistrate referred 
to in Subsection(1) must be allowed access to any part of a prison and any documentary record, 
and may interview any prisoner and bring any matter to the attention of the commissioner, the 
minister, the national council or the inspecting judge’.
According to the current inspecting judge, judges and magistrates are not compelled to visit 
prisons but are encouraged to do so by the inspectorate of prisons. Visits are currently under-
taken by judges on an ad hoc basis. Reports are then forwarded to the ofﬁce of the inspecting 
judge, where a decision is made to send them either to the national commissioner or to the 
minister of correctional services, depending on the nature of the issue raised. It is the view of the 
inspecting judge that this is an extremely effective oversight mechanism, given the weight that 
the views of judges carry in South Africa.412
Reintegration of offenders 
The Correctional Services Act states that one of the three purposes of the correctional system 
is ‘promoting the social responsibility and human development of all prisoners and persons 
subject to community corrections’.413 The act gives guidelines on how to implement this, provid-
ing for the assessment of every prisoner,414 as well as the participation of prisoners in designing 
programmes for their sentences.415 The act also obliges the department to provide access to as full 
a range of programmes and activities as is possible to meet the educational and training needs 
of the prisoners, especially children.416 Prisoners may also be compelled to participate in assess-
411 Saras Jagwanth , A Review of the Judicial Inspectorate of Prisons in South Africa, CSPRI, May 2004, p17; Jacqui Gallinetti, Report 
on the Evaluation of the Independent Prison Visitors System, CSPRI, May 2004.
412 Louise Ehlers & Judge Hannes Fagan, personal correspondence, 28 July 2005.
413 The Correctional Services Act, 1998 (Act 111 of 1998), Section 2(c).
414 Ibid., Section 38.
415 Ibid., Section 37.
416 Ibid., Sections 19 and 69.
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ment and development programmes.417
The Department of Correctional Services has indicated that it placed rehabilitation at the 
centre of all departmental activities in partnership with external stakeholders. The social reinte-
gration of offenders into their families and communities is a necessary component for effective 
rehabilitation. It requires partnerships between government and civil society, and hopefully 
results in social crime prevention. During a special national cabinet strategy meeting in 1995, 
the Department of Correctional Services identiﬁed rehabilitation as a key objective in reducing 
recidivism. Its strategy to meet this objective involves strengthening partnerships with civil 
society organisations. Speciﬁc objectives include the development of individualised need-based 
rehabilitation programmes; marketing programmes for inmates; promoting a restorative justice 
approach to imprisonment; combating illiteracy; increasing training facilities; and increasing 
prisoner-made goods and services to enhance the prisoners’ self sufﬁciency.
The department is constrained by a lack of resources, such as insufﬁcient social workers, 
teachers, psychologists and other professional staff. Prison staff are expected to play a signiﬁcant 
role in the development of prisoners, but overburdened as they are by the numbers of prison-
ers, they are unlikely to have sufﬁcient time to fulﬁl this role. Many prisons have severe space 
constraints and do not have rooms in which to run programmes. The conditions in most prisons 
are not conducive to a learning environment for prisoners. Even community assistance requires 
departmental resources, but prisons that are unable to accommodate their services often turn 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) away. However, the past few years have seen growth 
in the number of services offered within prisons by community-based organisations, and an 
increase in partnerships on projects between the Department of Correctional Services and 
NGOs.418 This is particularly important, as South Africa has no real tradition of offender-reinte-
gration services that start in prison and continue after people are released. Within prisons, the 
emphasis has always been on security, and for this reason prisons have been closed to other 
agents who may wish to render services there.
NICRO has been the leading NGO in this regard, offering rehabilitation programmes 
to offenders. One of its programmes is the Working for Water Project: as part of its poverty-
eradication programme, the government, through the Department of Social Development, 
made funds available to NICRO to provide temporary employment for 500 former prisoners in 
the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry’s Working for Water Project. In terms of this pro-
gramme, Working for Water employs these former prisoners for 60 days, while NICRO provides 
training, education and support services. The aim of the programme is to help participants to 
become economically self-sustainable.419
F.  Non-state action against crime 
In the context of a high crime rate and lack of conﬁdence in the police services, non-state action 
417 Ibid., Section 37.
418 The Centre for Conﬂict Resolution, Track Two, Vol. 11, No. 2, April 2002, pp.12-13.
419 Lukas Muntingh, After Prison—The Case for Offender Reintegration, Institute for Security Studies, Monograph No. 52, Chapter 6.
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against crime in South Africa is extremely prevalent.  There are two main sub-sets of actors 
involved in this activity; private security forces and self-help organisations known as vigilante 
groups. 
The private security industry has grown rapidly over the past decade, with an annual turn-
over in excess of R10 billion420 and around 265 000 registered security ofﬁcers in 2004.421 Since 
1994, a signiﬁcant number of former policemen, prison guards and defence staff have moved 
over into the lucrative private security industry. The rapidly expanding size of the industry threw 
the need for tighter regulatory measures into sharp relief and, in 2001, the Private Security 
Industry Regulation Act422 was passed. The act provided for the establishment of a new oversight 
body, the Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority, and also made the registration and 
licensing of all operating security companies compulsory. 
Vigilante groups tend to provide protection for the poorer classes, generally free, although 
one of the largest groups, Mapogo-a-Mathamaga, does charge members a ‘subscription’ fee.423 
Vigilante activity in South Africa has typically been associated with well-known groups such as 
Mapogo-a-Mathamaga, PAGAD and the Peninsula Anti-Crime Agency (PEACA). These highly 
organised, cohesive organisations have a wide network of members and operate under some 
form of command structure. One of the largest, Mapogo, claimed around 50 000 members, 
with over 90 branches throughout Gauteng in 2000.424 However, alongside these organisations, 
a signiﬁcant amount of vigilante activity is also carried out by local ad hoc groupings that come 
together within a community to deal with suspects, sometimes using informal justice mecha-
nisms known as ‘peoples’ courts’, to provide a rough-and-ready form of trial.425 
Particularly in poor, black areas, where public conﬁdence in the formal system remains 
low, vigilantism is still very much a feature of the landscape. In a recent survey conducted by the 
Institute for Security Studies, 26 per cent of South Africans said that a group or organisation 
other than the police exists in their area to provide protection against crime. Amongst those who 
said there was a non-state actor protecting against crime in their area, 76 per cent of blacks said 
that no joining fee was charged, compared to only 19 per cent of whites.426 
The state has taken some ﬁrm steps against the highest proﬁle vigilante groups. As a result, 
their activities have scaled down since the mid- to late 1990s, when PAGAD and Mapogo-a-
420 Jenny Irish, Policing for Proﬁt, Monograph 39, Institute for Security Studies, August 1999; Institute for Security Studies, Crime 
Index, Vol. 4, No. 3.
421 See the Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority website, available at http://www.sira-sa.co.za/statsmenu.html. 
422 The Private Security Industry Regulation Act, 2001 (Act 56 of 2001).
423 Keith Gottschalk, ‘Vigilantism v. the State: A case study of the rise and fall of Pagad, 1996-2000’,  Occasional Paper 99, Institute 
for Security Studies, February 2005.
424 Ibid.
425 Bronwyn Harris, ‘As for Violent Crime, that’s our Daily Bread’, Vigilante Violence during South Africa’s Period of Transition, Centre 
for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, May 2001.
426 Patrick Burton, Anton du Plessis, Ted Leggettt, Antoinette Louw, Duxita Mistry & Hennie van Vuuren, ‘Public Perceptions 
about Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice’, in National Victims of Crime Survey 2003, Institute for Security Studies, July 2004.    
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Mathamaga were involved in high-proﬁle bombings and public assassinations. The state has set 
up special investigative squads and many members of vigilante groups have been arrested, with 
some successful prosecutions. However, the rate of convictions has been relatively low, in large 
part due to the unwillingness of potential witnesses to come forward after the murder of a string 
of witnesses in trials against PAGAD members. Meanwhile, press articles suggest that more ad 
hoc vigilante activities, often termed by the media as ‘mob justice’ activities, are on the rise.427 The 
Independent Complaints Directorate also noted in its 2004/05 report an ‘alarming’ increase (of 
184 per cent, to 71 people) in the number of cases reported to it of people who had died in police 
custody, from injuries received in vigilante attacks before they were arrested.  
Public opinion towards vigilantism remains mixed.428 Over the years, groups such as 
PAGAD have alienated much of their mainstream support through the use of increasingly 
violent tactics. However, particularly for those with limited access to policing and the formal 
court system, vigilante groups offer protection from crime and justice against perpetrators when 
no other realistic alternatives may exist. The prevalence of vigilantism may also be due not solely 
to inadequacies in the formal criminal justice system, but to a more deep-rooted public desire 
for fast, retributive justice that is incompatible with the constitutional rights-based system that 
is in place.429
However, for the state, ﬁghting vigilantism remains a priority, representing a direct chal-
lenge to the state monopoly on force and South Africa’s constitutional rights-based criminal 
justice system. Community self-help actions can play a constructive role—but this is more likely 
when they are in liaison with the state, such as through Community Police Forums or neigh-
bourhood watches, rather than in parallel to the state. 
427 The Sowetan, 2 June 2003; The Mercury, 2 March 2005, available at … http://www.themercury.co.za/index.php?fSectionId=2
83&fArticleId=2430446. 
428 Bronwyn Harris, ‘As for Violent Crime, that’s our Daily Bread’, Vigilante Violence during South Africa’s Period of Transition, Centre 
for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, May 2001, p.15 (of download version). 
429 Ibid.
Case study: People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD)
PAGAD was formed in late 1995 as a community anti-crime group ﬁghting drugs and violence 
in the Cape Flats section of Cape Town, but by early 1998 it had also become involved in anti-
government activities. PAGAD spoke out against the state’s inability to curtail drug-related 
crime in the Cape Flats and took the law into its own hands, ﬁghting against gangs and drug 
traders, generally using violent means. The group has also been involved in providing anti-drug 
related social care within the community, and set up a Drugs Counselling Centre in Rylands in 
February 1999. 
In addition to this primary objective, PAGAD, with a predominantly Muslim membership, has 
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been linked to Qibla—a fundamentalist movement that arose in South Africa in the 1980s, 
aiming to propagate an Islamic Revolution. Although the exact extent of links between PAGAD 
and Qibla are unclear, these allegations have been seized upon by the state as part of its  
strategy to erode public support for the organisation. 
In its early days, PAGAD beneﬁted from public disillusionment with what seemed to be the 
state’s inability to put a stop to the drug trade and gang warfare rife throughout the Cape Flats. 
Not only did the police seem incapable of ﬁghting crime, with parts of the force also involved 
in corruption, but once arrests were made, the constitutionally-based criminal justice system 
was not providing the convictions public opinion desired. In 1996, during a PAGAD march that 
turned violent, Rashaad Staggie, leader of the Hard Livings gang, was lynched. Fellow leaders 
from the gang eventually faced trial, but prosecutors were unable to get a conviction for drug-
selling and only after six years, obtained a conviction on other charges, including the illegal 
possession of ﬁrearms.
During this time, parts of the police force also seemed to be implicitly supportive of PAGAD, 
turning a blind eye to their activities and even accompanying them on marches to the houses 
of drug dealers. Led by Justice Minister Dullah Omar, the state also attempted to negotiate 
with PAGAD to refrain from violence, and to co-operate with the SAPS by providing informa-
tion about drug dealers. 
Through the late 1990s, PAGAD’s tactics became more violent and radical, and their support 
began to dwindle. From around 1998, PAGAD’s targets began to include police stations, 
individuals who spoke out against the organisation, and ‘Western’ targets.  PAGAD was impli-
cated in a series of bombings, including one which took place at the popular V&A Waterfront 
complex in January 1999, and at St Elmo’s pizzeria in Camps Bay in November 1999, killing 48 
people. The state attitude to PAGAD hardened, with a concerted effort to stamp out the group.
A state crackdown on PAGAD has led to many of its members being arrested and tried. In 
1997, the police set up a squad of around 130 police members to investigate PAGAD and by 
2000, police had arrested and brought charges against nearly 150 PAGAD gunmen. The inves-
tigating arm of the National Prosecuting Authority (known as the Scorpions) has also assisted 
in raiding PAGAD’s highly armed G-Force cell. However, the assassinations or disappearances 
of many witnesses in PAGAD trials have highlighted the inadequacies of South Africa’s wit-
ness-protection system. It has also made it very difﬁcult for police to secure convictions, with 
many potential witnesses intimidated into silence or having gone into hiding to avoid being 
subpoenaed. Nonetheless, PAGAD today is mostly seen as a spent force, with limited public 
support and many of its members in jail. 
S O U R C E S :  
Keith Gottschalk, ‘Vigilantism v. the State: A case study of the rise and fall of Pagad, 1996-2000’, Institute for 
Security Studies, Occasional Paper 99, February 2005;
Anneli Botha, Fear in the City, Urban Terrorism in South Africa, Institute for Security Studies, Monograph 63, July 
2001; and
The Mail & Guardian website, available at http://www.mg.co.za/.




The right to a fair public hearing of any dispute is constitutionally enshrined, and also outlined in 
several international and regional treaties to which South Africa is party. However, despite efforts 
to introduce small-claims procedures, an active set of organisations involved in public interest 
litigation, and the expanding mandate of the Legal Aid Board to include civil cases, the ﬁnancial 
cost of legal proceedings remains a signiﬁcant barrier to realising equal access to justice. In par-
ticular, the cost of legal professional services remain unaffordable to the average South African, 
contributing to the continuing popularity of traditional courts as a practical forum for dispute 
resolution, especially in rural areas. 
A number of independent oversight institutions were established in Chapter 9 of the 1996 
Constitution, most notably the South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC). Although 
these institutions do provide alternative avenues of recourse for individuals, their effectiveness 
has been criticised, with issues such as overlapping mandates and a lack of adequate parliamen-
tary support being raised.
A. Knowledge of rights
Despite the widespread debate that accompanied the drafting of the Constitution and its Bill of 
Rights, a 2002 study by the largely government-funded Human Science Research Council found 
that 69.5  per cent of South Africans had either not heard of or did not know the purpose of the 
Bill of Rights.430 Similar statistics were reported relating to awareness of key institutions set up 
under Chapter 9 of the Constitution to protect, promote and monitor human rights. The study 
also found that these statistics are higher amongst vulnerable and poor social groups, especially 
when correlated with race, gender and ‘standard of living’ measurements. However, despite 
the lack of knowledge of the particular documents and institutions, South Africans showed ‘a 
430 The Human Sciences Research Council, Public Attitudes in Contemporary South Africa—Insights from an HSRC Survey, 2002.
S O U T H  A F R I C A :  J U S T I C E  S E C T O R  A N D  T H E  R U L E  O F  L AW     1 0 9
popular and deep commitment to a substantive human rights regime, inclusive of second-gen-
eration rights’.431
The Department of Justice and Constitutional Development (DoJCD) has as one of its stated 
primary objectives, the improvement of access to justice through public communication and 
the education of vulnerable communities. Their emphasis is usually on rural and impoverished 
communities. To this end the DoJCD has published materials, developed videos, held education 
sessions within communities, hosted seminars, opened two additional citizen advice desks in 
courts in each province and participated in community radio slots. The DoJCD together with 
the SAHRC is also working to ensure that human rights are included in the normal schooling 
curriculum.432
Chapter 9 institutions are also tasked with promoting human rights, and thus raising 
human rights awareness. The SAHRC has reached out to 41 812 people through community 
workshops and 4 502 people through seminars. The Commission for Gender Equality has 
disseminated over 100 000 human rights materials (posters and pamphlets) and hosted over 
130 awareness-raising events.433 Non-governmental and community-based organisations often 
provide community education on human rights in the speciﬁc locality where they work, and 
focus on the human rights issues that they seek to address.  
B. Physical access
The Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development identiﬁed the establishment of suit-
able courts, in rural and township areas, as a priority in 1999.434 Since then, much work has 
been done to upgrade and build courts in these communities. The DoJCD uses a court model 
blueprint to ensure that minimum standards are met.435 Magistrates’ courts are widely spread 
throughout the country; high courts are less accessible, and largely limited to urban areas.
Courts are not accessible to the physically disabled. The ﬁrst case brought before the new 
equality court in 2003, established under the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair 
Discrimination Act of 2000, tackled this issue when a practising attorney who is quadriplegic 
brought a case against the DoJCD and the Department of Public Works.436 The case related to 
the applicant’s difﬁculties in accessing courts due to her being in a wheelchair. The matter was 
resolved by a settlement agreement between the parties, which was then made an order of court. 
Under the terms of the settlement agreement, the courts in which the applicant primarily prac-
tices would be made accessible to people with disabilities. One court room would also be made 
accessible, together with one bathroom. Further to this end, the respondents were given six 
431 Ibid., p.163.
432 The DoJCD, Annual Report 2003/04, p.63- 71.
433 Ibid., p.84.
434 Presentation to Justice Portfolio Committee, 9 September 1999, available at http://www.doj.gov.za/2004dojsite/reports/
1999reports/courtefﬁciency/1999_courtsefﬁciency.htm .
435 The DoJCD, Annual Report 2003/04, p.32.
436 Esthé Muller v DoJCD and Department of Public Works (Equality Court, Germiston Magistrates’ Court  01/03).
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months to draw up an action plan with respect to other court buildings in the country. This plan 
must be submitted to the SAHRC and the court. The respondents agreed that there would be full 
compliance for access to courts for disabled people, within ﬁve years of the date of settlement.437 
The DoJCD has made accessibility to courts for all vulnerable groups a key strategic-perfor-
mance area.438 Yet, despite the strategic objectives of the DoJCD, of the R229.7 million spent on 
constructing and upgrading court buildings in 2003/04, no funds were spent on ensuring physi-
cal access for disabled people to the courts identiﬁed in the above agreement.439 In fact, by late 
2004, the DoJCD had failed to submit the progress report required to ﬁnalise the agreement.440
C.  Financial access
South Africa introduced a small claims court system as early as 1984, in an effort to make justice 
more accessible.441 Today, there are 153 of these courts across the country. Their jurisdiction is 
limited to claims for damages of R7 000 or less.442 No legal representation is allowed in these 
courts and no court fees are charged. The courts also use a less adversarial approach to resolving 
disputes, and cases are heard by a commissioner, rather than a judge or magistrate.  
The jurisdiction of magistrates’ courts, which are cheaper to access than high courts, is 
limited to R200 000. Claims for higher amounts have to be brought to the high court. 
Court fees
In general, court fees do not hinder access (in contrast to practitioners’ legal fees, which are often 
beyond the means of ordinary South Africans). In most courts, there are procedures to apply for 
indigent rulings, which would exempt the party from paying court fees. The details of different 
court fees and policies, applied in different courts, are described in greater detail below. 
The fees required to lodge and conduct a case in the Constitutional Court are outlined in the 
Rules of the Constitutional Court.443 In terms of these rules, a notice of appeal or a court order 
referring a matter to the Constitutional Court must be lodged with a revenue stamp, valued at 
R75.444 Other prescribed court fees include:
• R10 per document for the lodging of an appeal or the answering of an afﬁdavit;
• R15 for the lodging of a notice of appeal, cross-appeal or order of the court granting 
leave to appeal;
437 Jonathan Ancer, ‘Lawyer wins her right to a digniﬁed entrance’, The Star, 25 February 2004.
438 The DoJCD, Annual Report 2003/04, p.10.
439 Ibid., p.88-89.
440 Jonathan Ancer, ‘State’s foot-dragging on (the) disabled angers lawyer: Two departments fail to heed ruling on ensuring easier 
access to courtrooms’, The Star, Johannesburg, 8 September 2004.
441 The Small Claims Courts Act 61 of 1984.
442 The DoJCD, Annual Report 2003/04, p.11
443 The Rules of the Constitutional Court, Government Notice R.1603, in the Government Gazette No.25643, 31 October 2003.
444 Ibid., Rule 4(4).
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• R1 per page for certiﬁed copies; and
• R25 taxation fee.445
The Constitutional Court Rules also provide for the court registrar to waive fees if a party can 
show satisfactorily that he/she is indigent. The rules provide that a party must demonstrate that 
‘except for household goods, wearing apparel and tools of trade, such party is not possessed of 
property to the amount of R20 000, and will not be able within a reasonable time to provide such 
sum from his or her earnings’.446
The court fees for the Supreme Court of Appeal are contained in the Rules Regulating the 
Conduct of the Proceedings of the Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa.447 The rules provide 
for any party to request leave to prosecute or defend an appeal, in forma pauperis. This procedure 
allows the registrar of the court to make a ruling on the indigence of the party. The ruling is 
based on establishing that the party owns property valued at less than R10 000, and would be 
unable to earn this money or obtain legal aid within a reasonable amount of time. Once leave is 
granted, the party is exempted from paying court fees or lodging security for costs.448 Court fees 
are prescribed in Rule 19:
• R10 to lodge an application, answer an afﬁdavit, give notice of an appeal or to cross-
appeal;
• R10 to obtain an order of the court granting leave to appeal;
• R2 per document for registrar’s certiﬁcation;
• R1 per page for photocopies; and
• R25 in taxation fees.
The court fees prescribed for the high courts are outlined in the Uniform Rules of Court. Rule 67 
outlines the fees, as well as providing for an exemption for actions instituted in forma pauperis:
• R80 for lodging a notice of application, notice of action or notice of appeal from 
judgment of a single judge;
• R80 for the power of attorney to appeal from an inferior call, although no fees apply 
to appeals in criminal cases;
• R60 for every bill of costs submitted for taxation; and
• R2 per document.
The fees required to lodge and conduct a case in the land claims court are outlined in the Land 
445 Ibid., Schedule 2.
446 Ibid., Rule 4(5).
447 The Rules Regulating the Conduct of the Proceedings of the Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa, R.1523, in the 
Government Gazette No.19507, 27 November 1998.
448 Ibid., Rule 15.
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Claims Court Rules.449 The rules provide that no fees are required if the case is instituted by the 
Commission or the Director-General; further, no fees are required if the party is represented by 
a statutorily established Legal Aid Board or can prove indigence.450 Indigence is demonstrated 
when a party owns property valued below R30 000, and will not be able to obtain such an 
amount from their earnings within a reasonable time.451 Fees are prescribed in Schedule 2 and 
include the following:
• A revenue stamp valued at R80 must be attached at every notice of application, notice 
of action, power of attorney and notice of appeal;
• A revenue stamp valued at R50 must be attached to every bill of costs submitted for 
taxation; and
• R1 per photocopy or certiﬁed copy.452
Court fees for magistrates’ courts are prescribed in the Magistrates’ Court Rules of Court. Table E 
of Annexure 2 to the act outlines the following fees:
• R20 for the lodging of initial documents or summonses, or an application for an 
order;
• R2 for any request to inspect an identiﬁed record;
• R5 for every 100 records searched, when requesting to inspect a record with an 
incorrect number or no number;
• R2 per 100 words for a typed copy of the court record;
• R1 per page for a photocopy of the court record;
• R2 per 100 words for examining and certifying a copy of the record; and
• R10 for completing the statement referred to in Section 74A(4) of the Magistrates’ 
Court Act (this refers to the assistance given by the clerk of the court to an illiterate 
debtor, in the case of an application for an administration order).
No court fees are charged in equality courts.
Beyond ofﬁcially required fees, reports and studies on corruption in the criminal justice 
system suggest that corruption within the court system is not as prevalent as in the other 
branches of the criminal justice system, but that it does still exist. One study conducted by the 
Institute for Security Studies makes reference to bribes being paid by the public in relation to 
‘court-related services’, but does not specify whether these services include prosecutorial ser-
449 The Land Claims Court Rules, in the Government Gazette No. 17804, 21 February 1997.
450 Ibid., Rule 5(3).
451 Ibid., Rule 5(4).
452 Ibid., Schedule 2.
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vices.453 This study, which was conducted in 2003, shows that ﬁve per cent of respondents said 
that they had been asked for a bribe, but less than half of these paid a bribe for court-related 
services. The UN’s Country Corruption Assessment Report for 2003 lists bribery of South 
African Department of Justice ofﬁcials as one of the main categories of corruption in South 
Africa identiﬁed in the study, but does not speciﬁcally target judicial ofﬁcers.454 However, since 
the department provides administrative support to the courts, this may impact signiﬁcantly on 
the functioning of especially the lower courts. A Markinor Omnibus Survey in 2001 revealed that 
26.8 per cent of respondents believed that they were likely or very likely to have to bribe court 
ofﬁcials.455 The UN Corruption Report does point out that there is insufﬁcient information on 
actual incidents of bribery, and that statistics on perceptions may differ signiﬁcantly from the 
actual prevalence of the problem. 
The Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act456 makes corruption, which 
includes bribery by a civil servant such as a court ofﬁcial, an offence.457 The department has indi-
cated that it takes corruption and bribery seriously. It has an Anti-Corruption and Fraud Policy,458 
although in the year 2003/04 only six disciplinary hearings relating particularly to corruption 
were held.459 Only one of these related to bribery.460
Cost of legal advice
The major barrier to access to justice in South Africa remains the high cost of legal services, 
closely tied to the dual nature of the economy, with a small proportion of the population being 
served by a high proportion of the trained legal professionals.
There is general consensus that legal professional services are not affordable to the average 
person in South Africa. In litigation, the rules of each respective court sets the tariffs at which 
attorney’s fees are to be taxed (that is, at what rate they can be recovered by a litigant who has 
been awarded the costs of a matter). To the extent that the taxed amount is less than the amount 
charged by the attorney, the client has to pay the difference, even if successful. Thus consulta-
tion for a case in the magistrates’ court ranges from R67 to R80 for every ﬁfteen minutes.461 The 
Uniform Rules of Court set a consultation fee of R100, for every ﬁfteen minutes, for a case in 
453 Henni van Vuuren, ‘Small bribes, big challenge(s): Extent and nature of petty corruption in South Africa’, Institute for Security 
Studies, Crime Quarterly No 9, Pretoria, 2004.  See also Burton et al, National Victims of Crime Survey South Africa 2003, 
Chapters 5 & 7.
454 The United Nations Ofﬁce on Drugs and Crime & the Department of Public Service and Administration, Country Corruption 
Assessment Report: South Africa, April 2003, p.122, available at http://www.info.gov.za/otherdocs/2003/corruption.pdf.
455 Ibid., p.104.
456 The Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act, 2004 (Act 12 of 2004).
457 Ibid., Section 3.
458 The DoJCD, Anti-Corruption and Fraud Policy, 2000, available at http://www.doj.gov.za/2004dojsite/brochure/2000_anti 
percent20corruption.pdf .
459 The DoJCD, Annual Report 2003/04, p.118
460 Ibid.,  pp.116-117
461 The Magistrates’ Courts Rules of Court, Annexure 2.
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any of the high courts.462  The tariff for higher courts, including the Supreme Court of Appeal and 
the Constitutional Court, ranges from R70 to R105 for every thirty minutes of a consultation.463 
In non-litigation matters, the law societies often publish non-compulsory guidelines of fees. The 
Cape Law Society, for example, has established a guideline of between R75 and R400 for every 
15 minutes of a consultation.464 
In relation to advocates, the Magistrates’ Court Rules do not deal with the taxing of advocates’ 
fees, who seldom appear in the magistrates’ court on civil matters. The rule in the high court is 
that the taxing master (who determines the amount at which litigation costs may be recovered by 
a successful litigant) shall allow such fees as he considers reasonable.465 Similar provisions apply 
to the Supreme Court of Appeal and the Constitutional Court, although no express mention is 
made of advocates’ fees.466 The Bar Council issues a guideline of fees to be charged by advocates, 
according to seniority. These may be deviated from where there is good cause. The charging of 
excessive fees is a matter for disciplinary action by the Bar Council. 
The split-bar system in South Africa implies that clients will often have to pay for the pro-
fessional services of both an advocate and an attorney. Although attorneys are now permitted 
to appear in the high court in terms of Section 4 of the Right of Appearance in Courts Act,467 
matters at that stage are usually still referred to an advocate. While in theory the work done by 
either profession is distinct, and thus duplication of fees should not occur, in practice this does 
increase the cost of legal representation (for example, because of attendance at consultations and 
court hearings by both the attorney and the advocate). The high cost of legal advice is evident 
when compared to the average household income in South Africa. The 2000 Income and 
Expenditure Survey found that the average household income in South Africa is R29 004.16; 
the average income in black households is even lower at R17 193.16.468  At just over R80 per day 
or R47.10 in the average black household, it would take a week’s income to afford an hour-long 
consultation with an attorney.
South Africa has a long tradition of paralegal advice ofﬁcers, dating back to the apartheid 
era. Paralegal assistance is still largely driven by non-governmental organisations through legal 
advice ofﬁces. A number of these ofﬁces are members of the National Community Based 
Paralegal Association.  As of 2004, there are about 200 advice ofﬁces throughout the country 
462 The Uniform Rules of Courts, Rule 70.
463 Rules Regulating the Conduct of the Proceedings of the Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa, Government Notice R.1523, 
in the Government Gazette No. 19507, 27 November 1998, Rule 18 part D.
464 The Law Society of the Cape of Good Hope: Guideline(s) for the Taxing Committee for the Assessment of Non-Litigious Fees, 
April 1 2004, available at http://www.capelawsoc.law.za/Non-lit 2004-04.doc .
465 The Uniform Rules of Court, Rule 69(5).
466 The Supreme Court Rules, Rule 17; the Constitutional Court Rules, Rule 22.
467 The Right of Appearance in Courts Act, 1995 (Act 62 of 1995); see also Section 4.B on Lawyers, p. 52.
468 Statistics South Africa, Income and Expenditure of Households 2000 South Africa, Pretoria, 13 Nvovember 2002, p.86, available 
at http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0111/P01112000.pdf.
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servicing rural and urban communities.469 The cases covered by these ofﬁces include unlawful 
evictions, children’s rights, farm workers’ rights, domestic violence, maintenance and social 
grants. Organisations such as Black Sash, the Centre for Rural Legal Studies, the Centre for 
Socio-Legal Studies, the Social Change Assistance Trust, Lawyers for Human Rights and the 
Legal Resources Centre provide training and support for paralegals, as well as conducting and 
funding public-interest litigation directly.
The draft Legal Practice Bill, released by the Department of Justice and Constitutional 
Development in August 2000, has among its stated objectives to increase access to justice and 
create affordable access to legal assistance. It seeks to do this by, among other things, ensuring 
that all the various components of the legal profession are regulated by a single umbrella body, 
the Legal Practice Council. Though the Bill is not very clear on this, it would appear that para-
legals would (for the ﬁrst time) need to register as legal practitioners in order to be able to offer 
advice to the public, although the current restrictions on their capacity to appear in court, on 
behalf of clients, would be maintained. Whilst the formalisation of the paralegal system through 
accredited advice centres may enhance to a certain extent access to justice for poor people, it will 
not change the cost of legal services at the upper end of the market.
Individuals can choose not to have legal representation and can appear on their own behalf 
in the formal court system. Several special courts and tribunals, such as the equality court, the 
small claims court or the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration do not permit 
legal representation, and the judicial ofﬁcer in these matters fulﬁls a far more inquisitorial func-
tion than is permitted in other courts. It is exceptionally rare that persons are not represented in 
the high court; it happens far more frequently in the lower courts. 
Otherwise, individuals seeking to enforce their rights in court are dependent on state-funded 
assistance from the Legal Aid Board (see Section 5.C above). The Legal Aid Board, however, pro-
vides services mainly in criminal matters, though it is increasing its assistance in civil cases, 
where it prioritises matters involving children, women in divorce proceedings, maintenance and 
domestic violence cases, and unlawful evictions.470 Despite these commitments, less than 10 per 
cent of the board’s new cases in 2003/04 were civil matters.471 
469 See the Directory of Paralegal Ofﬁces—Knowing Your Rights, 2004, available at http://www.uct.ac.za/depts/ci/pubs/pdf/rights/
comtools/plegdir/prelims.pdf.
470 The Legal Aid Board, Legal Aid Board Handbook, available at http://www.legal-aid.co.za/services/handbook/hb_what.htm 
471 The DoJCD, Annual Report 2003/04, p.82.
Case study: Access to justice for immigration detainees
The Lindela Repatriation Centre is a holding centre for foreigners awaiting repatriation—for 
the most part undocumented migrants, but also failed asylum seekers—in Krugersdorp, near 
Johannesburg. It is owned and administered by the Dyambu Trust, an organisation set up by 
members of the ANC Women’s League in 1996. The Dyambu Trust is responsible for housing 
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and feeding detainees through a contract with the Department of Home Affairs. Rumours 
of bribery and abuse of power led to major fact-ﬁnding missions between 1998 and 2000 by 
the SAHRC and other human rights organisations, such as Lawyers for Human Rights, which 
expressed concern over the evidence of unsatisfactory conditions of detention. One of the 
concerns was that detainees were held at the centre for substantially longer periods than the 
30 days allowed by the Aliens Control Act 96 of 1991.
On 3 September 1999, a team consisting of Jody Kollapen, Commissioner of the SAHRC, 
Andrew Rens of the Wits Law Clinic, Jacob van Garderen from Lawyers for Human Rights, and 
Emma Algotsson, a researcher afﬁliated to Wits University, went to the facility for an initial 
visit to meet up with representatives from Department of Home Affairs and Dyambu. Despite 
the initially positive response to the investigation, Emma Algotsson was denied access to the 
facility on her ﬁrst two attempts to visit Lindela on her own. Only after further pressure was 
she given access to the facility. On subsequent visits, access to the centre at certain times, 
or to speciﬁc sections of the facility, was denied. On 27 September 1999, both the SAHRC 
representative and her translator were denied access to Lindela because the Dyambu junior 
manager had not been informed, though departmental ofﬁcials Mr Mabote and Mr Meyer had 
agreed to the visit earlier that day, the same day, but had failed to inform Dyambu about the 
arrangement. Similarly, Andrew Rens, an attorney at the Wits Law Clinic, was denied access to 
the facility by the department and Dyambu when attempting to visit clients who had been held  
in excess of 30 days at the facility. Mr Rens was visiting Lindela for the preparation of a case for 
the SAHRC. The junior manager is reported as saying, ‘This is my home, and if you would like 
to visit my home you have to have my permission.’ Later, he stated: ‘This is how I work and if 
you want to visit Lindela, you have to follow my rules.’ 
Through ongoing monitoring, the SAHRC discovered a substantial number of cases of people 
being detained for extensive periods, without any attempt made by the authorities to approach 
the high court for a legal extension. Finally, in November 1999, the SAHRC and the Wits Law 
Clinic approached the high court for an urgent order for the release of the 40 detainees who 
were unlawfully held at Lindela. The order was granted, and with the assistance of the sheriff of 
the court, the detainees were released.
But the problem of oversight over the facility remained. The Department of Home Affairs 
appeared to have no statutory or contractual power to review, monitor or report on activities at 
Lindela, nor did it appear to have the authority to intervene in a threatening emergency situa-
tion at the centre. Dyambu’s accountability for the management of Lindela therefore relies on 
the inspection and supervision from an independent body. The law clinic launched a further 
application to the high court, asking for an interdict in terms of which the SAHRC would have 
an oversight role over the administration of the Lindela Centre. 
Despite the court order and an ongoing monitoring process, the practice of holding persons 
for more than 30 days without the intervention of a court continued, and it was frequently 
necessary to threaten the authorities with further court action to ensure compliance with the 
law. Nevertheless, ongoing negotiations with the department and Dyambu has meant that the 
SAHRC and other human rights organisations have increasing access to persons detained, and 
other information relating to the facility.
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D.  Right to appear/jurisdictional restrictions 
Constitutional provisions on locus standi, the right to be heard in court, allow for wide access to 
the judicial process and are considered progressive. Section 38 of the Constitution reads:
Enforcement of rights
Anyone listed in this section has the right to approach a competent court, 
alleging that a right in the Bill of Rights has been infringed or threatened, and 
the court may grant appropriate relief, including a declaration of rights. The 
persons who may approach a court are - 
a. anyone acting in their own interests; 
b. anyone acting on behalf of another person who cannot act in their own 
name; 
c. anyone acting as a member of, or in the interests of, a group or class of 
persons; 
d. anyone acting in the public interests; and 
e. an association acting in the interests of its members.
Public interest litigation is thus permitted, and has been at the forefront of the majority of con-
stitutional cases dealing with access to socio-economic rights. It plays a vital role in allowing the 
poor access to justice through the courts. 
Amicus curiae (friend of the court) petitions are permitted and provided for in the 
Constitutional Court Rules, which set out the procedure for applying for recognition as an amicus 
curiae, in which case the party is able to participate in existing litigation.472 The rules are widely 
Nonetheless, serious problems remain. In September 2005, the UN Working Group on 
Arbitrary Detention came to South Africa and visited Lindela. It noted that many of those 
held alleged that they had been arbitrarily arrested, and concluded that the fact that they were 
not able to contest the validity of their detention (even though Section 35 of the Constitution 
stipulates that every person detained has the right to challenge the lawfulness of the detention, 
in person, before a court) could not be justiﬁed.
S O U R C E S
Lindela: At the crossroads for detention and repatriation, SAHRC, December 2000; 
Report into the Arrest and Detention of Suspected Undocumented Migrants, SAHRC, March 1999;
Botshabelo Sancturary: Refugee Rights Project, LHR newsletter November 2001, Vol. 4/2, available at http://www.
lhr.org.za/refugee/nletter/v4i2.pdf;
Wits Law Clinic: Past Cases, University of the Witwatersrand Law Clinic (Refugee Unit), available at http://
wwwserver.law.wits.ac.za/clinic/past.htm;
The Sowetan, ‘Move frees 40 detained aliens’, 12 November 1999; and
‘UN Panel on Arbitrary Detention ends visit to South Africa’, United Nations Press Release, 19 September 2005.
472 IDASA, Advocacy, Litigation and Amicus Curiae, 25 October 2004.
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framed, allowing for any person with an interest in a case, including NGOs, to apply. Amicus 
curiae have also played a signiﬁcant role in many constitutional cases, especially those focusing 
on socio-economic rights. 
Some examples of South African cases in which amicus curiae have played a role include; 
United Democratic Movement v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others (African 
Christian Democratic Party and Others intervening; Institute for Democracy in South Africa and 
Another as amicus curiae).473 This case raised the issue of amici curiae, shedding light on particu-
lar questions that arose in the case. In South African Human Rights Commission and Another v 
President of the Republic of South Africa and Another,474 some of the respondents did not appear 
in court, so the amicus curiae was able to provide the court with a fuller picture where the matter 
was of particular public interest.
E.  Delays in court proceedings
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the time it takes for a civil case to be heard, particularly in the 
busier courts, is of concern. For example, in the Cape High Court the ordinary court roll for civil 
matters is full for close to a year.475 The DoJCD does not, however, record information in relation 
to the time it takes civil cases in the lower and high courts, and it does not keep records of the 
time it takes a case to be heard on appeal.
F.  ‘Traditional’ justice systems 
Under the various forms of colonial and white-controlled government in power in South Africa 
until 1994, traditional or customary law was regulated in ways similar to, but perhaps more 
extreme than, in other African colonies.476 In 1927, a uniform approach to the recognition of cus-
tomary law across South Africa was adopted with the passing of the Black Administration Act.477 
Under this law, initially only commissioners’ courts (presided over by white ofﬁcials) and their 
appeal courts were permitted to apply customary law. In 1988, Section 1(1) of the Law of Evidence 
Amendment Act478 granted all courts the discretion to apply customary law between ‘black’ liti-
gants. Recognition was subject to a ‘repugnancy’ proviso, which required that applicable rules 
of customary law should not be contrary to public policy or natural justice. This section is still 
in force and application of customary law in the formal court structures remains discretionary. 
The interpretation and application of this proviso has been highly prejudicial to Africans, with 
the result that many customary rules could not be applied. For example, until the passing of the 
473 2003(1) SA 495 (CC).
474 2005(1) SA 580 (CC).
475 Information supplied by the clerk of the Cape High Court, 20 April 2005.
476 Mahmood Mamdani, Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, 1996.
477 The Black Administration Act, 1927 (Act 38 of 1927).
478 The Law of Evidence Amendment Act, 1988 (Act 45 of 1988).
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Recognition of Customary Marriages Act,479 customary marriages were not recognised.480
Two codes of customary law, the Natal Code481 and the KwaZulu Code482, were recognised 
prior to 1994 and applied territorially, and they remain in force. Their interaction, application and 
relation to national legislation remain uncertain, and they have not yet been considered by the 
courts or the South African Law Reform Commission.483 However, Section 2 of the Justice Laws 
Rationalisation Act484 extended all South African laws across the whole territory of the republic. 
It is to be supposed that nationally applicable laws, such as the Divorce Act485, for example, super-
sede the provisions of the codes.
The Constitution for the ﬁrst time recognised customary law as an equal source of law to the 
common law.  Section 211 of the South African Constitution reads:
211  Recognition
(1) The institution, status and role of traditional leadership, according to customary law, 
(is) … recognised subject to the Constitution.
(2) A traditional authority that observes a system of customary law may function subject 
to any applicable legislation and customs, which includes amendments to, or repeal 
of, that legislation or those customs.
(3) The courts must apply customary law when that law is applicable, subject to the 
Constitution and any legislation that speciﬁcally deals with customary law. 
Section 212 states that:
212 Role of traditional leaders
(1) National legislation may provide for a role for traditional leadership, as an institution 
at local level on matters affecting local communities.
(2) To deal with matters relating to traditional leadership, the role of traditional leaders, 
customary law and the customs of communities observing a system of customary 
law—
 (a)  national or provincial legislation may provide for the establishment of houses of 
traditional leaders; and 
  (b)  national legislation may establish a council of traditional leaders.
479 The Recognition of Customary Marriages Act, 1998 (Act 120 of 1998).
480 TW Bennet, Human Rights and African Customary Law, Juta & Co, Cape Town, 1995, p.189.
481 Promulgated in its current version in Proc R151 of 1987.
482 Promulgated in terms of KwaZulu homeland legislation, Act 6 of 1981.
483 TW Bennet, Human Rights and African Customary Law, Juta & Co, Cape Town, 1995, p.189.  
484 The Justice Laws Rationalisation Act, 1996 (Act 18 of 1996).
485 The Divorce Act, 1979 (Act 70 of 1979).
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However, the abolition of discriminatory practices has faced great difﬁculties, since the Black 
Administration Act, while offensive in many respects, also lays the foundation for the recognition 
of customary law. The harmonisation of common law and customary law has been the subject of 
several Law Reform Commission reports and proposals. In 1999, the Law Reform Commission 
published a Report on the Conﬂict of Law, which included recommendations on a host of issues, 
including succession, marriage, evidentiary rules and choice of law rules, but the Law Reform 
Commission’s proposals have not been translated into legislation.486 
The Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act487 came into operation in 
September 2004. It provides for the establishment of traditional councils to govern particular 
traditional communities, which have to fulﬁl certain requirements before they can be recognised 
as such.488 This act requires that at least 40 per cent of the members of the traditional council 
must be democratically elected,489 that one-third of the council must comprise of women,490 and 
that traditional communities must transform and adapt customary law and customs to comply 
with the Bill of Rights, particularly by preventing unfair discrimination, promoting equality and 
progressively realising female leadership.491
The customary (chiefs’) courts are encompassed by section 166 of the Constitution as ‘any 
other courts established or recognised by an act of Parliament, including any court of a status 
similar to either the high courts or the magistrates’ courts, since they are recognised in the Black 
Administration Act.492 In terms of this act, their jurisdiction is limited to ‘black ’ persons and to 
the application of customary law. Chiefs’ courts are further limited in their penal jurisdiction, 
and may only impose ﬁnes, orders of peace and suspended sentences. An appeal from a chiefs’ 
court is passed to a higher-level customary court and, where there is no higher-level customary 
court, to the magistrates’ court. In that case, a magistrate has the discretion as to whether to apply 
customary law, but must quash proceedings in the chiefs’ court if he or she ﬁnds that customary 
law was not applicable between the parties. 
Parties who are subject to customary law may of course enter the court system by going to 
the magistrates’ court directly, which will have the discretion to apply customary law. However, 
for most people in rural areas, chiefs’ courts will be closer and more accessible and they are thus 
regarded as an effective way to deal with a range of every day conﬂicts. Traditional courts are gen-
erally seen as speedy, informal, not intimidating, cheap and accessible. Members of many com-
486 In July 2005, a bill to repeal the Black Administration Act of 1927 was introduced to Parliament. Since not all the provisions 
of the act can be repealed immediately, the bill envisages the repeal of some of the provisions immediately, and others on a 
particular date in the near future, or on the date of implementation of substitute statutory provisions by different role-players at 
the national and provincial levels of government.
487 The Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act, 2003 (Act 41 of 2003).
488 Ibid., Sections 2 to 4.
489 Ibid., Section 3(2)(c)(ii).
490 Ibid., Section 3(2)(b).
491 Ibid., Section 2(3).
492 The Black Administration Act, 1927 (Act 38 of 1927).
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munities would rather appear before these courts than before a magistrate. There is a low appeal 
rate from traditional courts. Traditional courts substantially reduce the potential work-load of 
magistrates’ courts. These courts exist in almost every area or jurisdiction of a chief or headman. 
They are also accessible regardless of social status, wealth or education. Legal representation is 
not permissible in the court of a chief, so justice is affordable. Customary law in these courts 
consists of rules and customs of that particular community. The informal approach of African 
traditional courts has been held up as a major advantage over their more formal counterparts, 
with their complex, technical rules that may allow a perpetrator to beneﬁt from technicalities. 
The user-friendly procedure allows for parties to present their cases and have their witnesses give 
their version of events. Thereafter, the chief or headman and his councillors can question them. 
Members of the public can question the parties and witnesses. The language of the court is nor-
mally the local language of the defendants, with no risk of distortion through interpretation.493 
However, there are problems with these courts, including the participation of women and 
youth, which has been discouraged to date. Anecdotal evidence suggests a strained relationship 
between chiefs (often referred to as amakhosi) and youth, in particular. This results in a low level 
of participation of youth in the traditional court system and other aspects of community life. 
Women struggle, because of their generally limited status in customary law, to participate in 
the traditional court system, particularly as authority ﬁgures. The well-documented struggle for 
recognition by women and youth in a patriarchal culture also plays itself out in the traditional 
court system. The marginalisation of key groups, such as the youth and women, still remains a 
problem with the way in which the courts currently function. It has been argued that a system for 
monitoring marginalisation and human-rights abuses may be necessary, as well as the monitor-
ing of their engagement and satisfaction with the functioning of the courts.494 
Chiefs’ courts lie outside of the formal court structures and members do not receive training 
by the DoJCD. It is also a cause for concern that traditional courts hear cases that are, at heart, 
matters of social control. An example of this is compulsory virginity testing promoted through 
the courts, and cases relating to pregnancy. It has been argued that these practices deny young 
girls their sexual and reproductive rights. The amakhosi who have stopped practising virginity 
testing, said that they have done so because of complaints that it ‘embarrassed’ the girls and was 
an invasion of their privacy. The amakhosi who did support virginity testing did so because they 
believed it could reduce HIV infection and unplanned pregnancy rates.495 
In January 2003, following a long discussion period, the Law Reform Commission pub-
lished a report on traditional courts and the judicial function of traditional leaders.496 Resulting 
from this project, the Law Reform Commission has proposed a draft bill on traditional courts. 
493 M Peters, Traditional Justice on Trial, Centre for Socio-Legal Studies, University of Natal.
494 Ingrid Palmary, Traditional Leaders in the eThekweni Metropolitan Region: Their Role in Crime Prevention and Safety Promotion, 
Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation and the Midlands Women’s Group,  September 2004, pp.47-48, available at 
http://www.csvr.org.za/papers/papalm7.htm.
495 Ibid., p.38.
496 The South African Law Reform Commission Report, Project 90: Traditional Courts and the Judicial Function of Traditional Leaders, 
January 2003.
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The draft Traditional Courts Bill seeks to provide uniformity in the manner in which custom-
ary courts are constituted and regulated on a national scale. Sections 5 and 6 of this bill state 
that traditional courts will have jurisdiction over both civil and criminal cases, with the excep-
tion of a range of cases, including treason, fraud, murder, culpable homicide, public violence, 
rape, robbery, assault and domestic violence. There is some controversy around the question of 
whether the incorporation of adversarial legal practice would undermine the value of the tradi-
tional system, through which matters are resolved expeditiously and often with the involvement 
of the affected community. The bill also makes provision for the participation of women. 
The draft Traditional Courts Bill also proposes that customary courts must keep written 
records of their proceedings, containing the particulars of the case and the judgment. Copies of 
these records, of the cases heard by each court, should be sent to the commissioner for custom-
ary courts for the province in which the court falls. Currently, the original record is sent or deliv-
ered by messenger to the magistrates’ court in whose area of jurisdiction the chief’s court falls. 
Under current regulations, the traditional leader or a person designated by him or her compiles 
the record. Where, due to illiteracy, the record cannot be made by the chief or someone under 
the chief, he or she may verbally furnish, either personally or by messenger, the particulars of 
the case heard by him to the clerk of the magistrates’ court. It is envisaged that under the new 
system, the customary courts will have a clerk who is literate and who can compile a record for 
the purposes of the act.497
It is envisaged that the draft Traditional Courts Bill of 2003 will supersede the Black 
Administration Act. The bill has not yet been passed, however, and until such time, the provi-
sions of the Black Administration Act remain in force. 
G.  Respect for court orders
Where a court has issued an order against a party to a civil case, and where the person intention-
ally refuses to comply with it, the person commits contempt of court, which is a common-law 
criminal offence. Contempt of court orders are regularly issued against private individuals. 
Although such contempt may be prosecuted, it is usually up to the party wishing to enforce 
the order to bring an application to court for the conviction of the defaulting party. A court may 
impose imprisonment as well as a ﬁne, though the sentence will almost always be suspended 
on condition that the defaulting party complies with the order in the manner prescribed by the 
court.498
The requirements for the issuing of an order for contempt of court, based on non-com-
pliance with a court order, were reiterated in the case of Townsend-Turner v Morrow.499 Firstly, 
an order had been granted against the respondent; secondly, the respondent had been served 
with the order or had been informed of the grounds of the order and could have no reasonable 
grounds for disbelieving the information; and thirdly, the respondent had either disobeyed or 
497 Ibid., pp.21-22.
498 Information obtained from LAWSA, Vol. 6, ﬁrst re-issue, chapter 202.
499 Townsend-Turner and Anther v Morrow 2004 (2) SA 32 (C).
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neglected to comply with such order. Once these requirements were met, the additional require-
ments of wilfulness and mala ﬁdes would be inferred, and the onus was then on the respondent 
to rebut those inferences.500 The standard of proof, in contempt-of-court proceedings arising out 
of non-compliance with a court order, is the balance of probabilities; the civil standard of proof.
When former president PW Botha refused to obey a subpoena issued by the Human Rights 
Violations Committee of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), he was charged with 
contempt of the Commission, ﬁned and given a suspended jail sentence of 12 months, in August 
1998. The Cape High Court overturned his conviction and sentence, however, on technical 
grounds.501 By that time, the statutory time-frame within which the TRC operated had come to 
an end, and no new proceedings were instituted against Botha.
H.   Ofﬁcial mechanisms to assert rights outside the  
court system
The Constitution makes provision in Chapter 9 for ‘state institutions supporting constitutional 
democracy’. These bodies, which are independent and accountable to Parliament, provide 
individuals with an alternative opportunity to seek redress in the case of a violation. Members 
of these bodies are appointed by the president on the recommendation of Parliament. These 
bodies fall into two broad categories, human rights and governance/anti-corruption. The key 
statutory bodies that engage with the public in asserting rights are the following: the SAHRC; 
the Commission for Gender Equality; the Commission for the Promotion and Protection of 
the Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities; and the public protector. In 
addition to these institutions, the Independent Complaints Directorate (ICD), mandated under 
the Interim Constitution of 1993 and now by the South African Police Service’s Act, has been 
discussed in Section 5.B, on Policing.
These institutions have an important role to play in ensuring that the rights of South 
Africans are protected and respected by government and non-state actors. However, concerns 
have been raised on the effectiveness of the multitude of institutions and overlapping mandates, 
within a restricted budget climate.502 For example, the area of work of the newly established 
Commission, designed to protect and promote the rights of linguistic, religious and cultural 
communities, can arguably be adequately undertaken by the SAHRC. Also, it could be argued 
that matters pertaining to the addressing of gender issues should be a directorate within the 
SAHRC, rather than a full commission.
500  At 49A/B—E.
501 Human Rights Watch, World Report 1999, New York; US Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, 
1999 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, available at http://www.nationbynation.com/SouthAfrica/Human.html.
502 Human Rights Watch, Protectors or Pretenders—Government Human Rights Commissions in Africa, New York, 2001, p. 306.
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The South African Human Rights Commission
The mandate of the South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) is outlined in Section 
184 of the South African Constitution. The key activities of the human rights institution are 
to investigate human rights violations; seek redress for victims of these violations; conduct 
research; and engage in public awareness and education on human rights. The SAHRC also 
has the important function to monitor ‘measures that have been taken towards the realisation’ 
of social and economic rights.503  
The powers and functions of the Human Rights Commission and the procedures for the 
appointments of the commissioners are contained in the Human Rights Commission Act.504 
These include:
• Developing and conducting information programmes to foster public understanding 
of this act [the Human Rights Commission Act], Chapter 3 of the Constitution [the 
Bill of Rights], and the role and activities of the Commission;
• Maintaining close liaison with institutions, bodies or authorities similar to the 
Commission, in order to foster common policies and practices and promote 
co-operation in relation to the handling of complaints in cases of overlapping 
jurisdictions; 
• Considering such recommendations, suggestions and requests concerning 
fundamental rights as it may receive from any source;
• Carrying out or causing to be carried out such studies concerning fundamental 
rights as may be referred to it by the president, and including in a report referred 
to in Section 118 of the Constitution [public access to and involvement in provincial 
legislatures] a report setting out the results of each study, together with the 
recommendations in relation thereto as it considers appropriate; and
• Bringing proceedings in a competent court or tribunal in its own name, or on behalf 
of a person or a group or class of persons.505     
The act also protects the Human Rights Commission from ‘interference, hindrance or obstruc-
tion’ from any organ of state, its members or employers, and similarly from any other person or 
group of persons.506
The president appoints members of the Commission, but they are nominated by a cross-
party parliamentary committee and approved by a 75 per cent majority in a plenary session of 
both houses of Parliament. The commissioners serve a seven-year term, subject to re-appoint-
ment. The SAHRC is made up of two sections: the Commission, which sets out policy, and a 
secretariat, which implements policy. Although law provides for up to 11 commissioners, the 
503 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996, (Act 108 of 1996), Section 184 (3).
504 The Human Rights Commission Act 54 of 1994, Section 7.
505 Ibid., Section 7 (1).
506 Ibid., Section 4 (2).
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SAHRC currently has ﬁve full-time commissioners, including the chair and one part-time com-
missioner.507 The secretariat currently has a staff of approximately 70. In order to manage its 
work, the SAHRC is divided into the following departments: advocacy; legal services; research 
and documentation; and ﬁnance and administration.508 
While the SAHRC is empowered to resolve cases in a court of law, it can also use mediation 
and conciliation in resolving cases.509 The SAHRC is granted the power to conduct a search and 
seizure operation, and issue subpoenas ordering parties to appear before it in the course of an 
enquiry. The SAHRC has intervened in important litigation as amicus curiae, such as in the case 
of Grootboom.510 
In an attempt to avoid a duplication of case management with other institutions, the 
SAHRC identiﬁes those matters that should be directed to other bodies. These include miscon-
duct by the police (ICD); misconduct by government ofﬁcials (public protector); labour matters 
(Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration); and discrimination based on sex 
(Commission for Gender Equality).
The SAHRC began its work in 1995 under the chair of Barney Pityana, who was succeeded 
in 2002 by Jody Kollapen. In its early years, the Commission participated, working with the 
DoJCD, in the formulation of a national action plan for the protection and promotion of human 
rights in South Africa.511  Since then, its work has largely been split into two components: the han-
dling of individual complaints of abuses of rights from members of the public, and the holding 
of inquiries and other broader-based work on the promotion and protection of human rights. In 
addition, the Commission is responsible for monitoring the implementation of the Promotion 
of Access to Information Act (see further, Section 2.A above).
In relation to individual complaints, the majority of the SAHRC’s work has been in response 
to issues of equality (discrimination); with other substantial categories being labour relations and 
issues surrounding arrest and detention.512 
In its work, beyond the handling of individual complaints, the Commission has empha-
sised the struggle against racial discrimination and has argued for the realisation of economic 
and social rights.  In 2001, the Commission held a national conference on racism, following 
507 The commissioners currently are: Jody Kollapen (chair), Zonke Majodina, Tom Manthata, Charlotte McClain Nhlapo; Leon 
Wessels and Kathy Govender (part time).  See http://www.sahrc.org.za/commissioners_and_ceo.htm for further information.
508 See http://www.sahrc.org.za/departments.htm.
509 The Human Rights Commission Act, Section 8.
510 Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC); See case-study on 
Grootboom, p.31.
511 The national action plan on human rights protection and promotion in South Africa emanates from the Vienna World 
Conference on Human Rights, under the auspices of the United Nations Ofﬁce of the High Commissioner on Human Rights 
in 1993. 
512 The South African Human Rights Commission, 6th Annual Report April 2001—31 March 2002 (the latest annual report 
available on the commission’s website). See also, the Human Rights Committee of South Africa, Access, Vol.2, No. 3, July 2000, 
pp.8-10. 
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controversial hearings and reports on racism in the media.513 In some cases, these investigations 
followed on from individual complaints: the SAHRC’s widely publicised involvement in a case of 
racism in a state school in Vryburg, for example, culminated in a study on racism and racial inte-
gration in public secondary schools.514  The Commission has also published a series of reports 
on economic and social rights, where it comments on national policy in the areas of education, 
housing, health, social welfare and so on. The reports comment systematically on national policy 
and legislation, outlining possible gaps and failings within them. 
In some areas, the Commission has been relatively cautious. In the case of health, for 
example, the Commission’s earlier reports on the subject of HIV/AIDS were limited to com-
ments on the operational plan for HIV/AIDS and the inclusion of HIV/AIDS rights issues in 
the Patients’ Rights Charter ; the mainstreaming of gender issues into all HIV/AIDS programme 
activities; the need to address awareness around acceptance, care and non-discrimination 
towards people living with HIV/AIDS; the drafting of codes for HIV in the workplace; ensuring 
ethical guidelines on HIV/AIDS research; drafting clinical guidelines on HIV/AIDS care; issues 
surrounding tuberculosis (TB); reduction of mother-to-child transmission of HIV; and infant 
feeding for HIV-positive mothers. The commission’s recommendations stated that: 
The threat of the HIV/AIDS epidemic can only be addressed by translating 
political commitment into strong national and provincial programmes, 
based on past successful best practices, utilising civil society to ensure a 
national effort against the epidemic. The high prevalence of HIV/AIDS 
in [the] KwaZulu-Natal and Mpumalanga [provinces] and the rapid rate of 
increase of HIV/AIDS in the Northern Province, needs to be prioritised as 
provinces that require urgent intervention. The prevalence of HIV/AIDS 
in the Western Cape needs to be reassessed. Consideration should be 
made of the usage of antiretroviral(s) to reduce mother-to -child transmis-
sion of HIV.515
The emphasis was therefore very much more on prevention and containment of HIV/AIDS, with 
a limited focus on treatment; this was more or less in line with government policy at the time. 
The SAHRC also convened a number of public hearings on human rights issues pertaining 
to farm workers, on commercial farms in South Africa, between 2002 and 2003. The hearings, 
which took place over a two-year period and brought together land-rights organisations, farm 
owners, managers and workers, community leaders and government ofﬁcials, were documented 
513 National Conference on Racism: Final Report, March 2001; Faultlines: Inquiry into Racism in the Media, August 2000; Racism, 
‘Racial Integration’ and Desegregation in South African Public Secondary Schools, March 1999; Inquiry into Racism in the SAPS 
Vryburg District, November 1999; Enquiry into Racism and Racial Discrimination in the Department of Justice and Constitutional 
Development, 2002; and Hate Crimes and Hate Speech, September 2003. All available at http://www.sahrc.org.za/sahrc_cms/
publish/cat_index_41.shtml. 
514 Racism, ‘Racial Integration’ and Desegregation in South African Public Secondary Schools, the South African Human Rights 
Commission, March 1999.
515 The South African Human Rights Commission, 2nd Economic and Social Rights Report, 1998-1999.
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in a report published in June 2004.516 The Commission also conducted a similar process sur-
rounding the issue of poverty in South Africa. The poverty hearings were conducted in associa-
tion with the South African Non-Governmental Organisation Coalition (SANGOCO) and the 
Commission for Gender Equality, between March and June 1998. The ﬁndings and recom-
mendations were incorporated into a two-volume report, On Poverty and Human Rights, that was 
published by SANGOCO in October 1998. The SAHRC co-operated with SANGOCO in drafting 
a national plan of action on poverty. Important in these public hearings was the opportunity for 
particular human rights concerns to be opened up for debate. 
The SAHRC’s broad mandate and potential overlap with other bodies requires that it pri-
oritise certain areas of work. Two concerns have been raised in regard to the SAHRC: namely 
that initially in the ﬁrst ﬁve years after its establishment, it lacked focus and as a result had little 
impact; and that the SAHRC does not receive adequate support from Parliament, which does not 
give due consideration to its annual reports.517 
The Commission for Gender Equality
The core constitutional mandate of the Commission for Gender Equality is to promote respect 
for gender equality and the protection, development and attainment of gender equality.518 In 
fulﬁlling its mandate, the Commission has the power to monitor, investigate, research, educate, 
lobby, advise and report on issues of gender equality.519 In terms of Section 11 of the Commission 
on Gender Equality Act,520 the Commission has the following powers and functions:
• Monitor and evaluate policies and practices [of state and non-state institutions] in 
order to promote gender equality;
• Develop, conduct or manage [information and educational programmes] to foster 
public understanding of matters pertaining to the promotion of gender equality and 
the role and activities of the Commission;
• Evaluate [legislation] in force at the time [of the] commencement of this act or any law 
proposed by Parliament or any other legislature after the commencement of the act, 
affecting or likely to affect gender equality or the status of women;
• Recommend to Parliament or any other legislature the adoption of new legislation 
which would promote gender equality and the [equal] status of women;
• Investigate any gender-related issues of its own accord or on receipt of a complaint;
• As far as is practicable, maintain close liaison[s] with institutions, bodies or authorities 
with similar objectives to the Commission, in order to foster common policies and 
516 The SAHRC, Final Report on the Inquiry into Human Rights Violations in Farming Communities, June 2004, available at http://
www.sahrc.org.za/5th_esr_land.pdf.
517 Human Rights Watch, Protectors or Pretenders—Government Human Rights Commissions in Africa, New York, 2001.
518 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996, Section 187 (1).
519 Ibid., Section 187 (2).
520 The Commission on Gender Equality Act, 1996 (Act 39 of 1996).
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practices and to promote co-operation in relation to the handling of complaints in 
cases of overlapping jurisdiction … ;
• Monitor compliance with international conventions, international covenants and 
international charters, acceded to or ratiﬁed by the republic [of South Africa], relating 
to the object of the Commission;
• Prepare and submit reports to Parliament pertaining to any such convention, 
covenant or charter relating to the object of the Commission; and
• Consider such recommendations, suggestions and requests concerning the 
promotion of gender equality as it may receive from any source.
Joyce Piliso Seroke heads the Commission, which comprises four full-time and four part-time 
members.521  Commissioners, who serve a ﬁve-year term, are assigned provinces and in some 
cases are physically based in the allocated province.  For example, the commissioner based in the 
Western Cape is responsible for that province. The commission’s senior management comprises 
ﬁve ofﬁcials under the leadership of the Chief Executive Ofﬁcer, Chana Majake. The Commission 
has 25 staff at its headquarters in Johannesburg. It has ﬁve provincial ofﬁces and they are located 
in the Eastern Cape, the Free State, KwaZulu-Natal, Limpopo and the Western Cape.
In addition to the enabling legislation and the constitutional provisions, a Code of Conduct 
guides the work of the Commission, including standards of professionalism, accountability and 
accessibility.522
The Commission for Gender Equality’s plan of action covers the following areas: gover-
nance; gender-based violence; gender and poverty; gender; tradition, culture, religion and sexual-
ity; and gender and HIV/AIDS.523  
The Commission on Gender Equality was allocated a budget of R 17.3 million for the period 
between 1 April 2003 and 31 March 2004, by the DoJCD.524 The annual report of the DoJCD 
stated that the Commission expended R19.2 million during that period. Donor funding covered 
the shortfall.   
Receiving complaints is an important component of the protective mandate of the 
Commission. The Commission received 942 complaints between 1 April 2003 and 31 March 
2004.525 According to the report of the DoJCD, 45 per cent of the cases handled were resolved, 
while 33 per cent were referred to other institutions and 22 per cent remain pending. A majority 
of these cases relate to domestic violence, sexual assault and sexual harassment. The Commission 
has also received complaints pertaining to succession and inheritance under African customary 
521 The commissioners in the Commission on Gender Equality are: B Khumalo (FT); G Fester (FT); N Siqwane Ndulo (FT); R 
Manjoo (PT); T Kgase (PT); T Maitse (PT); & T Dumisa (PT).
522 The Commission on Gender Equality, A Code of Conduct to Guide the Work of the Commission on Gender Equality, is available 
at http://www.cge.org.za/userﬁles/codeconduct.html. 
523 The Commission on Gender Equality, Annual Report 2002/03, p.4.
524 The DoJCD, Annual Report 2003/04, p.83.
525 Ibid., p.79.
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law, as well as others concerning custody and access.
In the course of conducting its investigations, the Commission has the power to demand 
any person to appear before it and to produce documents.526 Furthermore, the Commission has 
search and seizure powers.527 
Promotional work includes engaging with role players, such as provincial government 
departments and civil society groups, on gender-related issues through workshops, public hear-
ings and training.528  For example, according to the Commission’s 2002/03 annual report, it held 
a public meeting on gender-based violence and how sexual offences courts operate in Mdantsane, 
East London, on 16 April 2002.  The Commission is involved in a monitoring project to assess 
the ability of women to access social grants and employment opportunities, in the Public Works 
Department of the Eastern Cape.  The Commission has also engaged in the annual Sixteen Days 
of Activism on No Violence against Women and Children campaign, which involves holding 
workshops with civil society organisations and government ofﬁcials.529 
The public protector
The function of the public protector, as provided for in Section 182(1)(a) of the Constitution is, ‘to 
investigate any conduct in state affairs, or in the public administration in any sphere of govern-
ment, that is alleged or suspected to be improper, or to result in any impropriety or prejudice’.  In 
contrast to other bodies, the public protector is not only authorised to report on his ﬁndings, but 
also ‘to take appropriate remedial action’.530 The public protector may initiate investigations or do 
so upon request. The Public Protector Act531 regulates the ofﬁce of the public protector.
The ofﬁce is headed by Advocate Laurence Mushwana, who has been appointed for a seven-
year, non-renewable term, as provided for by Section 183 of the Constitution.  He follows Selby 
Baqwa, the inaugural public protector.  Parliament amended the Public Protector Act in order to 
make provision for a deputy public protector ;532 however this post has not been ﬁlled.  The ofﬁce 
has its headquarters in Pretoria, while each province has its own regional ofﬁce. Seventy-four 
junior and senior investigators comprise the staff complement.
The DoJCD allocated R 43 519 million towards the work of the ofﬁce, which spent R43 115 
million during the 2003/04 year.533 Between 1 April 2003 and 31 March 2004, the public protec-
tor, through its investigators, had ﬁnalised 192 cases at its national ofﬁce, 245 cases at its North 
West regional ofﬁce and 198 at its other regional ofﬁces.534 During this period, the ofﬁces of the 
526 The Commission on Gender Equality Act, 1996 (Act 39 of 1996), Section 12 (4) (a) and (b).
527 Ibid., Section 13.
528 The DoJCD, Annual Report 2003/04, pp.38-49.
529 Ibid., p.23.
530 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (Act 108 of 1996), Section 182 (1)(b) & (c).
531 The Public Protector Act, 1994 (Act 23 of 1994).
532 The Public Protector Amendment Act, 2003 (Act 22 of 2003).
533 The DoJCD, Annual Report 2003/04. 2005, p.85.
534 Ibid., p.81.
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public protector received 17 295 complaints and resolved 15 946 (this number includes pending 
cases from previous years).
Special reports are published following such investigations. In the ﬁrst ﬁve years of its 
work, some of the reports published by the public protector include an investigation on the 
Mpumalanga housing project (Report 8); a public statement by the premier of Mpumalanga, 
Ndaweni Mahlangu (Report 12); and alleged irregularities with regard to the affairs and ﬁnancial 
statements of the Strategic Fuels Fund Association (Report 13).535 The Mpumalanga legislature 
rejected the public protector’s recommendation, arguing that the public protector had acted 
beyond his powers in investigating the matter536 (initial matter in the list above).
The current Public Protector, Lawrence Mushwana, was formerly an MP for the ANC. As 
such, he has encountered charges from opposition parties that his political allegiance would 
compromise his independence. He has been criticised by opposition parties and the media in 
two cases in particular : his ﬁnding that the NDPP had infringed the Deputy President’s dignity 
by stating that there was a prima facie case against him, but not prosecuting the charges; and 
his report on allegations that a private oil company illegally diverted public funds received 
from the state oil company to the ANC. The Mail & Guardian declared its intention to ask the 
Johannesburg High Court to review the public protector’s ﬁndings in relation to the ‘oilgate’ 
scandal, under the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act.537
The Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of 
Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities
The constitutional mandate of this Commission, which is the last Chapter 9 institution to be 
established, is contained in Section 185(1) of the Constitution and states that the Commission 
shall:
• Promote respect for the rights of cultural, religious and linguistic communities;
• Promote and develop peace, friendship, humanity, tolerance and national unity 
among cultural, religious and linguistic communities, on the basis of equality, non-
discrimination and free association; and 
• Recommend the establishment or recognition, in accordance with national legislation, 
of a cultural community or communities in South Africa.
The Constitution requires that the members of the Commission are broadly representative of the 
main cultural, religious and linguistic communities, and reﬂect the gender composition in South 
Africa.538 The president appointed the 17-member body, to be chaired by Dr Guma in September 
535 The Human Rights Committee of South Africa, ‘National Institutions Project’, in Access, Volume 2, Quarterly 2, April 2000, 
p.13. 
536 Ibid., p.14.
537 Case study on the Schabir Shaik and Jacob Zuma prosecutions, p.34; ‘M&G vs Mushwana’, Mail & Guardian, 4 August 2005, 
available, with other reports on the issue, at http://www.mg.co.za/specialreport.aspx?area=oilgate. 
538 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (Act 108 of 1996), Section 186 (2).
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2003, in accordance with the Commission for the Promotion of the Rights of Cultural, Religious 
and Linguistic Communities Act.539
The Commission, which became operational on 1 January 2004, has eight staff members, 
including the chief executive ofﬁcer.  The chief executive ofﬁcer of the Commission is Ms Pumla 
Madiba, who is responsible for its day-to-day management. The Commission was due to adver-
tise posts for six additional staff members in mid-2005.540 Since the Commission began its work, 
it has received some 20 complaints. 
I.  Non-state mechanisms and alternative dispute resolution
In addition to the formal court system, commercial arbitration and mediation are used widely in 
the business sector, although the legislative framework providing for domestic and international 
arbitration is outdated. The DoJCD has demonstrated support for alternative dispute resolution, 
through a South African Law Reform Commission project541 that recommends updating the 
existing legislation of Domestic Arbitration.542 The Law Reform Commission also recommended 
the [drafting of the] International Arbitration Bill in July 1998. To date, however, no legislation 
has been passed comprehensively overhauling domestic arbitration or international arbitration. 
Arbitration proceedings are subject to judicial review in the high court only, unless the arbitration 
agreement provides for an appeal mechanism.  There are several quasi-state institutions support-
ing mediation and arbitration. The Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration is 
the forum responsible for settling labour disputes in terms of the Labour Relations Act.543  
The SAHRC and the Commission for Gender Equality are also empowered to settle human 
rights disputes, using alternative dispute-resolution mechanisms.  
Among poorer communities, street committees play a large role in South African urban life, 
which is a remnant of the apartheid policy of providing limited, or no, justice and police services 
in urban townships. There is a concern that non-state mechanisms of dispute resolution, such 
as street committees, are turning into vigilante movements, but they do provide affordable and 
accessible recourse for the majority of South Africans who cannot afford formal legal services or 
are alienated by the formal legal process.544
 
539 The Commission for the Promotion of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities Act, 2002 (Act 19 of 2002); 
Members of the Commission are: Dr Guma, Ms Bethlehem, Mr B Mgcina, Dr O Mnende, Dr M Jobson, Pastor M Ntlha, Ms 
Soni Amin, Prof. S Dangor, Dr M Dockrat, Dr T Magwaza, Prof. S Ngubane, Dr L Boshego, Ms D Mboweni-Marais, Ms Le Roux, 
Mr H Gouvalis, Dr W A Boesak & Dr Langeveldt.
540 E-mail communication with the chief executive ofﬁcer, 29 March 2005.
541 The South African Law Reform Commission Report, Project 94: Domestic Arbitration, May 2001.
542 Arbitration is currently governed by the Arbitration Act, 1965 (Act 42 of 1965).
543 Labour Relations Act, 1995 (Act 66 of 1995).
544 See also Section 5.F on ‘Non-state action against crime’, p.104.
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Development assistance
Every government department, including the Department of Justice and Constitutional 
Development (DoJCD), publishes an annual report, which includes ﬁgures for assistance 
received. In South Africa, development assistance plays a relatively minor role in the budget.
The DoJCD records in its annual statement for 2003/4 that it received a total of R20 986 000 
in local and foreign-aid assistance as revenue. This contrasts sharply with the ﬁgures recorded for 
the year 2002/03 of R166 992 000,545 as well as for 2001/02 of R4 845 000.546 The department’s 
annual report records the receipt of donor funding in two particular instances—ﬁrstly in relation 
to the Justice College, where funding has been received from a variety of international govern-
ment agencies,547 and secondly in relation to the Commission on Gender Equality.548
Financial assistance is given to civil society organisations as well as the government sector. 
The non-governmental sector is regulated by the Nonproﬁt Organisations Act,549 which has as its 
stated object the encouragement and support of ‘non-proﬁt organisations in their contribution to 
545 The DoJCD, Annual Report 2003/04, see Income Statement.
546 The DoJCD, Annual Report 2002/03, see Income Statement.
547 The DoJCD Annual Report 2003/4 pp. 34-35; namely, the restructuring of the Judiciary Project funded by the French Embassy; 
the Training of Interpreters (tutor programme) funded by the government of the Kingdom of Denmark; the Fast-Track Training for 
Civil Magistrates funded by the government of the Kingdom of Denmark; the Canada-South Africa Justice Linkage Project; and 
the Criminal Justice Strengthening Programme funded by USAid.
548 Ibid., p.79.
549 Non-Proﬁt Organisations Act, 1997 (Act 71 of 1997).
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meeting the diverse needs of  South Africans’.550 The act establishes the Directorate for Non-Proﬁt 
Organisations,551 which among other functions, is obliged to prepare and issue codes of good 
practice for non-proﬁt organisations, and persons, bodies and organisations making donations 
and grants to non-proﬁt organisations.552 This requirement applies whether a non-proﬁt organi-
sation is registered in terms of the act or not. A non-proﬁt organisation is deﬁned by the act as 
being an organisation that is established for a public purpose and ‘the income and property of 
which are not distributable to its members or ofﬁce-bearers, except as reasonable compensation 
for services rendered’.553 Registration in a registry of non-proﬁt organisations is voluntary,554 but 
the act authorises the minister to prescribe beneﬁts or allowances to apply to registered organisa-
tions.555 No such regulations have been passed to date.
Donor agencies hire employees and engage consultants from the private pool of labour that 
is available in South Africa, and this does not affect the working of government departments.
In general, development assistance has been provided for human rights objectives both 
within government and to civil society organisations, including human rights training for the 
police and others. South Africa has many organisations supported by development assistance 
from government and non-governmental sources, whose focus lies in the area of human 
rights.
550 Ibid., Section 2: Objects of Act
The objects of this act are to encourage and support non-proﬁt organisations in their contribution to meeting the diverse needs 
of the population of the republic by
 (a) Creating an environment in which non-proﬁt organisations can ﬂourish; 
 (b)  Establishing an administrative and regulatory framework within which non-proﬁt organisations can conduct their 
affairs; 
 (c)  Encouraging non-proﬁt organisations to maintain adequate standards of governance, transparency and accountability 
and to improve these standards; 
 (d)  Creating an environment within which the public may have access to information concerning registered non-proﬁt 
organisations; and
 (e)  Promoting a spirit of co-operation and shared responsibility within government, donors and amongst other interested 
persons in their dealings with non-proﬁt organisations.
551 Ibid., Section 4.
552 Ibid., Section 6(1)(b).
553 Ibid., Section 1.
554 Ibid., Section 12.
555 Ibid., Section 11.
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Annex A: Human rights treaties 
List of human rights treaties supplied by the Ofﬁce of the Chief State Law Adviser (international 
law), Department of Foreign Affairs, March 2005: 
The Republic of South Africa is party to the below Conventions, that have been ratiﬁed/
acceded/adhered to, or by deﬁnitive signature:
• Convention for the Suppression of Trafﬁc in Women and Children, Geneva, 1921
– Signed (deﬁnitive) on  28 June 1922
• Slavery Convention, Geneva, 1926
– Acceded on 18 June 1927          
• Convention for the Suppression of Trafﬁc in Women of Full Age, Geneva, 1933
– Signed (deﬁnitive) on 20 November 1935
• Protocol to amend the Convention for the Suppression of Trafﬁc in Women and 
Children of  1921 and the Convention for the Trafﬁc of Women of  Full Age of 1933, 
Lake Success, 1947
– Signed (deﬁnitive) on 12 November 1947
• Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1948
– Acceded on 10 December 1998
• Geneva Conventions I to IV, 1949
–  Acceded on 31 March 1952
• International Agreement for the Suppression of White Slave Trafﬁc (1904), amended 
by Protocol, 1949
– Accepted on 14 August 1951
• International Convention for the Suppression of White Slave Trafﬁc (1910), amended 
by Protocol, Lake Success 1949
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– Accepted on 14 August 1951
• The Convention for the Suppression of Trafﬁc in Persons and of the Exploitation of 
the Prostitution of Others, plus Final Protocol, Lake Success, New York, 1950
– Ratiﬁed on 10 October 1951
• Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 1951
– Acceded on 12 January 1996
• Convention Against Discrimination in Education, 1960
– Acceded on 9 March 2000 
• Protocol amending the Slavery Convention of 1926, New York 1957
– Signed (deﬁnitive) on 29 December 1953
• Convention on the Nationality of Married Women, 1957
– Signed on 29 January 1993; acceded on 17 December 2002
• Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of 
Marriages, 1962
– Acceded on 29 January 1993
• International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 
New York, 1966
– Signed on 3 October 1994; ratiﬁed on 10 December 1998
 Declaration:
 The Republic of South Africa—
 (a)  declares that, for the purposes of paragraph 1 of article 14 of the  Convention, 
it recognises the competence of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination to receive and consider communications from individuals or 
groups of individuals, within the republic’s jurisdiction, claiming to be victims 
of a violation by the republic in any of the rights set forth in the Convention, 
after having exhausted all domestic remedies; and
 (b)  indicates that, for the purposes of paragraph 2 of article 14 of the Convention, 
the South African Human Rights Commission is the body within the repub-
lic’s national legal order, which shall be competent to receive and consider 
petitions from individuals, or groups of individuals within the republic’s 
jurisdiction, who claim to be victims of any of the rights set forth in the 
Convention.
1 3 6    S O U T H A F R I C A : J U S T I C E S E C T O R A N D T H E R U L E O F L A W
• International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966
– Signed on 3 October 1994; ratiﬁed on 10 December 1998
 Declaration: 
 The Republic of South Africa declares that it recognises, for the purposes of article 
41 of the covenant, the competence of the Human Rights Commission to receive 
and consider communications to the effect that a state party claims that another 
state party is not fulﬁlling its obligations under the present covenant. 
• Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966
– Signed on 3 October 1994; ratiﬁed on 10 December 1998 
• Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, 1967
– Acceded on 12 January 1996
• OAU Convention Governing Speciﬁc Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, 1969
– Acceded on 15 December 1995
• Protocols I and II to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International and Non-International Armed Conﬂicts, 1977
– Acceded on 21 November 1995                
• Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 1979
– Signed on 29 January 1993; ratiﬁed on 15 December 1995 
• Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, 1980
– Acceded on 8 July 1997
• The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Banjul, June 1981  
– Adhered on 9 July 1996
• Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, 1984
– Signed on 29 January 1993; ratiﬁed on 10 December 1998
 Declarations: 
 The Republic of South Africa declares that:
 it recognises, for the purpose of article 30 of the convention, the competence of the 
International Court of Justice to settle a dispute between two or more state parties, 
regarding the interpretation or application on the convention, respectively; and
 it recognises, for the purpose of article 21 of the convention, the competence of 
the Committee Against Torture to receive and consider communications that a 
state party claims that another state party is not fulﬁlling its obligations under the 
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convention; and
 it recognises, for the purpose of article 22 of the convention, the competence of the 
Committee Against Torture to receive and consider communications from, or on 
behalf of, individuals who claim to be victims of torture by a state party.
• Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989
– Signed on 29 January 1993; and ratiﬁed on 16 June 1995
• Amendment to article 43 (2) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1995
– Accepted on 5 August 1997 
• African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, July 1990 
– Signed on 10 October 1997; ratiﬁed on 7 January 2000
• Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, on the establishment 
of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 1998
– Signed on 10 June 1998; ratiﬁed on 3 July 2002
• Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, on the Rights of 
Women in Africa, 2003
– Signed on 16 March 2004; ratiﬁed on 17 December 2004
• Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of 
Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, 2000 
– Acceded on 30 June 2003
• Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafﬁcking in Persons, especially Women 
and Children, supplementing the UN Convention against Transnational Organised 
Crime, 2000
– Signed on 14 December 2000; ratiﬁed on 20 February 2004
• Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the 
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime, 2000  
– Signed on 14 December 2000; ratiﬁed on 20 February 2004
• Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafﬁcking in Firearm(s) Parts, 
Components and Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention 
against Transnational Organised Crime, 2001  
– Signed on 14 October 2002; ratiﬁed on 20 February 2004                               
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In addition, South Africa has signed the following treaties:
• Convention on the Political Rights of Women, 1953     
– Signed on 29 January 1993
• International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966
– Signed on 3 October 1994
• Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, on the involvement of 
children in armed conﬂict, 2000
– Signed on 8 February 2002
S O U T H  A F R I C A :  J U S T I C E  S E C T O R  A N D  T H E  R U L E  O F  L AW     1 3 9
Annex B: Notable laws affecting the 
justice system
Important South African laws affecting the justice system, passed since 1994.556
• The Judicial Service Commission Act 9 of 1994.
• The Public Protector Act 23 of 1994.
• The Human Rights Commission Act 54 of 1994.
• The Constitutional Court Complementary Act 13 of 1995.
• The Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995.
• The Right of Appearance in Courts Act 62 of 1995.
• The Judicial Matters Amendment Act 85 of 1995.
• The Justice Laws’ Rationalisation Act 18 of 1996.
• The National Youth Commission Act 19 of 1996.
• The Commission on Gender Equality Act 39 of 1996.
• The Electoral Commission Act 51 of 1996.
• The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction Act 72 
of 1996.
• The Special Investigating Units and Special Tribunals Act 74 of 1996.
• The International Co-operation in Criminal Matters Act 75 of 1996.
• The Criminal Procedure Amendment Act 86 of 1996.
• The State of Emergency Act 64 of 1997.
• The Contingency Fees Act 66 of 1997.
• The Natural Fathers of Children Born out of Wedlock Act 86 of 1997.
• The Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997.
• The National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998.
• The Magistrates’ Courts Amendment Act 67 of 1998.
• The Maintenance Act 99 of 1998.
• The Witness Protection Act 112 of 1998.
556 The Department of Justice and Constitutional Development, laws administered by the DoJCD. Available at www.doj.gov.
za/2004dojsite/legislation/acts/act_admin/acad90.htm, accessed on 20 July 2005.
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• The Debt Collectors Act 114 of 1998.
• The Domestic Violence Act 116 of 1998.
• The Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998.
• The Prevention of Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998.
• The Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000.
• The Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000.
• The Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000.
• The Protected Disclosures Act 26 of 2000.
• The Cross-Border Insolvency Act 42 of 2000.
• The Supreme Court Decree Amendment Act 16 of 2001.
• The Administration of Estates Laws Interim Rationalisation Act 20 of 2001.
• The Interim Rationalisation of Jurisdiction of High Courts Act 41 of 2001.
• The Judges Remuneration and Conditions of Employment Act 47 of 2001.
• The Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Act 27 
of 2002.
• The Reinstatement of Enrolment of Certain Deceased Legal Practitioners Act 32 of 
2002.
• The Institution of Legal Proceedings Against Certain Organs of State Act 40 of 2002.
• The Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of 
Communication-related Information Act 70 of 2002.
• The Judicial Ofﬁcers Act 28 of 2003.
• The Judicial Matters Second Amendment Act 55 of 2003.
• The Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 12 of 2004.
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Annex C: Court structure
Table of relevant laws applying to each court, supplied by the Department of Justice and 
Constitutional Development:557
A. Constitutional framework
In terms of Section 166 of the Constitution, the courts are:
• The Constitutional Court; 
• The Supreme Court of Appeal; 
• The high courts, including any high court of appeal established by an act of 
Parliament to hear appeals from high courts; 
• The magistrates’ courts; and 
• Any other court established or recognised by an act of Parliament, including any court 
with a status similar to either the high courts or the magistrates’ courts. 
B. Existing courts
B.1 Superior courts 
Court Origin Related legislation
Constitutional Court Section 167 read with item 
16(2) of Schedule 6 of the 
Constitution
Constitutional Court 
Complementary Act 13 
of 1995
Supreme Court of Appeal Section 168 read with item 
16(3) of Schedule 6 of the 
Constitution
Supreme Court Act 59
of 1959
High courts Section 166(c) read with item 
16(4) of Schedule 6 of the 
Constitution
Supreme Court Act 59
of 1959
557 See the DoJCD website, available at http://www.doj.gov.za/2004dojsite/ab_dojcd/2001_courtstructures.htm, for further infor-
mation. Last accessed on 19 Septembert 2005. 
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Labour appeal court Section 167 of the Labour 
Relations Act 66 of 1995
Section 166(c) and (e) read 
with item 16(1) of Schedule 6 
of the Constitution
Labour court Section 151 of the Labour 
Relations Act 66 of 1995
Section 166(c) read with item 
16(1) of Schedule 6 of the 
Constitution
Land claims court Section 22 of the Restitution of 
Land Rights Act 22 of 1994
Section 166(c) read with item 
16(1) of Schedule 6 of the 
Constitution
Special income tax courts Section 83 of the Income Tax 
Act 58 of 1962
Section 166(c) read with item 
16(1) of Schedule 6 of the 
Constitution
Competition appeal court Section 36 of the Competition 
Act 89 of 1998
Section 166(c) of 
the Constitution
Special (consumer) courts Section 13 of the Consumer 
Affairs (Unfair Business 
Practices) Act 71 of 1988
Sections 84, 85 and 86A of 
the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 
(mutatis mutandis applicable)
Electoral court Section 18 of the Electoral 
Commission Act 51 of 1996
Section 166(c) read with 
item 16(1) of Schedule 6 of 
the Constitution
B.2 Lower Courts 
Court Origin Related legislation
Magistrates’ courts Magistrates’ Courts Act 32 of 
1944
Item 16(2) of Schedule 6 of 
the Constitution
Divorce courts Section 10 of the 
Administration Amendment 
Act 9 of 1929
•  Item 16(2) of Schedule 6 of 
the Constitution 
•  Divorce Courts Amendment 
Act 65 of 1997 (especially the 
Preamble) 
Small claims courts Small Claims Courts Act 61 of 
1984
Item 16(2) of Schedule 6 of 
the Constitution
Courts of chiefs and headmen Sections 12 and 20 of the Black 
Administration Act 38 of 1927
Item 16(2) of Schedule 6 of 
the Constitution
Short process courts 
(No such courts are presently 
in existence)
Short Process Courts and 
Mediation in Certain Civil 
Cases Act 103 of 1991
Item 16(2) of Schedule 6 of 
the Constitution
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C. Jurisdiction of existing courts
C.1 Superior courts 
Court Jurisdiction
Constitutional Court • Section 167(3) to (5) of the Constitution—the highest court in 
all constitutional matters 
• Section 173 of the Constitution—with the inherent power to 
regulate process and to develop common law 
Supreme Court of Appeal • Section 168(3) of the Constitution—the highest court of appeal 
in all except constitutional matters 
• Section 173 of the Constitution—with the inherent power to 
regulate process and to develop common law 
High courts • Section 169(a) of the Constitution—any constitutional matter 
not falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Constitutional 
Court or assigned to another court of a status similar to a high 
court 
• Section 169(b) of the Constitution—any other matter not 
assigned to another court by an act of Parliament 
• Section 173 of the Constitution—inherent power to regulate 
process and to develop common law 
• Section 19 of the Supreme Court Act 59 of 1959—general 
jurisdiction, including determination of appeals from, and 
review of, the proceedings of inferior courts 
Labour appeal court • Section 173 of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995—exclusive 
jurisdiction to determine appeals from the labour court, and to 
decide questions of law in terms of section 158(4) of the act 
• Section 173 of the Constitution—inherent power to regulate 
process and to develop common law 
Labour court • Section 157(1) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995—
exclusive jurisdiction in respect of all matters which must, in 
terms of the act or any other law, be determined by the labour 
court 
• Section 157(2) of the Labour Relations Act—concurrent 
jurisdiction with the high courts in respect of violations of 
fundamental rights related to labour matters 
• Section 173 of the Constitution—inherent power to regulate 
process and to develop common law 
Land claims court • Section 22 of Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994—
exclusive jurisdiction to determine matters emanating from the 
application of the act 
• Section 173 of the Constitution—inherent power to regulate 
process and to develop common law 
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Special income tax courts • Section 83 of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962—hearing of 
income tax appeals 
Competition appeal court • Section 37 of the Competition Act 89 of 1998—to consider 
appeals from, or review decisions of, the Competition Tribunal 
• Section 173 of the Constitution—inherent power to regulate 
process and to develop common law 
Special (consumer) court • Section 13(1) of the Consumer Affairs (Unfair Business 
Practices) Act 71 of 1988—adjudication of matters in terms of 
the Act
Electoral court • Section 20 of the Electoral Commission Act 51 of 1996. The 
Court: 
• May review any decision of the Electoral Commission relating 
to an electoral matter; 
• May hear and determine appeals against any decision of the 
Commission; 
• Must determine which courts shall have jurisdiction to hear 
particular disputes and complaints about infringements of the 
Electoral Code of Conduct; 
• May hear and determine any matter relating to the 
interpretation of any law referred to it by the Commission; and 
• May investigate any allegation of misconduct, incapacity or 
incompetence of a member of the Commission. 
C.2 Lower courts 
Court Jurisdiction
Magistrates’ courts 1. Civil jurisdiction:
• Section 45 of Magistrates’ Courts Act 32 of 1944—jurisdiction 
by consent if the matter would otherwise fall outside their 
jurisdiction; and
• Section 46 of Magistrates’ Courts Act—matters beyond their 
jurisdiction.
2. Criminal jurisdiction—Section 89 of Magistrates’ Courts Act:
• Regional courts have jurisdiction in all matters except treason; 
and
• District courts have jurisdiction in all matters except treason, 
murder and rape.
3. Penal jurisdiction—Section 92 of Magistrates’ Courts Act:
• Regional courts—imprisonment not exceeding 15 years, ﬁne 
not exceeding R300 000 (amount determined by notice in the 
Gazette); and
• District courts— imprisonment not exceeding three years, ﬁne 
not exceeding R60 000 (amount determined by notice in the 
Gazette).
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 4. Other jurisdiction as determined by various acts of 
Parliament, notably the following:
• Section 12(4) of the Black Administration Act 38 of 1927—
hearing of (civil) appeals against decisions by chiefs and 
headmen;
• Section 3 of the Maintenance Act 99 of 1998—every 
magistrate’s court is a maintenance court for the purposes of 
that act;
• Section 6 of the Inquests Act 58 of 1959—holding of inquests 
by magistrates or regional magistrates;
• Section 7 of the Close Corporations Act 69 of 1984—
adjudication of matters emanating from the act, including 
liquidation of Close Corporations;
• Section 1 of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 
2000—review of administrative actions;
• Sections 1 and 78 of the Promotion of Access to Information 
Act 2 of 2000—applications regarding decisions not to 
disclose information;
• Sections 1 and 16 of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention 
of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000—every magistrate’s 
court is an equality court; and
• Section 4(2) of the Children’s Act 33 of 1960—every 
magistrate’s court is a children’s court.
Divorce courts Section 10(1) of the Administration Amendment Act 9 of 1929—
divorce matters
Small claims courts Sections 15 (causes of action) and 16 (matters beyond 
jurisdiction) of the Small Claims Courts Act 61 of 1984
Courts of chiefs and headmen • Section 12 of the Black Administration Act 38 of 1927—civil 
disputes 
• Section 20 of the Black Administration Act—certain offences 
Short process courts Section 9 of the Short Process Courts and Mediation in Certain 
Civil Matters Act 103 of 1991—the adjudication of disputes which 
could not be resolved through mediation in terms of 
the act
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Annex D: Sources on management 
of the justice sector
In answering the questions set out relating to Section 3, ‘Management of the justice sector’, the 
following sources have been used:
• Justice Vision 2000, at the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development 
site, available at http://www.doj.gov.za/.
• Government Batho Pele Policy Statement. 
• The Charter for Service Delivery for Court Users 1999, at the Department of Justice 
and Constitutional Development site, available at http://www.doj.gov.za/.
• Gender Policy Statement 1999—Balancing the Scales of Justice through Gender 
Equality, at the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development site, available 
at http://www.doj.gov.za/.
• The Annual General Report of the Department of Justice and Constitutional 
Development 2003/4.
• The South African Year Book, Government Communication and Information 
Systems (GCIS), available at http://www.gcis.gov.za. 
• Stack & Soggot, Enhancing Policy Implementation—Lessons from the Justice Sector, 
Centre for Policy Studies, Johannesburg, October 2001.
• Chaskalson & de Jong Consulting—Family Courts Policy Document, December 
2002.
• C Rickard, The South African Judicial Service Commission, available at www.law.cam.
ac.uk/docs/view.php?doc=879.
• Government Communication and Information Services, available at http://www.gcis.
gov.za.  
• The South African government site, available at http://www.gov.za/.
• The South African government site—Justice section, available at http://www.info.gov.
za/structure/justice.htm.
• The polity site for government information, including acts and bills, available at  
http://www.polity.org.za/pol/home/.
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• The Department of Justice and Constitutional Development, available at http://www.
doj.gov.za/.  
• The Constitutional Court, available at http://www.concourt.gov.za/.
• The Supreme Court of Appeal, available at http://wwwserver.law.wits.ac.za/sca/index.
php.
• The South African Treasury, available at www.treasury.gov.za.
Where additional sources were used, this is indicated in the text.
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